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a:'iai:e •. These and other. exaiiiPles. lntelliieuce
. exl)erts say attest to tbe'Skill of the prind·
bloc" mvtslon~Eile ln~gellee~c;:fals pal.Soviet ~y semce, ,the KGB.•~ys Mr.
U}'. 'Tbe j!X}Stence 1)f such a nde·w_as men· Helms; the former CIA director: You can
t:lbnedb
. r.seural Sovietdetec~lirtmves·. say what you like about the Russians: .that
their .agricultural system doesn't wof.!t or
~'~7Ms'~'~~~~ that they're too bureaucratic. But there s no
SUspec:tl:ft' :&:~~. .t ~- country in .the.'v orld that unde,r.stands intelli·
renee ·t>etter.:''The KGB is a ilamned good
1950s .ani! .mo ;helped ~ JJ$iples- who rganization·: ' ·•
0
vlere
Soviet
The KGB'S recent ·success
lead
was~Jater:;,botographed•entenng the SOViet some u.S. intelligence people to wonder
embaisy·1lere~;Bait h.e -was·never formally whether the CIA and the FBI are equal to
$fged··by ·t,be ....U.S., -'8Ild be. JIOW. lives in
,.,,
m
rm::;:;=n.•
•
virginia as ~ :A~erican .citizen. • ,
.
the challenge .. B~th u.s: agenc1es have been
'-sovtelf.9ies · i'bave ·;<recen.t~Y.!;C>btained battered "Qy pubhc critici~ i.p the last se~·
ilf'ltbe.
precious u.s.~-in· era1 years for past misdeeds,- ~ moraie-;c}udlnt"11.etalls· about America'~thods of esptcially . at the CIA-:is saggmg. Whats
verHying .Sovlet compliance with the strate- more, many intelllgence offic~als fear that
gtc arms-limiiatlon treaty-by ~~gdisaf· the 'public 's aversi()n tQ the agencies' use of
fecten yowig .Americans. ~ ye~~ a~ dirty tricks and secret-snOOJ?ing could lead
man '.who bad .;worked briefly .~ ··the CIA Congress to enact a'·new:teg~slatlve charter
was c:Onvicted for ·selling 'the, ~ans a for u .s. Intelligence that would place exces·
manUal describing a top·secreru.-s: spy-sat· sively severe limits on -~I and CIA ac_~vientte system, · known· as the·!KH-ll. _And in ties. (Such counterintelligence legislation
1977, a former ~ploye of TRW- Inc. was would supplement the FB~'s .new charte~.)
convicted for selling 1he Russi~ ·~·
These officials maintain that suc:h criti·
tion about clasSified TRW .proJects; mtelli· cized methods as wiretaps and mali open·
gence -officials .'f ear he may ·ha:l'e ~ealed ings may be necessary to crack certain spy
u.s. :.systems 1fo~ monitoring -~ rnisslle ·operations. They cite as an example what the
developm~t. !:: ;~ •
·,,_:"'.;_ >
FBI believes is a KGB network ~ so-call~ .
• ·:...ciA !)perations within the ·SOvletUnion illegal agents ~at may be operating within
in ·recent years have been ..hamstrung by the u.S., handlmg such sensitive inte~gence
blowp covers ;and .by SoViet deception. In chores as recruiting informers to work in·
July -1977, the~Russians grabbed .a CIA offi· side u.s. defense con~actors. Unlike
cer· .named 'Martha : Peterson as she was "legar· KGB officers, who typi~y are in
planting :a ~a~he -of equipmen~ for . ~ ·~ the UA$. . under Soviet ~plomatic ..cover'·.
agent in Moscow. Several prormnent.mtelli· these ~·megal" agents usually hold passpof1S
gence exper!s·~onder whether the Russi~ from various countries.
,
were tipped off ·about Miss Peterson's nus·
Critics of the FBI contend that the
sion by a mole within the CIA. These _former agency didn't have much luck combating
intelligence officials also, believe that during such "illegals" even when it could bug of·
1975 ud. l976, 'the CIA_was duped into re- fices and open mall of Suspects.
cruiting -as an .agent a sup~:-dissident
The spy war is further complicated by
Soviet doctor, .1l~ed Sanya Lipavsky, who what .former .intelligence officers <:9ntend is
was ac~ally under Sovietcontro1. ·
.
a attem of Soviet "disinformation" -Soviet.spies have infil~ted the ~ruted pla!ted by the KGB to confuse and demoral· .
Nation~ Secre~at, accordirig ·to Sovtet de- ize u.s. intelligence. The CIA. of course,
fector- Arkady N. ·Shevchen1ro. Mr. . Shev· tries ·similar ploys with some success. A
chenko, who was a prominent Soviet diplo- CIA official even ~ted. years ago, of the
mat at the UN until he defected last year,
ency's ability to plant stories around the
told a British interviewer recently that the. :rld and play the press .like -'a "mighty
UN has become "the most im~t base of Wurlitzer."
.
all Soviet intelligence operations in the
Soviet deception, however, tends to be
world." He contends, for example, that a So- more subtle; and for the CIA. it can create
viet special assistant to UN Secretary·Gen· a kind of paranoia, in which ·every event
eral Kurt Waldheim is a Soviet mole and seems part of a larger, sinister puzzle.
that the chief of personnel at · th~ UN's of· ·
Take the · case of the Soviet mole Sasha.
fices in Geneva is also a "high·level" Soviet For nearly 2o..years. the mail suspected of
intelligence ·officer.
· spying for the Russians under this name has
The Russians also may have placed ~
been living in a Virginia suburb of Washing·
agent within the Federal Bureau of Investi·
ton, quietly managing a small business with
gation, according to the late William ~i·
his wife . By his own account, he ~as one of
van, who served for many years as chief of
the CIA's "best .men in operati~ns while he
was a contract agent, handling _some of the
FBI counterintelligence. In a :ecently put:
lished book written before he died, Mr. S~agency's most sensitive spy missions from
van said that when he left the bureau m
his base in west Berlin. ·
1971, he was convinced that a "Russian spy"
was this man actually a Soviet agent? He
in the FBI's New York office hat;! blo~ the
denies the allegation. And the FBI, ·despite
months of interrogation, has never been able
cover of a major FBI countenntelligence
operation.
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By DAVID IGN~Titts · . ·
sta/JHeportero/THEWALi:.STREF.TJorRNAL

~

WASHINGTON-The centralln~lllgence
Agency's station chief in· Katmandu. Nepal,
some years ago liked to invite- his local
counterpart in Soviet ·mllitaey intelligence
.
-::,
over to the .house for dinner.
It wasn't idle socializing. ~e CIA officer
was trying to recruit th~ Sovtet:qffidal to
spy for the U.S. The Russian, a military offi·
cer named Pecherov, ·happily_accepted the
invitation~. F~r Mr. P,echerov was also
trying to recru1t the CIA s man. In the end.
the Katmandu affair "proved to be a stalemate.
:. ·.. ·
~ . · · , ' ·-. .
Every day, arollD:d the world, such esp1onage games are bemg played out between
u.s. and Soviet intelligence services. These
spying operations 1:an _become crucial when
a U.S.·Soviet crisis anses, such as the cur·
rent commotion over Soviet-troops in CUba.But even when rela~ons are ~ bo~
sides are quietly wor~g to place !f!oles,
penetration agents, Within the opposmg
service~ and to pry loose the other sides
most vttal secrets. ·
.
Wh_a t conc~rns ~any U.S. mtelligenc~ ex·
perts 1s growmg ev1de~ce that the RusSlans
have been winning th1s cov_ert war. Th~
cite examples of an aggressive Soviet esplonage effort that over ~e years has compromised U.S. spy·.satellJte technology, penetrated CIA ~ecunty and subverted theda~en·
at
cy's operat10ns. These experts ~te~
new controls on U.~. counterintelligence,
such as have been discussed by Con~ss,
co~d fur!her weaken U.S. ~efe~ against
So~e~ sp1es. . ·
·
.
.
I m worn~ that th~ ~read will keep
~yeling until there lsn_t any sweater
left, says former CIA director Richard
Helms.
Dangers 10f Soviet Intelligence
current CIA officials won't discuss the
Soviet ·spy threat in any·detail. But former
intelligence officials .4escribe · a series .of
cases that; in their view, illustrate the dan·
gers of Soviet intelligence to U.S. security: ·

SIJ!

··-~

~ries

.........
.. .......

most

.............. .... ............. .............. .
......... ... ....... ..................... ..... ..... .......•.•...........••• .•. ...•..••... .
:::::::::::··:·::· ·:.: ··::··::·· .. ·:.::. :·:·: . ....... ... ::::::::: ;: ::::::::: :::·::: :::::::::: :::::::::: ..... ·::: .... ·:::: :::::::::::.::::::::::: ...... ... .

... ...
·····"'·······
r· .... ...•••••

i::· ·::·::··::·:-

....... . ...... .•. . . .... . .........•.. ····•·····•·•·····
.·::::;::. ·::::::.:·:.:::::::::::: :;.::::::::::: ·:: ~: ::~ : :::::::::::::::.:. ·.:::::: :;: .:::::: ::·

-lowed Igc)r ti-I96ftOpretend to ''recruit" as
a Soviet_ agent a RUSSian ·1Ulval deer wbo
. ha&f defected to this countr)''lD 1959 and was
Uvlng ·here ·under ~e ·name Nicholas Shad·
rin.. The CIA arid ·. the FBI :hoped ·that the
· controlled · Iior·Shadrin Telatlmsbip 'WOuld
~--------------1 yield info~ation about KGB ·operations lD'
to reach a:ttnal.conclusion.'nie case me ·on' tbe'U.S., but the gambit ended-in•disaster ln
him remains ' open; one former intelligence '1975; ·when · Mt:·.Shadrin · disappeared in VIofficial says sardonically .that he doubts the' enna -while ·maiclng contact 'With' 'his SOViet .
case will be~ resolved "until' the KGB has a handlers.) .. ·
·: "· ,
.:~ '. •
freedom-of-information act" MeanwhUe,' Hall of Mlrror.s
any judgments about Sasha's true identity ,. As these spy tales suggeSt, the World of
must hinge on the InterPretation. of ·· a .intelligence sometimes resembles a ball of
strange series of interlocking cases. ·
mirrors, where it is impossible to tell image
The existence of a Soviet rode with the from reality .
One intelligence , expert . says that it
. code name ·sasha was first mentioned in
1962 by a KGB defector named Anatoli Gol~ . _wasn't until1968,.- for example;thai U.S. offiitsin. Mr. Golitsin had heard tales from his 'dais had conclusive evidence that ·a Russian
former colleagues. in the KGB about Sasha's ·based in Istanbul who headed·a supposedly
exploits, and he thought this Sasha had '·
worked as a contract agent for the CIA in anti·Soviet network during WOrld War 11West Germany. But he wasn't 'sure of the ·and passed voluminous milltary information
to the German high command-was actually
a KGB agent. If so, the Russians apparently
man's Identity.
Suspicions of a Plant
·were willing to jeopardize thousams of their
Two years later, Sasha was mentioned by soldiers to preserve the credibility of this
another KGB defector, named Yurt N()o agent-so that he could plant .false informa·
senko. But Mr. Nosenko's Information .about tion· at ·a crucial moment. ·:· ·' ··
Sasha pointed in an entirely different direc·
The suspicion · about Soviet intelligence
tion, away from any relationship with the activities can sometimes .get :out of hand,
. CIA. Mr. Nosenko's version came to be however. Some former CIA officials contend
doubted; CIA officials, after analyzing many that happened during the 19als, when a
of his statements, suspected that he ·was a search for Soviet moles within the CIA
Soviet plant.
nearly paralyzed the agency's own inteUiThen, in 1966, .a third KGB .official; who ,ence·gatherlng operations. ·
.The web · of ·internal suipldoo · had be·
called himself Igor. contacted the CIA while
he was on temporary assignment in Wasll- come so . tight at the agency ..by the late
ington-offerlng to serve as a CIA mole 1960s, one CIA official remembers. that di·
within the KGB. According to one account, rect permission was required from the bead
Igor did more than simply identify Sasha as of the agency's clandestine servi_!:e simply to
the former contract agent living in Virginia: arrange a letter .drop .for <an agent in Mos·
He said that because.this man was a prized cow. "We were so convinced that everything
"ideological" agent (as -opposed 'to a crass was controlled by the KGB 'that we never
mercenary one l, the KGB hoped to arrange had the heart 'to start anything," this official
his defection from the U.S. to Russia.
recalls. The Russians, he says. were viewed
Igor even helped provide hard evidence. as "10 feet tall" and "too smart for us."
He told his interrogators that if the FBI
Former CIA Director WUliam Colby
checked its records of surveillance at the So- argues that . excessive counterintelligence
viet embassy in Washington, it would find .a . worries were.hindering the CIA's effectivephotograph of Sasha entering the embassy ness. "Every director · was doubted, -every
by the back door. The FBI checked its files, · potential agent was doubted," he remem·
and sure enough, there was a photo of the bers.
former agent who is living in'VIrginia. (The
Despite all the intrigue and suspicions,
suspect~ Sasha concedes in an interview there apparently are certain rules to be fol·
that he had visited the embassy, but he says lowed in the spy business. Howard "Rocky"
his purpose there was innocent.)
Stone, the CIA officer who tried to recruit
The Russians never brought Sasha back his Soviet counterpart ln Katmandu, discov·
home, and Igor never convinced some CIA · .ered that such rules can be enforced when
officials that his offer to spy for the ·U.S. necessary. While he was stationed in 'Nepal,
was genuine. Although the CIA. maintained Mr. Stone took a vacation with his wife to
contact with him when he returned to Mos· Bombay, India, to attend a Catholic Eucha·
cow, the. Agency felt he should be treated ristic conference. When he arrived ln Born- ·
with extreme caution.
· bay, he found his name plastered across the
(Despite these suspicions, the U.S. al· cover of an Indian magazine called Blitz,"

.whi~· .identified binl"{as.~a >u~· -·~~

I

I
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spy ---·· - '
.. .. ,._ ... =-.... ,.. .•
~
' 'Mr. ·stone was.furiolla.' 1'hil was the Jat- ·
est in a series .of jtortes that 'hwslaDI bad
been planting ·aboat.Jdm Jor"Jie8l'JY·a-deeIde, and lt threatened tO eodan,er Ids fam.
Uy aDd destroy .b1s effectlveDeSS ln Nepal.
Mr. Stone .d.1scussect tbe matter With Richard Helms,- then dlrector·'Of tbe CIA's clan- ·
destine se"ice. . _. .
·
· ~·Tell the Russians In Katmandu to bock
it off," Mr. Helms said. "Tell tbem that U
they don't, we'll hit them all over the world"
by exposing Soviet agents. The RussliDJ-got
the message, and Mr. ·Stone's name · W.S
never planted ln the press apln.
'
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P<MA. 12./4/11
The Soviet_ 'Forgery Offensive'
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The decision l>Y Iranian militants to
show the world an alleged "secret" doc·
ument that they said had been pur-.
Joined ftom files in the occupied U.S.
Embassy adds an ominous new factor
in the battle of American intelligence
against Soviet forgeries aimed at discrediting the United States.
Whether the militants have what
they claim to have or whether the al·
leged CIA assignments for the two new
staffers at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran
are bogus, the surfacing of the docu~
ment compounds the problem of identi·
fying and exposing proliferating Soviet
forgeries. These forgeries are now
known to have drawn both President
·Carter and Vice President Walter Mondale into their worldwide operations.
The Soviet forgery game was·
analyzed early this year in a classified
·government document called "the for·
gery offensive," which opened with
this flat assertion: the dangerous Soviet
game of lying about the United States
Jb the struggle between the two superpowers is undergoing "an appreciable
upsurge."

~ :~ :

;

"The political purpose of these forgeries, their technical sophistication
and intelligence reporting all point to
the Soviet Union, its various East European alUes and Cuba as being the responsible parties," the document said.
The study containing that charge
against Moscow was followed in late
summer by a second analysis, limited to
"official use only" and published by the
Defense Intelligence Agency-a major
branch of the U.S. intelligence community. It proclaimed that Moscow has
"continually employed forged documents to implement foreign policy, support political objectives and to lend
substance, credibility and authenticity
to their propaganda claims."
The United States has never played
the forgeries game against Russia or
any other country. One reason could be
that in an open society forgeries would
almost surely be exposed by those opposing the practice-by politicians, for
example, who in the. past have taken
pride in exposing undercover operations by the CIA, regardless of foreign
policy objectives.

The "Soviets have a closed society and
no known scruples against dirty tricks
of any kind. But the efforts-described
as being "of suspected Soviet origin"to put false words in ·the mouths of the
president and the vice president of the
United States touched a new low. The
falsification of Jimmy Carter's spoken
word came in December 1977, in the
form of a bogus press release from
the United States Information Agency
(now the International Communica·
tions Agency). It purported to be a verbatim report on a speech Carter gave in
the "American perspective series."
Newspapers in Greece-and almost ·
certainly in other countries where the
forgery never surfaced-received the
phony Carter speech in the mall. Two
newspapers in Athens published it. In
his "speech," Carter flayed the Greeks
for letting down NATO; demanded far
higher defense spending by Greece and
made demeaning remarks about this
major Meiliterranean ally.
The forgery involving Mondale came
just over a year ago when Xeroxed copies of an interview
he. allegedly
gave to a
. .
...
. .
.
l
.. . .

'\ :~. . !':-H'i
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European newspaperman named "Karl
Douglas" were mailed to Paris-based correspondents of several newspapers.
In the "interview," the vice president
cast aspersions on Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem. Begin. Mondale, according
to the bogus "interview," called Sadat
not the master of his own house (implying the then-pending treaty with Israel
would not be adhered to) and claimed
that Begin was suffering from a "terminal illness."
Both. these efforts were crude, and
neither one did American policy much,
if any, damage. But they illustrate this ·
point: there is no limit to the Soviet effort to "disinform" governments and
peoples of the world about the perfidy
of the United States by exploiting all
techniques of forgery and black propaganda. Moreover, other attempts to
undermine the United States have had
conspicuous success.
In 1978, in an altered vers.lon of a genuine State Department document
known as "Airgram A8950," dated Dec.
3, 1974, U.S. embassies in Europe were

..
.· .

L

(.~

ordered to collect information "on ways
to bribe European officials and to develop other covert means by which to damage or eliminate foreign trade competition" with the .United States. The timing
was calculated to cash in on the uproar
in the United States over bribery accusations against U.S. corporations.
This forgery, American intelligence
now believes, vias "an eminent Soviet
~orgery success" despite some sloppy
discrepancies, such as bad punctuation
in the covering letter that came with
fuzzy copies of the alleged airgram.
With superpower competition now
heating up, partly under the stress of
the Iran crisis, to'p intelligence officials
have ordered the anti-forgery watch
put on overtime duty. But for every
"forgery discovered, there probably are
half a dozen that go undiscovered. The
whole world Is a forgery market and it
1s inconceivable that the United States
will riot be damaged in the days of
heated rivalry that lie ahead with an
adversary who plays by only one rule:
the rule to win.
Clli711, Field Enlierpr!Jea,Jne.

THE WASHINGTON STAR Wednesday, February 20, 1980

ustices Back CIA Control of Agent's Writing
Must Pay U.S.
II Profit From Book
By a Washmgton Star Staff Wnter

The Supreme Court yesterday
a sweeping endorsement of the
power to control what its
and employees write for pu~
. The decision split the court
I.

With or without its employees'
t, the court said, the CIA
s power to require advance clearce of anything that an employee
to write for use outside the
cy.
upheld an order by U.S. District
Oren R. Lewis of Alexandria,
ring former agent Frank W.
III to get the CIA's approval behe writes anything- secret or
t - about the agency. That will

apply not only to a book he has already published, titled Decent Interval, but also apparently to a romantic novel he has written.
That part of Judge Lewis' order
has aroused worry in the nation's
publishing industry, fearing it
would put strict limits on dealings
with government employees who
write books, articles or scripts.
While the court's ruling appeared
to be aimed primarily at CIA employees, it did contain language that
could apply to an employee of any
agency that uses "sensitive information."
Yesterday's decision also upheld
Lewis' order requiring Snepp to pay
to the U.S. Treasury all of the money
he has earned in the past and any he
will earn in the future from his book
about the agency. That order also
applies to earnings if the book is
made into a movie.
Agreeing witb the judge that

.•,QUIRMLES"

~
invisible leash and
~ an make SOUIR·
·~ks!

"'"E 31c

Complaining that yesterday's rulSnepp had violated his duty not to
publish without advance clearance, ing against Snepp was "unprecethe court majority said the CIA's dented and drastic," Justices Wilonly effective remedy JNould be liam J. Brennan Jr., Thurgood
Marshall and John Paul Stevens disrecapture of his "unjust gain."
The court rejected a conclusion of sented.
Here were the other results in
the 4th U.S. Court of Appeals that the ·
CIA might be able to recover "puni- press-related cases yesterday:
tive" damages, too, if it could prove • The court, without comment,
that what Snepp had done actually cleared the way for a trial of a $1 million libel lawsuit that consumer
had harmed the agency's interests.
Trying to prove that, the court advocate Ralph Nader has filed in
said, might force the CIA to disclose Superior Court here against consersecret information - something it vative newspaper columnist Ralph
would not be likely to do, even in De Toledano.
• The court left intact a lower
pursuit of money damages.
The decision came in a nine-page federal court ruling that public_
opinion that was unsigned. The school officials may not punish stucourt made its ruling without even dents for publishing an underground newspaper full of dirty
holding a hearing on the case.
Snepp's case arose after he pu~ words, if the newspaper is mostly
lished, without CIA clearance, his written and exclusively sold away
highly critical book about the U.S. from the school grounds.
withdrawal from Vietnam at the end
_:Lyle Denniston
of the war there.
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Catholic Bishops,·Church Council
Oppose Return of Military Draft
ian as well as military purposes.
Both the bishops and the NCC
The nation's Catholic bishops and pledged support for education and
the National Council of Churches, in counseling programs for young men
separate statements, have opposed a faced with the possibility of the
draft.
return to the military draft.
The bishops' statement was issued
The NCC also opposed the Carter
administration's proposal to resume by the administrative board of the
draft registration as "an inevitable U:S. Catholic Conference, the bishand essential step to a military ops' civil action arm. The NCC statement was issued by its executive
draft."
The bishops said they have "no committee.
The bishops supported the present
obj~ction in principle" to draft regis·
tration, but added that "convincing" standby draft system, which would
reasons must be advanced before require the president to get congressional approval before conscription
registration begins.
In their statement, the bishops op- could begin.
They said any draft should allow
posed including women in a draft
called for a national defense emer- selective conscientious objection to
gency, while the NCC did not men- particular wars regarded as unjust
"The experience of the Vie
tion the question of drafting women.
The bishops also opposed a "uni- War highighted the mor.~•
versal national service," which cal significance of would draft young people for civil- question," the bi"
By Jim Castelli

Washmgton Star Religion Edttor
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.,

MURRAY J . GART. Ediror
W!LUA.I.I P. Ncn.w AIN. Deputy BdJtor

'.
.,

EDWIN N YODER JR., Ed/torl•l Page Editor

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1980

1

.....

''

.,

Mr. Sneppsnipped

•..

.
.
:· Two years ago Mr. Frank Snepp III <;trew on his government. That judgll,lent .was overtur~ed by
e~p~riences as a CIA agent in Vietnam to publish the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. It IS now
1
'- without•prior screening - a book about the reinstated by the Supreme Court.
·
•
·fall of Saigon called Decent Interval. A lingering
The three dissenters are troubled, .however, by ·
climate of -h ostility lo the CIA - and a lazy- that "uninhibited ... exercise in lawmaking."
minded tendency to confuse the issues- made.it · They contend that the proper recourse ·for the
inevitable that his defiance of contractual obli- ·CIA was to sue for punitive damages. The Court, ·
gations to the CI~ would be def~nded as a daring, apparently on its own inotion, rejeCted that argueven admirable, exercise of First Amendment -ment as unrealistic.~ saying that "proof of
·
·
· (wtongful) conduct necessary to sustain an
rights.
The U.S. Sup,reme Court doesn't see it that way. award of punitive damages might force the go~- '
rlts brisk and unceremonious disposition of Mr. ernment to disclose some of the very confl. Snepp's appeal frO"m a conviction in the lower dences that Snepp promised to protect ; ·. • When
· courts, in an unsigned opinion delivered with- the government cannot secu_re its remedy without benefit of oral argument, is a ,clear sign of out unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all."
.' changing climates. The collapse ·of Iran and the This may be "lawmaking" by the high court; but
argument there
. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have reminded of the force of the sustaining
1
. those who needed reminding that there's ·a dan- can be no doubt.
•
· . ger'ous world out there - in which it is foolish
The Snepp cas~~ we say agaip., has givei:uise to
·for the U.S. to treat its intelligence needs and much confusion,, not to say nonsense -::- pri·. ·
.·
· · inarily a confusion between a case involving the
practices casually.
·
.. The Supreme. Court recognizes. and reaffirms enforcem'e nt of a lawful. contract (which it is) :
that the CIA mustbe empowered to prevent its .and a case involving Mr. Snepp's constitu~ional
·~ employees from bolting from the fold with their . "right" to publish unimpeded (which is what ...
memoirs and briefcases overflowing with··un- , Mr. Snepp's ingenious ·lawyers SQUght tQ make ·..
screened agency information. It also recognizes it). But a First Amendment defense of Mr.
· that the CIA must have effective means of penal- Snepp's behavior· closely approximates what is ·
izing disregard of its covenants with agents.
•often cited as the classic case of chutzpah- the
1
~ Mr. Snepp unq~estionably -a~? apparently case of, the boy who murdered his p~rents and
.. ~nashamedly- ~1d so. When he J?ll~ed the CIA . .then threw himself on the' mercy of the court
~~ 1968, and a gam when .?e _left lt m 1976, h.e . pleading that he was an orphan, No one ·COJV.pel: signed ~gree~ents to seek p~wr ~pproval of the · led Mr. Snepp at gunpoint to join the CIA, or to
a~ency and the ~xpress wntte_n c,?nsent of ~he sign away his r!ght to publish without 'prior
' J:?Ire~tor.; · · ~r h1s rep~esentatlve -~efo!e ~u~ clearance. But having done so, he will be ex.· hshmg any mformatlon concernmg mtell~pected to face the legal consequences. · ·
gence or the CIA that has not been made pubhc
.
.
No intelligence service conducted on the lax
. by CIA." The obligation was.clear. Yet Mr. Snepp
went right ahead and published his book with· and permissive principles implicit in Mr. Snepp's
out clearance. His profits are reportedly in defense would be other than an .incontinent
excess ol $115,000.
. ·· ~
shambles, valueless to :the ~ation it served. In
· . None of the three courts, incidentally, has most other countries, including Great Brita'in,
found that ,a contractual ob.ligation of the kind Mr. Snepp's violation of his terms of employment
~ Mr. Snepp was under may be waved aside on ' a· '-~ in the intelligence s~rvice would have brought
' pleading of First Amendment rights. The'cpntro- him more than the ~onfiscatiQn of his ill-got
. versial point in the case was the penalty. The gains, possibly even imprisonment.
' · ,
He is hicky, though he is out a good bit of .1
<trial judge held that Mr. Snepp's profits, ,hpving
l
been g~in~d in violation of a .trust, belong to the money, to live·undef" American law. ·
I
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The ~: ~ . Supreme Court ruled this week in the
·:::::·.-.- Frank SJ?.epp-CIA case even as the Senate began
:,:,:/ii work on ;{l "charter" for the legal domestication
n\:/i:: . of CIA work, and when· The Brethren has spot:
'"'-=.·::,. lighted the techniques of judicial review.
These circumstances are pertinent, for in rul~~~~~~~:~ ing on the enforcibility of CIA contracts with
....... former agents the Court brushed the issues with
which the Senate must grapple; and the Court
also, according to some critics, flouted strict constructionism to penalize Mr. Snepp.
As yesterday's comment suggested, we _don't
....... agree wilh that criticism. But since it sprang
from sharp dissidence within the Court, and
since it is even said that the Court "showed con······· tempt for the rule of law," a second look may be
appropriate.
Let us focus, this time, on the dissenters' con....... · demnation of the Court's confiscation of Mr.
...... Snepp's roy,alties. Here, a gentlemanly disagree······· ment among the justices over the law of trusts,
....... which was the legal heart of the matter, has
been magnified into a charge that the Court
ruled lawlessly. . .
·
Yet Mr. Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissent,
and Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined
....... him, agreed that if Mr. Snepp had disclosed
classified information, the forfeiture of his
profits would be appropriate. Since the CIA had
not charged him with a breach of classified
information the dissenters thought the remedy
excessive and unjust.
The government, however, did not flatly declare that Mr. Snepp's book had revealed no
"information concerning intelligence or CIA"only that "for purposes of this action" that was
not the contention.
·
Was this conditional clause insignificant? The .
dissenters assume so; we do not. While it's anyone's guess, the CIA and the Justice Department
may have been trying to avoid revealing "for
purposes of this action" what it seemed to them
······· in the national interest to conceal. Yet the dis.senters drew 'from the conditional stipulation
the startling conclusion that "by definition, the·
..-.·.·.·.·.· interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract'
was designed to protect has not been com pro- ·
······· mised." They do not really know that. They know
.. .... only that no compromise of that "interest in
confidentiality" had been charged.
The dissenters' broad interpretation of the ,

EDWIN W. YODER JR., Editorial Page Editor
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For the Record
From the satirical Hungaria~
weekly Ludas Matyi, by Sandor N01J0.o
baczky:
Kovacs knows as much about foreign
policy as a chicken about the ABCs. I
can't drum into his stupid head what
the international situation is. He tells
me:
''I just don't nnderstand this Iranian
thint. After
these are religious fanatics!'"
''You fool, It's not Important wbai
kind of fanatics they are. The lmpor·
tant thing is that objectively they serve
progress."
''You mean we must like these fa·
natic Moslems?"
"Yes, we must like them."
At this the anti-dialectical blockhead
shouts:
"'Then long live an the fanatical Moslems in Iran! And in Afghanistan!"
· "What did you say? We weren't talk· ·~
tng about Afghanistan."
"But I just read 'that the religious fanatics there are also rebelling. So we
should like them, too."
"Them we don't have to like, because
they objectively want to turn back the
wheel of history. They want an Islamic
Republic."
"Like in Iran?"
"Iran is one thing, Afghanistan is an·
other. The Iranians are positive Moslem
fanatics, the Afghans are negative Moslem fanatics."
I see I have him convinced. He bows
his head.
"You see what a simpleton I am? I
cannot grasp such clear things. For ex•
ample, take this boxer."
"Which boxer?"
"Idi Amin. Who's already out."
"What's the problem here?"
"Is he positive or negative?"
''Posinegative. He was a harmful
charlatan, but for a while he was objective••••"
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Snepp Decisions'een Helping Court to Plug Its Own Leak
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By Fred Barbash
Washmcton Post Staff Writer

The Supreme Court's government
secrecy opinion, issued Tuesday to
help the CIA solve a problem with
leakers. may also help to solve a similar problem at the Supreme Court.
In the \·iew of many lawyers. the
opinion in the Frank Snepp case gave
the ;:!overnment broad new powers to
restrict release of information nJt
only by intelligence operatives, but
also by a wide variety of government
employes, including people who work
at the Supreme Court.
And it is court employes. particularly clerks, who ha\ e been blamed
for a series of court leaks in the past
two years, some of which produced the
best-selling book, "The Brethren."
~Iany lawyers also feel the court
acted with unw:ual haste. unusual
reach and with a phrase at the end of
the opinion that reflected unusual vehemence . The opinion. the court said,
requires Snepp to "disgo,·ge the benefits of his faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to

•

deter those who would place sensitive
information at risk."
"Whether it was the court's purpose
or not." said Gerald Hollingsworth,
general counsel and vice president of
Random House, Snepp's Publisher.
"the justices have seemingly fashioned a remedy which could enable
the court to reach its own employes
leaking its own secrets."
The case was prompted by Snepp's
publication two years ago of "Decent
Interval," a book based on his experiences as a CIA official in Vietnam.
Though the government did not allege
that the book revealed secret information. it pursued Snepp for not submitting his manuscript for prepublication
screening by the CIA. He was required to do so under a secrecy agreE:ment he signed as a CIA agent, the
government contended.
The government moved to seize all
of Snepp's earnings from the book
(now about $115,000) and to enjoin any
further violations of the prepub!Ication screening requirement. It won all
it sought, including an extension of

.
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the injunction to cover anyone acting
"in concert·• with Snepp, in this case
Random House.
Since Random House is preparing
to publish further Snepp writings, according to Hollingsworth, the ; company now believes that for the first
time a publisher has been plac~ under "prior restraint" against putting
out a book.
1
The court's approval of the District
Court's orders in the case went well
beyond the CIA. lawyers pointed out,
and secrecy agreements by employe<>.
Government employes with access
to "sensitive information" have a trust
relationship with their ~mployers, the
court said. The trust may be 1established, in part, by "access to confidential sources and materials," not ~ust to
national security secrets.
''\\"ithout a dependable prepublication review procedure no intelligence
agency or responsible government official could be assured that an employe privy to sensitive information
might not conclude on his own"-innocently or otherwise-that it should be
1

•

disclosed to the world," the majority
said.
The remedy imposed. the confiscation of earnings, '·is the natural and
customary censequence of a breach
of trust."
At the ceurt, law clerks and some
other empleyes are privy to the secretive memerantia and conversations
which lead to decisions b~- the justices.
Beb WH41warfl and Scott Armstrong, authers ef "The Brethren," say
they relieti en hundreds of interviews
with clerks te aescribe those secret
delilteratiens e\·er a seven-year period
at the ceurt. Previous leaks, notably
an advance en a major Supreme
Ctturt •~tbtien te ABC reporter Tim
O'Brien, have alse been attributed to
court empleyes.
Though there is no law governing
secrecy ameng ceurt employes. Chief
Justice Warren Burger has said that
one is net required to solve the problem.
·
In his dissent in the Pentagon Papen; case in 1971. Burger wrote: ":\o
statute gives this court express power

to establish and enforce the utmost
security measures for the secrecy of
our deliberations and records. Yet I
have little doubt as to the inherent
power of the court to protect the confidentiality of its internal operations
by whatever judicial measures may
be required."
The Snepp opinion may have been
the first judicial measure, some lawyers believe. ·'A clerk is clearly in a
position of trust in dealing with sensitive information." said American Civil
Liberties Union lawyer :\lark Lynch,
who represented Snepp. "I think
there 's no question that the decision
could apply to them.''
··r see the decision as in part a reaction to
confidences improperly
breached" in "The Brethren," said
Bruce Fein, an American Enterprise
Institute court expert.
··r can't say that conclusively. But in
the procedure used by the court, the
decision reflected a kind of instinctive
hostility" unusual for the justices.
Procedurally, the court chose to issue its unsigned opinion without argu-

ments from either side. Accordin
Eugene Gressman, coauthor of a
on Supreme Court practice, tha
common in m a j or cases but
unique· It is, he said, ··unfair.
wake up in the morning and
you've lost your case without ever
ing had the chance to argue it."
In addition, the court gave the
ernment more than It or anyone
had asked for. The Fourth U.S.
cuit Court of Appeals had overtur
the seizure of Snepp's earnings a.:;
harsh a penalty. The government t
the Supreme Court that if it rejec
Snepp's appeal of the rest of
lower court decision , it should also
ject the gO\·ernment's appeal of
earnings seizure decision. The co
disregarded the government's requ
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a
sent along with Justices William Br
nan and Thurgood Marshall, .:al
that action "unprecedented." He
scribed that and the decision in g
era! as an "uninhibited ... exercis
lawmaking."
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Supreme Court's government
' opinion, issued Tuesday to
1e CIA solve a problem with
;, may also help to solve a simiblem at the Supreme Court.
1e view of many lawyers, the
1 in the Frank Snepp case gave
·ernment broad new powers to
release of information nJt
y intelliE:ence operatives, but
a wide variety of government
·es, including people who work
;upreme Court.
it is court employes. particulerks, who ha•e been blamed
~ries of court leaks in the past
trs, some of 1vhich produced the
ling book, "The Brethren."
• lawyers also feel the court
with unusual haste, unusual
nd with a phrase at the end of
nion that reflected unusual ,·e~e. The opinion, the court said,
s Snepp to "disgorge the benetis faithlessness. Since the rem;wift and sure. it is tailored to

deter those who would place sensitive
information at risk."
"Whether it was the court's purpose
or not," said Gerald Hollingsworth,
general counsel and vice president of
Random House, Snepp's publisher.
"the justices have seemingly fashioned a remedy which could enable
the court to reach its own employes
leaking its own secrets."
The case was prompted by Snepp's
publication two years ago of "Decent
Interval," a book based on his experiences as a CIA official in Vietnam.
Though the government did not allege
that the book revealed secret information, it pursued Snepp for not submitting his manuscript for prepublication
screening by the CIA. He was required to do so under a secrecy agreE:·
ment he signed as a CIA agent, the
government contended.
The government moved to seize all
of Snepp's earnings from the book
(now about $115,000) and to enjoin any
further violations of the prepublication screening requirement. It won all
it sought, including an extension of

I

the injunction to cover anyone acting
1
"in concert'' with Snepp, in this case
Random House.
Since Random House is preparing
to publish further Snepp writings, according to Hollingsworth, the ,company now believes that for the first
time a publishet· has been placed under "prior restraint" against putting
out a book.
The court's approval of the District
Court's orders in the case went well
beyond the CIA, lawyers pointed out,
and secrecy agreements by emlJ!loye~.
Government employes with access
to "sensitive information" have li trust
relationship with their employers, the
court said. The trust may be 1established, in part, by "access to confidential sources and materials," not just to
national security secrets.
"Without a dependable preptiblication review procedure no intelligence
agency or responsible government official could be assured that ah employe privy to sensitive information
might not conclude on his ownT-innocently or otherwise-that it should be
1
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disclosed to the world," the majority
said.
The remedy imposed, the 'confiscation of earnings, "is the natural and
customary censequence of a breach
of trust."
At the ceurt, law clerks and some
other empleyes are privy to the secretive memeranlia and conversations
which lead to decisions by the justices.
Beb WM4wartl and Scott Armstrong. authers ef "The Brethren," say
they relieli en hundreds of interviews
with clerks te aescribe those secret
delilteratiens ever a seven-year period
at the ceurt. Previous leaks, notably
an advance en a major Supreme
C"urt •l'illien te ABC reporter Tim
O'Brien, have alse been attributed to
court empleyes.
Though there is no law governing
secrecy ameng ceurt employes. Chief
Justice Warren Burger has said that
one is not required to solve the problem.
'
In his dissent in the Pentagon Papers case in 1971, Burger wrote: "Xo
statute gives this court express power
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to establish and enforce the utmost
security measures for the secrecy of
our deliberations . and records. Yet I
have little doubt as to the inherent
power of the court to protect the confidentiality of its internal operations
by whatever judicial measures may
be required."
The Snepp opinion may have been
the first judicial measure, some lawyers believe. "A clerk is clearly in a
position of trust in dealing with sensitive information." said American Civil
Liberties Union lawyer .:\lark Lynch ,
who represented Snepp. "I think
there's no question that the decision
could apply to them."
"I see the decision as in part a reaction to
confidences improperly
breached" in "The Brethren," said
Bruce Fein, an American Enterprise
Institute court expert.
"I can't say that conclusively. But in
the procedure used by the court, the
decision reflected a kind of instinctive
hostility" unusual for the justices.
Procedurally, the court chose to issue its unsigned opinion without argu-

ments from either side. According to
Eugene Gressman, coauthor of a book
on Supreme Court practice, that i8
common in m a j or cases but not
unique· It is, he said, "unfair. You
wake up in the morning and find
you've lost your case without ever having had the chance to argue it."
In addition. the court gave the government more than it or anyone else
had asked for. The Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had overturned
the seizure of Snepp's earnings as too
harsh a penalty. The government told
the Supreme Court that if it rejected
Snepp 's appeal of the rest of the
lower court decision, it should also reject the government's appeal of the
earnings seizure decision. The court
disregarded the government's request.
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissent along with Justices William Brennan and Thurgood .Marshall, .::ailed
that action "unprecedented." He described that and the decision in gen·
era! as an "uninhibited ... exercise is
lawmaking."
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In defense of confiscation
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled this week in the
Frank Snepp-CIA case even as the Senate began
work on a "charter" for the legal domestication
of CIA work, and when The Brethren has spotlighted the techniques of judicial review.
These circumstances are pertinent, for in ruling on the enforcibility of CIA contracts with
former agents the Court brushed the issues with
which the Senate must grapple; and the Court
also, according to some critics, flouted strict constructionism to penalize Mr. Snepp.
As yesterday's comment suggested, we don't
agree with that criticism. But since it sprang
from sharp dissidence within the Court, and
since it is even said that the Court "showed contempt for the rule of law," a second look may be
appropriate.
Let us focus, this time, on the dissenters' condemnation of the Court's confiscation of Mr.
Snepp's royalties. Here, a gentlemanly disagreement among the justices over the law of trusts,
which was the legal heart of the matter, has
been magnified into a charge that the Court
ruled lawlessly.
Yet Mr. Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissent,
and Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined
him, agreed that if Mr. Snepp had disclosed
classified information, the forfeiture of his
profits would be appropriate. Since the CIA had
not charged him with a breach of classified
information the dissenters thought the remedy
excessive and unjust.
The government, however, did not flatly declare that Mr. Snepp's book had revealed no
"information concerning intelligence or CIA"only that "for purposes of this action" that was
not the contention.
Was this conditional clause insignificant? The
dissenters assume so; we do not. While it's anyone's guess, the CIA and the Justice Department
may have been trying to avoid revealing "for
purposes of this action" what it seemed to them
in the national interest to conceal. Yet the dissenters drew from the conditional stipulation
the startling conclusion that "by definition, the·
interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract
was designed to protect has not been compromised." They do not really know that. They know
only that no compromise of that "interest in
co fiden.tiality" had been charged.
'1 he d:s·senters' broad interpretation of the

government's plea is question-begging. It carries
us swiftly back to the quandary that bothered
the Court - that a "remedy" risking the disclosure the CIA seeks to avoid is no remedy.
Another frailty of the dissenters' position, as
the Court's unsigned opinion noted, is that "the
dissent (divides in two) Snepp's 1968 agreement
and treats its interdependent provisions as if
they imposed unrelated obligations." Mr. Snepp
not only agreed not to publish classified information without clearance, he agreed to clear all
information "relating to the Agency, its activi- ·
ties or intelligence activities generally" before
publishing.
If you assume, as we do, that the Agency is better situated than former agents to judge when
disclosure could cause harm, tl\e inclusiveness
of the contract is all-important. Yet the dissenters - speaking of "lawmaking" - gratuitously
distinguish between classified information and
more general information, ignoring that in some
ways the disclosure of the latter could be as compromising as the disclosure of the former. What
a form~r agent imagined to be harmless information could lay a trail to undercover sources, or to
foreign intelligence agencies cooperating with
the CIA.
Justice Stevens and the other dissenters indicated, oddly, that they would be at ease if the
Court confiscated book profits in response to a
breach of classified information, but not in response to the other kind of disclosure. How or
why they distinguish between the two, in the
light of a trust relationship explicitly restraining both, is not blindingly clear. That is why the
disagreement is, in essence, a disagreement
about the law of trusts. And on that question Mr.
Justice Stevens has six votes against him.
Of course - to take passing note of more
fundamental objections to the Court's decision
-the Supreme Court may be no better than Congress at balancing the needs of a working intelligence system against the claims of openness,
free speech and constitutionality. It may be a
fond illusion in any case that the nation can
have it both ways - that it can function effectively in the shadowy, extra-legal world of foreig~ intelligence and indulge the publishing
whims of former agents. Not even the mo'3t ingenious legislative or judicial acrobatics, we suspect, could quite square that circle .•
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Why Decision in Snepp Case Disturbs P
By RICHARD EDER

T

HE recent Supreme Court decision curtailing the right of former Government employees to
write about their experiences
has left publishers and constitutiopal
lawyers seriously disturbed; It bas left
Frank Snepp both gagged and broke.
All professions have their powerful
mysteries: medicine has psychiatry,
journalism bas unattributable sources,
and the legal profession
bas injunctions and equity
News
jurisprudence. When the
Analysis Supreme Court decided
three weeks ago that Mr.
Snepp had violated his
contract with the Central Intelligence
Agency, his former employer, by put>.
lishing his account of the last days of
the United States presence in Vietnam,
without clearing it with the agency, it
applied a punishment not out of law but
equity; and left him tied up with an injunction to boot.
The court did not grant Mr. Snepp's
request to be heard in appeal. Instead,
it issued an opinion confirming, in effect, an original Federal District Court
judgment against him two years ago. It
permanently enjoined him from circulating any of his writing arising from
his years in the C.I.A., unless it was
first cleared by the agency. It went on
to punish his failure to clear his book,
"Decent Interval," with something
considerably beyond the normal legal
remedy for a breach of contract. Such a
remedy, as recommended by the intermediate Circuit Court of Appeals,
would have been an order for a new
lower-court trial to determine damages.
Bacltgrouncl of Other Books

Instead, the Supreme Court applied a
punishment based on equity jurisprudence. More than simply breaching a
contract, it held, Mr. Snepp had
breached a position of trust - even
though classified material was not held
to be at stake. Therefore, he must pay
to the Government not a specific sum to
be determined, but all present and future profits from "Decent Interval."
The Government's prosecution of
Mr. Snepp was taken against a background of numerous other books that
former agents have published or are
seeking to publish. It sought to estat>.
lisli the C.I.A.'s widespread right of
clearance on all material, classified or
not. It cited as specific justification the
contract that all its agents must sign;
more generally, it argued that an intelligence agency must be sole judge of
whether material would be damaging.
A minority of the court- Justices
John Paul Stevens, Thurgood Marshall
and William J. Brennan Jr. - supported the Snepp defense argument
that the contract could not reasonably
cover more than classified material,
and that to extend it further might be a
violation of the First Amendment.
The majority, however, said
• '1\,fr.

Snepp's failure to get clearance was
the kind of action that could cause the
United States "irreparable harm and
loss" and was in violation of his contract. It ordered the trust remedy on
the grounds that a new trial for specific
damages could risk exposure of confidential Government affairs - even
though the Government had accepted
the less sweeping Circuit Court trial
order.
$120,008 Held In Eserow
For publishers, the court decision
raises serious questions about the freedom to write and publish; enunciating,
as it does, a concept of breach of trust
that could theoretically bind all kinds
of former public or even private employees who wanted to write about
their experiences. For lawyers, apart
from these First Amendment issues, it
raises questions about the temper and
procedures of the present Supreme
Court. For Mr. Snepp, the concern is
more urgent and odder.
The $120,000 that he has earned from
his book is tied up in an escrow account
at a local bank. Barring an unlikely
decision by the Court to rehear the
case, it must be paid to the Government. Mr. Snepp has been writing
steadily for the last two years and bas
virtually completed two other manu-

scripts: a novel about the C.I.A. and
the assassination of President Kennedy, and an account of his legal difficulties.
His publisher, Random House, bas
lent him $12,000 for livin8 expenses, in
expectation of being shown the manuscripts. These were lying on the table in
a borrowed apartment when Mr. Snepp
was in town the other day, but he cannot let Random House even see them,
let alone publish them. The injunction
requires Mr. Snepp to let the C.I.A. see
them first and make whatever deletions it decides upon, before showing
them to anyone else. Thus, Mr. Snepp
cannot convert his debt into the advance that his publisher would provide
if it could look at his manuscripts.
Submlssloa to C.I.A. PI~
"I'm absolutely impoverished," said
the author, who was the C.I.A.'s principal analyst and briefer in Saigon before
the evacuation at the end of the Vietnam War. "I've spent the last two
years writing; I couldn't go out and get
a job because I was going to pay back
Random House with the advances on
the new books. Now the novel is ready
and I can't even submit it. This must be
the first novel in American history that
Is enjoinable in advance."
Mr Snepp intends to submit his novel

to the C.I.A. review appa
next week or two. Because
with. which the Governm
against his first book - it
haste with which United Sta
evacuated Saigon, making
slons for vulnerable Vie
had worked with the C.I.
agencies - he doubts tha~
cleared without major dele
The peculiarities in
situation are considerabl
thing, his British publish
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Art: Portraiture by Hendrie
By HILTON KRAMER

W

ORKING in a style of
meticulous, mirror-bright
Realism, the American
painter Barkley Hendricks
concentrates for the most part on
producing portrait figures of young
blacks. A large, uncommonly interesting exhibition of these paintings is on
view at the Studio Museum in Harlem,
2033 Fifth Avenue, at 125th Street.
Mr. Hendricks's subjects are often
drawn from the artist's native Philadelphia, and much attention is lavished
on their sartorial splendor. Clothes are,
indeed, something of a fetish in this
painting- not only for Mr. Hendricks's
subjects, but also for the artist himself.
Even in his own nude self-portrait of
1978, the white cap and multicolor
socks worn by the figure are rendered a
good deal more persuasively than the
structure of the anatomy.

•

Detail from "Doc and Ruby's
Oldest Boy," a self-portrait
by Barkley Hendricks.

The glittering, light-reflecting surfaces of watches, rings, bracelets, eyeglasses and other personal jewelry are
likewise brilliantly rendered. But all of
these details, while remaining remarkable feats of pictorial representation,
are secondary to the painter's principal
stylistic device. This consists of silhouetting the figure, or figures, in a brilliantly tinted empty space, devoid of
everything but light, and playing off

the vivid chromatic elem
clothing and the skin tones
This pictorial strategy is no
slick side- and Mr. Hen
as slick as any Realist now
but it is particularly eff
the palette is dominated
pearly grays and off-whites
In an interesting depart
pictorial scheme, there is
of a female figure on a cou
forms other than the figu~
the entire space. From the~
rug in the foreground to th
the wallpaper along the u
painting attempts a far m
structure than Mr. Hendri
allows himself and Is all the
esting because of it. In so
this is the most thoughtful
the show.
In addition to the paint
also a selection of recent
collages and photographs.
colors, though at times a s~
in execution, usually achi
pealing delicacy. But to
photography Mr. Hendrie
one feels, turned the full
talents. Except for one
photograph of people stan
ington"Square, the photogr
be commonplace and
.slight. It is in the paint!
Hendricks remai!'lS some
tuoso.
The exhibition will be
through March 30.
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e Disturbs. Publishers

dom House, has
living expenses, in
g shown the manulying on the table in
.ent when Mr. Snepp
.e r day, but he caneven see them,
.em. The injunction
to let the C.I.A. see
.e whatever deler ~ ~1, before showing
~· Thus, Mr. Snepp
!!I debt into the adlisher would provide
manuscripts.
.PI~

mpoverished," said
the C.I.A.'s princi~fer in Saigon before
~e end of the Vietspent the last two
Uidn't go out and get
going to pay back
1 the advances on
the novel is ready
mit it. This must be
erican history that
.c e.''
to submit his novel

to the C.I.A. review apparatus in the
next week or two. Because of the vigor
with. which the Government moved
against his first book- it details the
haste with which United States officials
evacuated Saigon, making few provisions for wlnerable Vietnamese who
had worked with the C.I.A. and other
agencies - he doubts that it will be
cleared without major deletions.
The peculiarities in Mr. Snepp's
situation are considerable. For one
thing, his British publisher plans to
send him on a promotional tour in Britain when "Decent Interval" is published there. "Assuming that the tour
sells books, I'll really be working for
the Government: they'll get my profits. But at least I'll be fed," he said,
passing over the theoretical possibility
that the C.I.A. would bill him for the
price of his food.
To the publishing world, the implications of the Supreme Court opinion are
highly disturbing. The freedom to read
committee of the Association of American Publishers is expected to consider
the matter when it meets later this
month. It will have before it a lengthy
memorandum by the association's general counsel, Henry R. Kaufman.
"The entire opinion, from beginning
to end, including several absolutely in-
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ight-reflecting surs, bracelets, eyersonal jewelry are
rendered. But all of
remaining remarka! representation,
painter's principal
s consists of silhou'r figures, in a brilspace, devoid of
t, and playing off

the vivid chromatic elementS ot the
clothing and the skin tones against it.
This pictorial strategy is not without its
slick side- and Mr. Hendricks can be
as slick as any Realist now painting but it is particularly effective where
the palette is dominated by blacks,
pearly grays and off-whites.
In an interesting departure from this
pictorial scheme, there is one painting
of a female figure on a couch in whicli
forms other than the figure itself fill
the entire space. From the design of the
rug in the foreground to the pattern of
the wallpaper along the upper edge, the
painting attempts a far more complex
structure than Mr. Hendricks usually
allows himself and is all the more interesting because of it. In some respects,
this is the most thoughtful painting in
the show.
In addition to the paintings, there is
also a selection of recent watercolors,
collages and photographs. The watercolors, though at times a shade hesitant
in execution, usually achieve an ap.
pealing delicacy. But to collage and
photography Mr. Hendricks has no~,
one feels, turned the full weight of his
talents. Except for one hand-tinted
photograph of people standing in Washington-square, the photographs tend to
be commonplace and the collages
slight. It is in the paintings that Mr.
Hendricks remaL'l.S something of a virtuoso.
'
The exhibition will be on view
through March 30.

credible footnotes, is an unadulterated
disaster,"' Mr. Kaufman wrote. He
pointed out, among other things, that
the Supreme Court opinion, and its use
of the equity concept of "trust," could
be used to penalize the writings of any
former Government employee deemed
to have violated confidences.
"Furthermore," Mr. Kaufman said
in an interview, "the notion of the constructive trust could allow the Government to get money from the publishers
as well.'' In the Snepp case, the Government did not ask for Random
House's profits, but It could have, In
theory.
Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard Law
School professor who specializes In
First Amendment cases and wbo assisted in Mr: Snepp's defense, noted
that the implications could go further.
"Take Deep Throat, in the WoodwardBernstein book," he said. "If he turns
out to be an official under fiduciary obligation, which surely he was, then the
authors and The Washington Post could
be sued for their profits."
EdltiDg Question Raised
At Random House, Its president,
Robert Bernstein, called the situation
"very serious and very sad." "They
have set up a ceJJSOrship system. There
are no rules of any kind. They have said
that an organization that is criticized
can censor its critic."
"Furthermore," Mr. Bernstein continued, "how do you edit a book? Sup.
posing the original manuscript is
cleared and sent to us. How do we suggest changes? Each change would have
to go off to Washington, unless tbey bad
a C.I.A. man sitting in our office."
Among constitutional lawyers, the
opinion by the court is causing a considerable stir. "I am appalled," Prof.
Thomas Emerson of Yale said. "I look
at it as a continuation of what they have
been doing in other cases, but moving
beyond them. They have been treating
this as if it were a private contract. If
one thing is clear, it Is that for a Government to Impose that kind of blanket
inhibition on its employees is a kind of
action that is simply not governed by
normal contract rules. It raises First
Amendment rules about the right of an
employee, and the right of the public to
obtain information and the right of the.
press to publish it."
'It's a Loaded Gun'
Professor Dershowitz and other lawyers expressed concern not merely at
the substantive results of the decision,
but at the procedures used. Reflecting
the dissent submitted by Justices Stevens, Marshall and Brennan, they
noted that the Court had decided grave
constitutional matters without hearing
arguments from the two sides; by simply deciding the question upon submission of the Writ of certiorari.
"It's a loaded gun," Professor Dershowitz said of the decision. "It contains extraordinarily open and loose
language. It comes from writing the
decision without briefs. My God, when
three members of the Court want to

Wqner hltmlatlonll

FrankSnepp
hear the briefs, doesn't simple courtesy
call for arguments to be heard?"
Noting that the Government bad
asked for less than the Court awarded,
Mr. Dershowitzsaid:
"It's the greatest example of overreaching and lack of judicial restraint
in our memory. None of us can think of
any other example where the Government asked for a remedy and the Court
gave so much more. There was one example, in an antitrust suit, but then
there was full argument by both sides."
Both publishers and lawyers expressed hope that Congress might be
persuaded to limit the theoretical effects of the Court ruling. Two pending
pieces of legislation - the unified
crime bill and a C.I.A. charter- were
mentioned as areas where limiting language might be adopted.

'Scenes From King Kong'
And 'Mister Lincoln' Close
Two Broadway productions closed
over the weekend. "Mister Lincoln" by
Herbert Mitgang closed Sunday at the
Morosco Theater after five preview.·
and 16 regular performances. The star
of this one-man play was Roy Dotrice,
the British actor. The producers were
David Susskind and Isobel Robins.
"Mister Lincoln" opened last fall at the
Citadel Theater in Edmonton, Alberta,
and also played at Ford's Theater in
Washington before opening on Broadway. Peter Coe directed.
The other closing was Howard
Schuman's "Censored Scenes From
King Kong," which closed Sunday at
the Princess Theater. This revue,
which had a brief run in London, gave
11 previews and five regular performances. The cast included Carrie Fislier,
Stephen Collins, Chris Sarandon and
Peter Riegert. Michael White, Eddie
Kulukundis and Robert S. Fishko were
the producers.
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n February 19, the Supreme Court
issued a 6-3 decision in Snepp v. U.S.,
No. 78-1871 that generated a predictable
firestorm of press criticism. (One New
York Times columnist termed it "lawless,"
a sign of "disorder in the court.") Much of
this impassioned criticism, however, has
been flawed by factual error or a misunderstanding of the questions at issue.
ThecaseinvolvesaformerCentrallntelligence Agency officer, Frank Snepp, who
was stationed in Saigon at the time it fell and
who subsequently wrote a book about Vietnam entitled "Decent Interval." The government took Mr. Snepp to court because he
did not submit his manuscript to the CIA for
security review prior to its publicationarguing that in so acting, Mr. Snepp violated
the secrecy agreement he had signed in initially accepting CIA employment, as a condition of that employment.
Mr. Snepp's basic defense, argued by the
American Civil Liberties Union, was that
his secrecy agreement did not apply because nothing in his book was "classified."
The Supreme Court ruled unambiguously
in the government's favor, endorsing the
government's contention that the question
of whether or not "Decent Interval" contained any classified material was irrelevant
in this action; that this was a breach-ofcontract case, not one raising First Amendment issues; and upholding lower-court
ruling that for breaching his contract, Mr.
1 Snepp had to forfeit all earnings derived
from his book.
Appeals: The issues raised by this case are
complex and important. Though not a law.yer, I have considerable familiarity with all
sidesofallofthem. From 1966to 1973, I was
special assistant for Vietnamese affairs to
three successive directors of Central Intelligence; for the following three years, I was
deputy for national intelligence to two. In
that latter capacity, I was a member of the
CIA's highest appellate board (under the
director), considering appeals on, among
other things, recommended deletions in
manuscripts submitted for prepublication
review by current or former employees. I am
now retired and on the other side of the
fence, earning much of the money needed to
support my family by writing.
I have known Frank Snepp and his work
for many years. We have often disagreed,

O

a

but our disagreements have always been
within a context of reciprocal professional
respect and personal regard. He and the
ACLU, in fact, had me subpoenaed-from
overseas-as a defense witness in this case,
and voluntarily bore the expense of my
round-trip travel. Frank Snepp cannot be
legitimately faulted for writing or publishing "Decent Interval." His mistake lay in
not submitting his manuscript for prepublication review, as required by the secrecy
agreement he had signed-voluntarilysince no one is obliged to work for the CIA.
Despite mythology to the contrary, CIA
prepublication security review of employees' manuscripts is not "censorship" as that
term is normally understood. As I know

To have good
intelligence, our
nation must effectively
protect legitimate
intelligence secrets.
from my own experience on both sides of
this fence, such review focuses on one thing
only: the exposure of information that, in
the agency's institutional opinion, needs to
be kept classified to protect sensitive intelligence or intelligence sources and methods-not on criticism, accuracy, personal
opinions or anything else.
As the government argued and the Supreme Court ruled, whether or not anything in "Decent Interval" still required the
protection of classification was irrelevant. I
think several passages in it should have
been considered classified, and would have
so ruled had I been officially reviewing Mr.
Snepp's manuscript; but since I did not
review the manuscript officially, this is a
strictly private, personal opinion. That,
however, is precisely the central point here
involved. No former agency employee, let
alone any journalist, has any private right
to determine what is or is not properly
classified. The right to make that determination is institutional, vested by statute in
the United States Government.
Ruling on classification is not censor-

ship. Any claim that it is, or that our
government's exercise of this legitimate,
legally sanctioned right has a "chilling
effect" on former government employees'
exercise of their private rights of free expression as protected under the First
Amendment is hogwash-as I also know
from my own experience. Since retiring last
September, I have published several articles, and signed a book contract. All my
manuscripts have been or will be submitted
for prepublication security review in compliance with the secrecy agreement which I
freely signed (as did Frank Snepp). Honoring this obligation, however, has been no
bar to remunerative productivity; nor, as
anyone who reads my published prose will
see, has it been any impediment to criticizing the U.S. Government or its policies.
We are unlikely to survive this striferidden and now thermonuclear era without
good intelligence, and our nation cannot
have good intelligence without an effective
ability to protect legitimate intelligence
secrets. Prepublication screening of CIA
employees' or former employees' manuscripts-for this purpose-is essential; for
legitimate secrets can hardly be protected
if every employee or former employee assumes a private right to make declassification determinations individually and
unilaterally.
Remedies: I would be more than .prepared to go to the mat with the agency and
the government and fight tooth and nail, in
the courts if necessary, if I were ever to feel
that any CIA prepublication review of my
prose was being expanded beyond what I
considered legitimate classification determinations into anything I considered illegitimate censorship. This has not happened, however, and there are ample
remedies available to me, as an American
citizen. if it ever should.
Even though I now earn a major portion
of my living with my pen and typewriter, I
applaud the Supreme Court's "Decent Interval" decision. It was wise, sound, justand necessary to protect me as an American
citizen and to protect our country.
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George A. Carver Jr., a retired CIA offi·
cer, is currently a senior fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
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Griffin B. Bell

Secrecy After the Snepp Case
The legal principle underlying the case of the
United States v. Frank Snepp is a simple one;
but it may well be the glue that -preserves our
intelligence agencies from the ravages of a purported absolutism, described under the euphe,
mism of "the public's right to know."
Continued disclosures by ex-agent Philip
Agee, books by Snepp and others, had alarmed
intelligence officials in the United States and
abroad, American and allied. The CIA and related American intelligence agencies, :vere
more and more viewed as existing in an unstable environment.
Now that the Supreme Court has sustained
the principle that the CIA may contractually require its employees to clear any publication concerning the agency, careful consideration
should be focused on how the government is to
operate with this right.
Clearly, the government's successful action
against Frank Snepp, the ex·CIA agent who had
signed at least two agreements with the CIA to
submit matters proposed for publication concerning the agency for clearance-and who had
represented personally to Adm. Stansfield
Turner that he would-is one of the more significant recent steps to buttress our nation's intelligence capacity. The rush to disclose by exemployees and officials had reverberated
throughout the international intelligence community. Our longtime allies seriously questioned our ability to maintain their confidence
and trust, and sources questioned our ability to
protect them. Our own operatives in the field
were endangered by the disclosures of their excolleagues.
.
We are beyond the day of Le Carre·like cloak
and daggers in furnishing adequate and timely
intelligence to the president and his advisers
The writer, former attorney general in the
Carter administration, is in private practice in
Atlanta.

-------------------------------------

"In embracing.the principle of the Snepp case, there is no
lessening of our nation's resolv~ to channel the activities of
our intelligence agencies in a proper and lawful manner."
·for responding to the social, political and economic complexities of today's world. Protecting
our intelligence secrets, and the sources and
methods by which we derive them, is the cornerstone of an effective CIA.
But in embracing the principle of the Snepp
case, there is no lessening of our nation's resolve or ability to channel the activities of our
intelligence agencies in a proper and lawful
manner, to live within those safeguards and established bounds that prevent proscribed activities both at horne and abroad.
·
In a significant article on the First Amendment -and a responsible press, which caused
much comment on these pages (September 5,
1977), the late Alan Barth, a discerning First
Amendment advocate, wrote:
"There are many matters, it must be recog- .
nized, that governments-including the governments of dernocracie~ught and must keep
secret.... But the responsibility for guarding
them is a government responsibility. It is not a
responsibility of the press. Nor should the press
be considered in any sense a partner or agent of
the government in discharging this responsibility."
.
The eminent British jurist and scholar Lord
Scarman put it well when he observed that
while freedom of the press, including the right
of the public to be informed, is a transcendent
right, it is a right subject in some instances and
to some extent to the security of the nation, the
security of the individual, property rights, the
right of privacy and the right of the individual
to reputation.

In foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
there is no danger of covering up wrongdoing if
one wishes to report it. Specifically, there are internal agency and executive branch mechanisms
for disclosures, including taking the matter to the
intelligence oversight board or to the president
himself. In addition, our shared system of checks
and balances between the executive and legislative branches provides-through the congressional oversight function of the Senate and House
intelligence committees-additional means for
the "whistle blowers'" redress-all without public
disclosure necessarily of those matters that
should be protected.
Beyond a possible criminal sanction in a
clearly definable area, such as publishing the
names of CIA agents abroad, no statutory
scheme, given the limitations in definition, can
be as effective, fair or limited as the simple contractual preclearance requirement. Nor is the
argument persuasive that the contract should
distinguish between classified and nonclassified
data. The relevance of whether the matter is
classified, nonclassified or classifiable is better
left to the agency. review process. Moreover,
this across-the-board formula facilitates application of the clearance requirement to all levels
of the agency, as it should, whether the proposed author is a former head of the agency or
the lowest·level agent.
Now that the contract principle is firmly in
place, the government's own responsibility is to
see that such contracts are carefully and narrowly drafted to ensure the reasonableness of
the basic contract in relation to the job and

trust imposed, as well as to ensure the reasonableness of the agency's response. This importantly includes the speed of the review process
and the basic fairness of the review to exclude
only from publication those matters that are
and should be truly secrets. For the most part,
the greatest burden is on the reviewing agency
to ensure this. But because of the understandable reluctance of the courts to undertake a
review of the fairness of the agency review
process, not to mention the outright difficulty, - ·
consideration should be given to the creation: of
a special review panel inside the executive
branch, but apart from the agency itself, to
review any· appeals of the employee from the
agencY's own review. ThiS addresses the important concern of keeping secret those things that
should be, and not necessarily that which is
merely embarrassing or disconcerting. Resort
to the courts as is presently the case could then
be had.
The contractual principle of the Snepp case
should be limited to those_engaged in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. That many
governmental agencies employ persons who
hold positions of trust and confidentiality does
not sufficiently distinguish the very special
character and national needs of our foreign intelligence operations.
The issues in the Snepp case were not those of
the First Amendment, but rather whether the
government might exercise its responsibilities
in foreign intelligence by conditioning the employment of those who seek to enter into its employ on a publication-preclearance process. The
courts, on every level, found such a condition to
be valid and reasonable. The required forfeiture of profits was no more than an application
of the ancient maxim that one should not profit
from his own wrongdoing. The legal principles
involved and the lack of disputed facts rendered the case so simple as to warrant summary
disposition in the Supreme Court. The nation is
the better for the decision.'
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employment contract between the parties.

The United States cross petitione

on the question of remedies.
2.

FACTS:

Petr Snepp, was first employed by the CIA in 1968.

that time, he executed a secrecy
...

to publish

__.-:

agre_e~nt,

At

in which he undertook "not

w.-

any information or material relating to the Agency . . •

either during or after the term of my employment
prior approval by the Agency.

without specific

I understand that it is established Agency

policy to refuse approval to publication of or participation in publication of any such information or material."

Petr served in Viet Nam

for four and one half years for the CIA.
Petr was dissatisfied with the manner in which the CIA had conducted
its affairs in Viet Nam and resolved to write a book on the topic, nego-

}
~

tiating a publication advance with a publisher prior to his resignation
from the CIA, effective January 26, 1976.

At the time of his resignation

in 1976, he executed a "Termination Secrecy Agreement" in which he agreed
'-=-

~.....

-

--

not to publish • . . any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA . . .

without the express written consent of the Director of Central Intelligenc(
or his representative."

Defendant was told that his responsibilities

under this agreement were the same as those under the agreement that he
signed when he was employed.
Petr's book, Decent Interval, was published in November 1977.

......

Petr

did not submit the book to the CIA for prior approval before publication .
Petr maintains that he did not do so because he feared that approval would
not be given.

The governmen'c brought an action against petr in 1978,

....

3 -

alleging that petr had breached his contractual and fiduciary obligations
to the CIA by failing to submit the manuscript of his book for pre-publication review pursuant to the original secrecy agreement.

The CIA sought

damages for breach of contract and an injunction against future breaches
as well as a constructive trust over all past and future revenues from
the sale of the book.

The CIA does not contend that Decent Interval

reveals any classified information or any information concerning intelligence that has not been made public by the CIA.

The only issue was

whether a breach had occurred because of petr's refusal to submit the
book prior to publication.
3.

DECISIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS:

The DC ruled that petr had

breached his contractual and fiduciary duty to submit his manuscript for
pre-publication review.

Finding that petr's breach caused the government

irreparable harm, the DC
enjoined petr from future violations and imposed
........,_
a constructive trust on all revenues derived from Decent Interval for the
benefit of the government.

The DC injunction provided that petr must

submit all manuscripts to the CIA prior to publication but imposed upon
the CIA the condition that it complete its review within 30 days after
submission and that it withhold approval for publication of materials only
if they are classified.

In determining the remedy, the DC found that

the measure of damage inflicted on the United States by petr's breach was
not calculable.

-

Petr appealed to the CA 4.
mination

tha~

the

TheCA affirmed the lower court's deter-

s~crecy ag2:~ment

was

v~id

and had been breached.

Although upholding injunctive relief, the court declined to approve the

- 4 imposition of a constructive trust.

The court construed the 1968 and 1976

employment agreements as imposing an obligation to submit all publications,
and not just those containing classified or secret information, for approval.

The court did not determine whether the 1976 agreement superseded

the 1968 agreement, reading both agreements, contrary to the arguments of.
petr, as imposing the same obligation.

In reliance on two prior decisions

of theCA, United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (CA 4), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (Marchetti I); and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby,
509 F.2d 1362 (CA 4) cert denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (Marchetti II), the
court concluded that the prior restraints imposed by the employment agreements did not violate the First Amendment.
~~

In the Marchetti cases, the

CA 4 found that the CIA could constitutionally prohibit employees from
publishing classified information.

The court also found that as a means

of enforcing this interest, the CIA could impose pre-publication review
for all intelligence-related materials for the sole purpose of permitting
the CIA to identify ' and to withhold permission for the disclosure of
classified information.

The court recognized an obligation on the part of

the CIA to respond promptly to a request for authority to publish and
held that there was a right of judicial review if permission was withheld.
\ The court concluded that employees did have a First Amendment right to
( publish non-classified information.
The majority of the pane l departed from the DC on the issue of
dies.

reme ~

The court first concluded ·that a constructive trust was inappropri-

~

ate.

The court found that the contract only created a fiduciary obligatio1

to submit classified informa tion for pre-publication review.

The obliga tir.

- 5 -

(

to submit non-classified information was stric·tly contractual, and not
fiduciary in nature.

The court therefore concluded that there was no

fiduciary relationship established to support the imposition of the constructive trust.
The court concluded however, that on a proper factual showing, the
government would be entitled to recover punitive damages from petr.*

~----~----------------~-------------------------

.___

Although the court acknowledged that punitive damages ordinarily are not
recoverable for breach of contract, it stated that the evidence at trial,
viewed in a light most favorable to the government., was sufficient to
permit a trier of fact to find that petr had falsely represented to Agency
officials that he would comply with his contractual obligation to submit
(

his manuscript for pre-publication review and that the agency had relied
on these false representations in determining not to take legal action
to enjoin the publication of Decent Interval.
)

the court held

Under these circumstances,

petr's breach of contract may also have embraced the tort

t of deceit, for which punitive damages may properly be assessed.

The

court ruled that the amount of punitive damages that the government may
recover does not bear any necessary relationship to the amount of compensatory damages that can be proved, but rather should depend on petr's
culpability and financial circumstances.

It therefore remanded for a jury

trial on these disputed factual issues, and in the event those issues are
-wz

-

~-

resolved favorably to the government, for a jury determination of the
amount of punitive damages which should be awarded.

(~~

Judge Hoffman dissented on the remedy question.

~

He found that the

1968 secrecy agreement did establish a fiduciary relationship, and in

\ - ----.fThe-comRlaint does not claim punitive
lP.!H7t=> tn .!'lmPnf-1 !=:hn11lri h P

lih P r::~llv

& 1·::~nt P ri .

damage~

but theCA s8id

-

6 -

light of the government's conceded difficulty in proving compensatory
damages, he concluded that imposition of a constructive trust was an
appropriate remedy.

He also found that the majority's conclusion on the

potential availability of punitive damages was in error.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

breach of contract.

Petr, Snepp. Petr first argues that he was not in
This argument is premised on his conclusion that

the 1976 agreement superseded the 1.968 agreement.

He maintains that the

1976 agreement, by its terms, only requires the submission of non-public
information for pre-publication review.
Petr next argues that this Court's decisions require that a system
of censorship by a government agency must be supported by explicit
congressional authorization.

u.s.

579, 585-86 (1952).

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343

Petr maintains that no such statutory authori-

zation supports the CIA's agreement.
Petr also maintains that the agreements contravene the First Amendment.

First, petr maintains that the government has not upheld its

burden of sustaining the need for the system of prior restraint, alleging
only speculative injury from the publication of unclassified information
without prior review.

Moreover, petr maintains that he did not waive

his First Amendment rights by signing the 1968 secrecy agreement and
accepting employment with the CIA.
in cole v. Richardson, 405

u.s.

Petr relies on this Court's decision

676, 680 (1972) in which the court stated

that government employment may not "be conditioned on an oath that one
has not engaged, or will not engage, in protected speech activities such
as • . . criticizing institutions of government .

II

See also Elrod

- 7 -

c·

v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
Finally, petr alleges that punitive damages are inappropriate in
this case, both as a construction of contract law, and because they contravene decisions of this court.

Petr reasons that this court places

strict limitations on the assessment of damages against those who publish
inforrration of public importance.

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 u.s.

254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch,

Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).

Petr

also cites Electrical Workers v. Foust, 47 U.S.L.W. 4600 (May 29, 1979)
holding that punitive damages may never be awarded against a union in a
fair representation case because of the general labor policy against
punishment and the potentially disruptive consequences of such awards.
Petr maintains that similar policies against the imposition of punitive
damages are applicable here.
Amicus submissions.
·~{the

-----

Both the Reporters committee for Freedom of

Press and the Association of American Publishers have submitted briefs

in support of petr.

The briefs reiterate petr's contentions and add one.

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press maintains that the
action by the government, seeking d9mages and a constructive trust, is
in essence an action in copyright.

Amicus maintains that Congress has

prohibited the federal government from restraining a publication based
on any concept of government proprietaryinterest, common law or statutory
copyright under 17 u.s.c. § 105 (1976).
Respondent's contentions. The SG argues first that the lower court's
construction of the 1967 and 1976 agreements is both correct and not
certworthy.

The SG also reject.s petr • s statutory authority argument

-

8 -

citing 50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3) which expressly states that "The Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

In the exercise of

this responsibility, the SG maintains that the Director may proscribe
reasonable requirements designed to safeguard asainst the improper release
of information, including pre-publication review.
The SG also contends that the pre-publication review procedure is

a valid condition of employment which does not violate the First Amendment.
The SG identifies the appropriate standard for determination in Pickering
v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), where the Court stated
that:
"The State has interest as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ
significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of
the citizenry in general. The problem in any
case is to arrive at a balance between the
interest of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the state, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees."
The SG contends that it is entirely reasonable for the Central Intelligence Agency, whose principal function concerns the most sensitive and
confidential matters regarding the national defense to condition employment on a promise not to make unauthorized disclosure of classified infermation.

Only by requiring pre-publication review can the Agency hope

to prevent the compromise of important governmental functions that would
result if classified information were revealed.

The SG characterizes

the burden on the employee's First Amendment rights as minimal since under

-

9 -

the DC's decision the Agency must complete its review of

submitted

materials within 30 days and must approve the publication of all nonclassified material.

The SG concludes that so long as the contract itself

does not infringe First Amendment rights, a court injunction ensuring
adherence to that contract is also not an invalid prior restraint.
On the issue of punitive damages, the SG suggests that the claim is
premature.

If such damages are awarded after a jury trial on remand,

petr could then seek review of that question.

In any event, the SG main-

tains that since the evidence may support the conclusion that petr
11

Willfully, deliberately, and surreptitiously" breached the 1968 secrecy

agreement in a manner specifically designed to mislead the Agency, the
imposition of punitive damages would be appropriate.
Cross petition of the United States.

The United States has submitted

a cross petition on the question of the propriety of theCA's rejection
of the constructive trust.

The petition states however that the United

States only seeks to review this question if Snepp's petition is g.ranted.
In the event that Snepp's petition is denied, the United States requests
the Court to deny the cross petition as well.

On the merits, the SG

-~----,--~'--,---------------~--------------------------

argues that the CA construed the fiduciary obligation too narrowly and
that a constructive trust was an appropriate remedy for the breach of the
fiduciary obligation.

Snepp maintains that the decision of the CA on

this question was correct.
5.

DISCUSSION:

author ~ ~ation

Snepp's contrActual construction anG st~tutory

8rguments would not Bppear certworthy

-10Fir~r

inrlepenrlent of the con~titutional aue~tions.

Amenrlment
SimilAr'ouestions

were presenterl in Marchetti I, in which cert was rlenierl. (Tustices
Pouglas, Brennan and Stewart dissenting.)

Marchetti does appear,

howeverr to .. impose only an obligation to submit classified·±nform~tion

for prepublication review, perhaps on the

court's reading of the secrecy agreement.

basi~

of the

The constitutional

auestions are not insubstantial, and a conflict in the

circuit~

is unlikely to develop since the United States will probably
continue to bring such

action~

in rhe CA4 where it is winning.

The remedies ouestions are

prob~bly

premature.

At this

point in the litigation, the United States' complaint has
not even been amended to
punitive damages Pre

see~

a~sessed

recovery of punitive
after a jury trial

rl~mages.

If

the nueption

coulrl be reviewerl.
Respon~e

filed.
Mahoney
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MEMORANDUM

18 October 1979

Mr. Justice Powell

To:

From: Gregory May

No. 78-1871: Snepp v. United States
No. 79-265:

You

asked

me

to

United States v. Snepp

review

recent

cases

supporting

the

proposition that the government may put reasonable restrictions
on its employees'
think

that

F.2d 1309

the

exercise of their first amendment rights.

cases

(4th Cir.

support United States v.

Marchetti,

I
466

1972), and confirm the validity of the CIA

secrecy agreement as construed by CA4 in this case.

I. General Principles
(A) Mr. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Elrod v.
Burns,

427

U.S.

347,

360-63

(1976),

summarizes

the

guiding

principles:
( 1)

"[T] he

prohibition

on

Amendment protections is not absolute.
for appropriate reasons."

·,

encroachment

of

First

Restraints are permitted

2.

(2)

"The denial of a public benefit may not be used by

the government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling
it to achieve what it may not command directly."

See Perry v.

Sinderman,

v.

Regents,

u.s.

408

U.S.

385 U.S.

593,

589,

597

605-06

(1972);
( 1967);

Keyishian
Speiser v.

Board

of

Randall,

357

government

for

513, 526.
The

(3)

justification advanced

by

the

the impairment of first amendment rights "must survive exacting
scrutiny."

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.

1, 25 (1976).

principle, of course, has three components.
interest
burden

"must be paramount,

is on

interest."

the government to
Speiser

subordinating
government]

one of vi tal

v.

Randall,

show the

must

outweight

the

(a) The government
importance,

and

the

such

an

"The gain

to

the

[employed

by

the

existence of

supra.

interest provided by

This last

(b)

the means
incurred

loss

of

protected

rights." See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96
(1947).

(c)

"[T]he

government

must

'emplo[y]

drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement

"

means

closely

Buckley, supra,

at 25.
In

Elrod

v.

Burns,

you agreed with these principles,

but struck a different balance on the matter at hand.
U.S.

at

381-89

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

The

same

See 427

principles

find more measured expression in the passage that the SG's Brief
in Opposition quotes from Pickering v.

u.s.

563,

568

(1968).

[Quoted at 8.]

Board of Education,
The Pickering

391

language

3.

more

frankly

acknowledges

the

legitimacy

of

reasonable

restrictions on a government employee's exercise of his

first

amendment rights.
(B) Among the most helpful recent cases are Buckley v.
Valeo,

424

U.S.

(1976):

Civil

Service

Comm'n

v.

Letter

Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), and Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S.
676 (1972).
(1) Buckley upheld, among other things, a limitation on
the size of individual contributions to candidates for federal
elective office.
Court

found

actuality

that the government's

and

individual

Applying close scrutiny,

appearance

financial

of

on

Furthermore,

the Court held,

on

"less

interest

corruption

contributions"

infringement

protected

restrictive

rights

424 U.S. at 25,

was
of

in preventing

resulting
enough

to

expression,

from

the
"the

large

justify

the

id.

26.

at

Congress was not required to rely

means"

of

policing

corruption,

criminal bribery laws and disclosure requirements.

such

Id.

as

at 27-

L

28.

Both holdings support the CIA's secrecy agreement.
CIA

has

a

appearance"

clear
of

interest

leaks.

And,

in

preventing
in

light

of

The

"the

actuality

and

that

interest,

the

Indeed,

the

agency need not rely on after-the-fact sanctions.

need for forestalling interferences with the government interest
is

much

clearer

security of

when

information

the
and

government
the

is

confidence

concerned
of

its

than when it is concerned with preventing corruption.

·'

with

the

informants

(2)

Letter

Carriers

reaffirmed

the

validity

of

the

Hatch Act's limitations on political activity by federal civil
servants.

The Court found the restriction justified not only by

the

to

need

influences,

keep

government

employees

but also by the need

such freedom.

free

from

partisan

to present the appearance of

"[I]t is not only important that the Government

and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice,"
wrote the Court,
the

public

"but it is also critical that they appear to

to be avoiding

it,

if confidence in the system of

representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent."

413 U.S. at 565.
The

Mitchell,

decision,

330 U.S.

75

reaffirming
(1947),

United

Public

Workers

v.

surprised many commentators who

had believed that United Public Workers was a derelict.

See T.

Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 587, 590 (1970); G.
Robinson
(1974).

&

E.

Gellhorn,

Letter Carriers,

The

Administrative

like Buckley,

Process

demonstrates

687-88

that

the

government has not only an interest in its integrity, but also
an interest in the appearance of integrity.

And Letter Carriers

clearly

the

stands

for

the

restrict its employees'

proposition

that

government

can

first amendment activities in order to

advance these interests.
(3) Richardson upheld (by a 4-3 vote) the loyalty oath
that Mass. exacts as a condition of state employment.

The Court

had invalidated other oaths that required a prospective employee

5.

"to

reach

back

innocent,
Court
that

[his]

[political]

found

past

to

recall

405

activities."

minor,

u.s.

at

sometimes

681.

But

no bar to an oath "addressed to the future,"

simply

"illegal

into

required

and

the

employee

constitutionally

to

foreswear

unprotected

force

the

to

the
id.,

use

change

of
the

constitutional system," id. at 684.

~Richardson is helpful because it upheld a condition on
government
because,

But

employment.
as

the

majority

the

case

interpreted

does
it,

not
the

go

very

far

did

not

oath

interfere with an employee's constitutionally protected rights.
Indeed, a passage in The Chief Justice's opinion went so far as
to say that public employment may not "be conditioned on an oath
that one •
such as

the

discussing
certain

• will not engage[]
following:
political

forms

of

political office.

in protected speech activities

criticizing

doctrine

government;
Keyishian v.

that
and

institutions of government;
approves

the

supporting

overthrow of

candidates

Board of Regents,

for

385 U.S.

589

(1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board
of Public Instruction,
cases

which

foreswearing

The

368 U.S.

Chief

association

subversive organizations.

278

Justice
with

the

(1961)."
cited

Id.

at 680.

invalidated

Communist

Party

or

The
oaths
other

6.

II. Origins of Marchetti
The

Supreme

Court

relied

when considering

supra,

are

less

cases

the

instructive

upon

which

Judge

secrecy agreement
on

the

issue

Haynsworth

in Marchetti

with

which

you

I,
are

concerned.
(A)

E.

W.

involved

(1918),

Bliss
a

Co.

v.

contract

United

dispute

States,

248

between

U.S.

the

37

federal

government and a defense contractor who wanted to sell to other
powers torpedos like those manufactured for the

u.s.

government.

A large part of the dispute turned on whether the contractor had
a proprietary or patented interest in the weapon's design.
the

Court

parties'

found

that

"secrecy was

contract which 1 imi ted

an especial object"

whatever

property or

rights the contractor otherwise might have had.
The

case

contains

no

mention

of

the

first

But

of the

contract

Id. at 45-46.

amendment

and

no

discussion of whether the design was "classified" in the current
sense.
Freedman

(B)

invalidated

a

clearance

of

statutes

were

safeguards
system."

v.

state

all

statute

motion

valid

designed
Id. at 58.

only

to

providing

pictures.
if

obviate

The
they

the

u.s.

380

Maryland,

for

Court

51

pre-screening
held

contained

dangers

(1965),

of

that

such

"procedural
a

censorship

First, the censor must bear the burden of

proving that the film is unprotected expression.

Id.

Second,

the censor himself can have no powers of suppression.

He must

• •

seek "a prompt final

judicial decision" on his claims within a

"specific brief period."

Id. at 59.

Marchetti I drew upon Freedman to reach the conclusions
that (a) the CIA had an interest in suppressing only classified
information ["unprotected expression"?] ,
its decision promptly, and
disapproved
decision.

has

a

right

(c)
to

the CIA must reach

the employee whose writings are
judicial

466 F.2d at 1317.

(b)

review

of

the

agency's

Given the "sensitivity of the area

and confidentiality of the relationship in which the information
was obtained," however, CA4 held that the employee should bear
the burden of seeking
have

no

judicial review and that the court would

authority

classifications.

Id.

to
at

review
1317-18.

the
The

should bear the burden of proof at the

agency's

court did

not

secrecy
say who

judicial hearing.

But

Judge Craven's concurrence suggests that the burden should fall
on the employee.

Id. at 1318.

III. Conclusion
Although the constitutional bar against restraints on
speech

is

unreasonable

not

absolute,

restraints

as

the
a

government

condition

of

may
public

not

impose

employment.

The restraints impose must be closely tailored to a legitimate
government interest, and they must be no more restrictive than
necessary to protect that interest.

8.

The
satisfies

CIA

secrecy

agreement,

construed

The CIA has

these requirements.

preventing

as

leaks of classified

appearance of confidentiality.

clear

information and

by

CA4,

interests

preserving

in
the

Requiring new employees to agree

to prepublication review of their writings on the agency is a
reasonable

means

for

protecting

these

interests.

Post-

publications sanctions are not a viable alternative because they
are less likely to prevent unacceptable breaches of security.
Your concern that certain scraps of information, while
unclassified,

might

operations

important,

agency

is

little

fit

into a

pattern

that

would

damage

CIA

and CA4's language seems to give the

protection

against

that

---------------------------

danger.

-----

The

court,

however, has not been faced with a case where the agency seeks
enforcement of the "information about the agency not previously
disclosed"

part of

61 a,

It seems to me that disclosures that would undermine

~~

the

3. ]

security

of

its

secrecy

officially

agreement.

classified

themselves to be taken as "classified"
that

word,

conclusion.
would

and

Marchetti

I

leaves

[Snepp' s

Petn

information

at

ought

in the common sense of

CA4

It is less likely, however,

free

to

reach

that

that disclosures that

undermine the agency's appearance of inviolability--thus

damaging its ability to garner the confidence of informants--can
fit

within CA4's

language.

To

the

extent

that CA4 would not

enforce a secrecy agreement against such disclosures, it appears

------

to be conceiving the government's interests too narrowly.

The

9.

appearance of inviolability is as
appearance of integrity is

important to the CIA as the

to the government

Buckley, supra; Letter Carriers, supra.

in general.

See
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October 31, 1979

No. 78-1871 Snepp v. u.s.
No. 78-265 n.s. v. Snepp

,,

Dear Harry:
You would do me ~ favor if, at your convenience,
you would read the enclosed draft of a dissent that I have
prepared in the above cases that are relisted for me.
F.ven though the qovernment se~ks cert only if we
grant Snepp's petition, I am persua~ed that it would be in
the interest of our country to reinstate the District Court's
judgment - one that seems clearly correct. This would
require granting of both petitions, and a summary reversal
only of the portion of CA4's judgment limiting damaqes. The
issue is RO clear cut, and the dissent by Judqe Roffman so
riqht, that I see no reason to take the case for argument.
Indeed, my guess is that the government is nervous
about this case, as it would be quite disastrous if Snepp's
cross petition were qrante~ and this Court went on to
invalidate the secrecy agreement altogether. I cannot
imagine the Court reaching such a result, and yet we know
that the CIA has taken such a "beating" in recent years its
nervousness may be understandable. A bill is still pending
(according to what former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, has
told me) that would damage even further the capacity of the
CIA to function effectively in the national interest.
You may wonder why I trouble you with
precirculation review. I would prefer not to take the cases
for argument, and thus I would like to know what the chances
are of four other Justices joining me in a summary reversal.
At this time, I have spoken only to Potter, who - at the
first Conference on this case - indicated to me some

'

-~ ,, -- -- .~ :,.&'_.

"'·

··.

2.

interest. I believe he will •join 4" to deal with the cases
summarily. Although I have not yet talked to the CJ or WHR,
I am sure they will be influenced by your thinkinq.

,,
,.I

I commend to you Judge Hoffman's dissent from CA4's
on the damage (constructive trust) issue.
Sincerely

Mr. Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
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.,
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No. 78-1871 Snepp v. United States

MR. JUSTICE POWELL dissenting.
The petitioner in 78-1871J , Frank W.
Snepp, III,

a former employee of the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), published a book sharply
critical of specific CIA activities in South
Vietnam.

At the time of his employment by the CIA

in 1968 Snepp executed a secrecy agreement that
provided, in pertinent part, that he would "not
• publish • • • any information or material
relating to the Agency, its activities or
intelligence activities generally,

either during

or after the term of [his] employment • • • without
specific prior approval of the Agency."2

As Snepp

published his book without seeking or obtaininq
prior approval, the government filed this suit
seeking a declaration that the preclearance
agreement had been breached, an injunction against
further publications except in strict compliance
with the agreement, and the imposition of a
constructive trust for the benefit of the
government on all monies which Snepp had earned or

2.

will earn from the publication of his book. As of
the t ~ of suit, his realized profits totaled
about $60,000, with additional royalties expected.
Pet. 6a.

The claim for recovery of these monies

was based on an asserted violation of a fiduciary
duty by Snepp.
I

In a nonjury trial (there being no issues
of fact), the District Court found Snepp liable for
breach of his preclearance agreement, found a
breach of fiduciary duty, enjoined further
publications without compliance with his agreement,
and imposed a constructive trust on his profits
from the

book ~ The

court made specific findings

of fact, accepted by the Court of Appeals,
including a finding that Snepp "willfully,
deliberately and surreptitously breached his
position of trust with the CIA and the secrecy
agreement dated September 16, 1968. •
6a.

"

Pet. Sa,

It was further found that Snepp also had

deliberately misled CIA officials as to his
intention to publish a book without submitting it
for prior review.4

3.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court
with respect to the breach of the agreement and the
injunction against future publications.

But the

Court of Appeals reversed as to the finding of a
constructive trust.

The government had stipulated

that, for the purposes of this litigation, it did
not contend that any information in the book was
classified.

Focusing solely on that concession,

the court concluded that "on this record • • •
[Snepp] breached [no]

fiduciary obligation".

It

held that the government was entitled to "nominal
damages", and left open the possibility of punitive
damages if the government, in a jury trial, is
able to prove that classified material had been
published with tortious intent.
District Judge Hoffman, sitting on the
panel of the Court of Appeals, dissented from the
majority decision that there was no constructive
trust.

In an opinion that I find persuasive, Judge

Hoffman concluded that a constructive trust on
profits was established and that, absent such a
trust, the government is left with no dependable

4.

and effective remedy from this sort of violation of
secrecy agreements made by employees of the CIA.

I

will state my reasons for agreeing with Judge
Hoffman.
II
It is difficult to think of any
employment with the government of the United States
that involves a higher degree of trust than Snepp's
employment with the CIA.

Indeed, the first

sentence in the secrecy agreement expressly
recognized the trust relationship:

"I, Frank w. Snepp, III, understand that
upon entering upon duty with the Central
Intelligency Agency, I am undertaking a
position of trust in that Aqency • • • "
Pet. 4a.
In the stipulation of certain facts, Snepp agreed
that he had been "assigned to various positions of
trust, including two tours of duty in South Vietnam

." ,

and that hehad been granted "frequent

access to classified information, including
information regarding intelligence sources and
methods".

Pet. 4a.
Snepp thus had access to information of

the highest sensitivity.

He published his book on

5.

intelligence operations of the CIA with this
background and experience.

He published without

complying with his preclearance agreement, and did
so deliberately.

Whether he violated a

relationship and agreement of trust does not depend
upon whether the information in his book was
classified.
The secrecy agreement executed by Snepp
contained two separate restrictions upon the
disclosure or publication of information.
Paragraph 3 thereof was limited to classified
information, and contains no preclearance
provision.

Paragraph 8, however, obligated Snepp

"not to publish • • • any information" relating to
the agency or its intelligence activities without
the prior approval of the agency.

This case

therefore differs from
466 F.2d 1309, cert. den. 409

u.s.

1063 (1972),

where the constraint was limited to classified
material.

The undisputed evidence in this case

v-f}o-

( ~'"

shows that the mere publication, by a prior aqent,
of information relating to intelligence activities
may be as detrimental to national interests as the

6.

publication of specific classified information.
Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified in
this case.

When asked whether there had been any

adverse effect resulting from Snepp's publication
of his book, he replied in part as follows:

"There clearly has. Over the last six to
nine months, we had had a number of
sources discontinue work with us. We
have had more sources tell us that they
are very nervous about continuing work
with us. We have had very strong
complaints from a number of foreign
intelligence services with whom we
conduct liaison, who have questioned
whether they should continue exchanging
information with us, for fear it will not
remain secret. I cannot estimate to you
how many potential sources or liaison
arrangements have never germinated
because people were unwilling to enter
into business with us • • • • "Pet. 7a.5

In view of the foregoing, and similar testimony,
the Court of Appeals recognized that "the
[government of the United States] has suffered
irreparable harm from [Snepp's] breach" of his
agreement to preclear the publishing of information
whether specifically classified or not.

If a

former agent can publish with impunity, relying on
his own judgment as to what may be harmful, the
intelligence services of friendly countries and particularly agents recruited by the CIA - would
never be certain of the secrecy upon which their

7.

willingness to cooperate depends.
Every major country in the world has a
secret intelligence service.

The CIA, whatever

fairly may be said about some of its past
activities, is an agency essential to the security
of the United States6, and world.

in a sense - the free

It is impossible for a government wisely to

make critical decisions affecting foreign policy
and national defense without the benefit of
dependable foreign intelligence.

And the

availability of such intelligence depends in
significant part upon (i)

the sharing of secret

information by intelligence services of friendly
foreign nations, and (ii) espionage conducted
primarily by foreign nationals recruited for the
purpose.?

Admiral Turner's uncontradicted

testimony (partially set forth above) states that
Snepp's violation of his secrecy agreement has
affected adversely the capacity of the United
States to obtain needed intelligence.

Pet. 7a.

Althouqh the entire panel[ ;he Court of
Appeals accepted as fact these consequences of
Snepp's breach, a majority

nevertheless found no

8.

violation of a trust. This conclusion was reached
because the government had elected not to reveal
whether or not information disclosed by Snepp was
classified.

The Court reasoned that Snepp "has a

First Amendment right to publish anything not
classified".

Pet. 33a.

It is here, it seems to

me, that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the
issue in this case.

The government does not deny -

as a general principal - Snepp's right to publish
unclassified information.

~el--i ~ i'~('~~the

prec l

Rather, the issue is the

~:r.an:e.. agreement

that would

enable the government to determine whether material
proposed to be published includes or could
compromise classified information or sources.
Although the Court of Appeals sustained the
validity of this preclearance procedure and held
that Snepp has violated it, the court

-f"

neve~heless

seemed to reason that the obligation to preclear
unclassified information - thouqh valid and
enforceable - did not create a trust relation
~

because of a perceived First Amendment right to
publish "anything not classified."
difficult to follow this reasoning.

I find it

9.

The agreement - by its expressed terms created a trust.

The trust was not limited to

classified material, but included as well the
obligation not to publish

~ny

information relatinq

to the agency or its activities without
preclearance.

Pet. 27a, 32a, 58a, 59a, 6la.

Moreover, as Judge Hoffman stated, the "secrecy
agreement was no ordinary contract:

it qave life

to a fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp
the trust of the CIA".

Pet. 4la.7

The Court of

Appeals found that Snepp's violation
"irreparable harm".

1

had~

The disclosure of classified

information hardly could do more.

The distinction

I

drawn by the Court of Appeals is one without a
difference.
III
The holding of the Court of Appeals that
there was no constructive trust may well leave the
government, as a practical matter, with no
effective deterrent against similar breaches of
security.

It is conceded that actual monetary

damages from a publication such as Snepp's rarely
can be proved.

The suggestion that nominal damages

10 •

are available is an empty one, certain to deter no
one.

This leaves, under that court's opinion, the

possibility of the recovery in a subsequent jury
trial of punitive damages.

Yet, for the reasons

ably stated by Judge Hoffman, this remedy is likely
to be more illusory than real.
In view of the thoroughness of Judge
Hoffman's opinion on this point, I will not
elaborate.

As the Court of Appeals recognized,

punitive damages ordinarily are not available for
breach of contract. Pet. 36a.

If, as seem

likely,state law determines the availability of
punitive damages, even this speculative recourse
-I

":1

would vary dependt upon the jurisdiction in which a
suit can be brought.

More fundamentally, for the

very reason that the government in this case
elected not to rely on the disclosure of classified
information, proof that information is classified
normally will require disclosure and thus frustrate
the purpose of a secrecy agreement.
The majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals largely ignores the seriousness of this
problem.

It held, as I understand its opinion,

11.

that before the government may even attempt to seek
punitive damages it must amend its answer to
Snepp's interrogatories and prove that classified
material was published.

As Judqe Hoffman observed

"[o]nce this has been done, [the material]

is

available to the public and the media and the
purpose of any classification has been destroyed."
Pet 40a.

The same point - an obvious one - was

made by William E. Colby in a

letter to the

Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
admitted in evidence in this case.
on

In commenting

constraints against the bringing of a criminal

action, Colby stated that "[existing law] requires
the revelation in open court of confirming or
additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes
prosecution".

Pet. 68a.

In sum, the government

rarely will be willing to run the risk of probing
discovery by the defendant and a resulting
disclosure of the very material or information it
seeks to protect.

It is for this reason that the

type of preclearance procedure has been designed by
the CIA. It is intended to protect the national

12 •

interest without undue interference with the right
of a former · CIA employee to publish innocent
material.
The impressing of the profits of the
violator of the secrecy agreement with a
constructive trust avoids the foregoing problems.
As it is a remedy likely to be swift and certain,
depriving the offender of profits gained by
violation of his trust, it would have a significant
deterrent effect.

The decision of the Court of

Appeals, however, may deprive the government of its
only effective means of asssuring enforcement of
preclearance agreements that the Court of Appeals
has held to be valid.

This could impair seriously

the capability of the CIA to discharge its
statutory responsibilities:

the providing of

secret intelligence essential to decision making by
our government.

I therefore

would grant the

petition and the cross petition in this case, and
l
summarily affirm the Court of Appeals except its

holding that there was no constructive trust.
to this portion of that court's holding, I would

As

1 3.

summarily reverse and reinstate the judgment of the
District Court.

Ptl-1

<V

'

0x:(
•

Fe>e>TNe>TES

The second case, referred in the

caption above, No. 79-295
is a cross petition.

5nited ~ states · v; · Snepp,

It is conditioned on the

granting of the petition filed in No. 78-1871.

rtv- 2.

/

2.

Snepp also executed a "termination

secrecy agreement" in

c
197/J upon

the eve of his

leaving the Agency.
He thereupon reaffirmed his obligation
"never" to reveal "any classified information, or
any information concerning intelligence or CIA that
has not been made public by CIA • • • without the
express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 6la.

F/11-

3.

Snepp advanced several

defense~o

3.

the

claim he had violated his agreement, all of which

c r(c; ~
were resolved against him by the court}

below.~

In

his petition for certiorari, Snepp relies primarily
upon the First Amendment argument that his secrecy
agreement is a prior restraint and therefore
unenforceable.
(Greg will write the answer - briefly the First Amendment argument).

F~4.

/

4.

"Although [Snepp] assured, or at least

lead both Admiral Turner and Morrison of the CIA
legal staff to believe that he would submit his
manuscripts for Agency review before publication the Court finds he had no intention of so doing
because [he] was then making secret arrangements
with Random House, Inc. to publish the book - all
negotiations were conducted on park benches, in
restaurants and/or in the public library.

Snep?

admits he did everything he could to keep the CIA
from knowing about it prior to publication."
Sa, 32a.

Pet.

Ftv-5.

,__(J
I

Turner did not attribute the entire
loss of confidence in the CIA to Snepp's breach of
security.

He said:
" [Snepp's case] is one, and a very
serious one, of a number of incidents
that have diminished • • • world-wide
confidence in our ability.
"His [case], in particular, because
[he]has flaunted the basic system of
control that we have.
If he is able to
get away with this, it will appear to all
those other people that we have no
control, we have no way of enforcing the
guarantee which we attempt to give them
when we go to work with them." Pet. 7a.

f!/-6.

The CIA was established following
World War II, our government having learned
belatedly that such an agency was essential.

The

need for a central, foreign intelligence aqency has
been recognized by every President since Franklin
D. Roosevelt. By definition, foreign intelligence
operations most be secret.

FN-7.

In addition to these sources, the CIA
relies extensively on modern technology, including
satellites and other types of sophisticated
survelliance.

The various sources complement each

other, and facilitate verification and
clarification of informaation.

A recent

contemporary comment documents the extent to which
the Soviet Union relies upon espionage, and states
that "many U.S.

intelligence experts [are concerned

by] growing evidence that the Russians have been
winning [the] covert war".
Journal, Oct. 4, 1979, p. 1.

The Wall Street

F!V-

8. It also is evident that the
consequences of the violation of the preclearance
component of the secrecy agreement, as

described

by Admiral Turner, could be no less serious than
the release of some specific item of classified
information.

Pet. 7a, 32a.

8.

9.

Indeed, quite apart from the plain

language of the agreement (see Pet 8a.), the
relationship itself, the nature of Snepp's duties,
and his conceded access to classified material and
secret sources of intelligence, could have
established a constructive trust.

lfp/ss

10/19/79

MR. JUSTICE POWELL dissentinq.
The petitioner in 78-18711, Frank
Snepp, III,

w.

a former employee of the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), published a book sharply
critical of specific CIA activities in South
Vietnam.

At the time of his employment by the CIA

in 1968 Snepp executed a secrecy agreement that
provided, in pertinent part, that he would "not
• publish

any information or material

relating to the Agency, its activities or
intelligence activities generally,

either during

or after the term of [his] employment • • • without
specific prior approval of the Agency."2

As Snepp

published his book without seeking or obtaining
prior approval, the government filed this suit
seeking a declaration that the preclearance
agreement had been breached, an iniunction against
further publications except in strict compliance
with the agreement, and the imposition of a
constructive trust for the benefit of the
government on all monies which Snepp had earned or

2.

will earn from the publication of his book. As of
the tiem of suit, his realized profits totaled
about $60,000, with additional royalties expected.
Pet. 6a.

The claim for recovery of these monies

was based on an asserted violation of a fiduciary
duty by Snepp.
I

In a nonjury trial (there being no issues
of fact), the District Court found Snepp liable for
breach of his preclearance aqreement, found a
breach of fiduciary duty, enjoined further
publications without compliance with his aqreement,
and imposed a constructive trust on his profits
from the book.3

The court made specific findings

of fact, accepted by the Court of Appeals,
includinq a findinq that Snepp "willfully,
deliberately and surreptitously breached his
position of trust with the CIA and the secrecy
agreement dated September 16, 1968 • •
6a.

"

Pet. 5a,

It was further found that Snepp also had

deliberately misled CIA officials as to his
intention to publish a book without submitting it
for prior review.4

3.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court
with respect to the breach of the agreement and the
injunction against future publications.

But the

Court of Appeals reversed as to the finding of a
constructive trust.

The government had stipulated

that, for the purposes of this litigation, it did
not contend that any information in the book was
classified.

Focusing solely on that concession,

the court concluded that "on this record • • •
[Snepp] breached [no] fiduciary obligation".

It

held that the government was entitled to "nominal
damages", and left open the possibility of punitive
damages if the government, in a jury trial, is
able to prove that classified material had been
published with tortious intent.
District Judge Hoffman, sitting on the
panel of the Court of Appeals, dissented from the
majority decision that there was no constructive
trust.

In an opinion that I find persuasive, Judge

Hoffman concluded that a constructive trust on
profits was established and that, absent such a
trust, the government is left with no dependable

4.

and effective remedy from this sort of violation of
secrecy agreements made by employees of the CIA.

I

will state my reasons for agreeing with Judge
Hoffman.
II
It is difficult to think of any
employment with the government of the United States
that involves a higher degree of trust than Snepp's
employment with the CIA.

Indeed, the first

sentence in the secrecy agreement expressly
recognized the trust relationship:

"I, Frank W. Snepp, III, understand that
upon entering upon duty with the Central
Intelligency Agency, I am undertaking a
posit ion of trust in that Agency. • • "
Pet. 4a.
In the stipulation of certain facts, Snepp aqreed
that he had been "assiqned to various positions of
trust, includinq two tours of duty in South Vietnam

." ,

and that herad been granted "frequent

access to classified information, includinq
information regarding intelligence sources and
methods".

Pet. 4a.
Snepp thus had access to information of

the highest sensitivity.

He published his book on

5.

intelligence operations of the CIA with this
background and experience.

He published without

complying with his preclearance agreement, and did
so deliberately.

Whether he violated a

relationship and agreement of trust does not depend
upon whether the information in his book was
classified.
The secrecy agreement executed by Snepp
contained two separate restrictions upon the
disclosure or publication of information.
Paragraph 3 thereof was limited to classified
information, and contains no preclearance
provision.

Paragraph 8, however, obligated Snepp

"not to publish • • • any information" relating to
the agency or its intelligence activities without
the prior approval of the agency.

This case

therefore differs from Hnited · States · v: · Marchetti,
466 F.2d 1309, cert. den. 409

u.s.

1063 (1972),

where the constraint was limited to classified
material.

The undisputed evidence in this case

shows that the mere publication, by a prior agent,
of information relating to intelligence activities
may be as detrimental to national interests as the

6.

publication of specific classified information.
Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified in
this case.

When asked whether there had been any

adverse effect resulting from Snepp's publication
of his book, he replied in part as follows:

"There clearly has. Over the last six to
nine months, we had had a number of
sources discontinue work with us. We
have had more sources tell us that they
are very nervous about continuing work
with us. We have had very strong
complaints from a number of foreign
intelligence services with whom we
conduct liaison, who have questioned
whether they should continue exchanginq
information with us, for fear it will not
remain secret. I cannot estimate to you
how many potential sources or liaison
arrangements have never germinated
because people were unwilling to enter
into business with us • • • • "Pet. 7a.5

In view of the foregoing, and similar testimony,
the Court of Appeals recognized that "the
[government of the United States] has suffered
irreparable harm from [Snepp's] breach" of his
agreement to preclear the publishing of information
whether specifically classified or not.

If a

former agent can publish with impunity, relying on
his own judgment as to what may be harmful, the
intelligence services of friendly countries and particularly agents recruited by the CIA - would
never be certain of the secrecy upon which their

7.

willingness to cooperate depends.

~ ~very

major country in the world has a

secret intelligence service.

The CIA, whatever

fairly may be said about some of its past
activities, is an agency essential to the security
of the United States6, and world.

in a sense - the free

It is impossible for a government wisely to

make critical decisions affecting foreign policy
and national defense without the benefit of
dependable foreign intelligence.

And the

availability of such intelligence depends in
significant part upon (i)

the sharing of secret

information by intelligence services of friendly
foreign nations, and (ii) espionage conducted
primarily by foreign nationals recruited for the
purpose.?

Admiral Turner's uncontradicted

testimony (partially set forth above) states that
Snepp's violation of his secrecy agreement has
affected adversely the capacity of the United
States to obtain needed intelligence.

Pet. 7a.

Although the entire panel the Court of
Appeals accepted as fact these consequences of
Snepp's breach, a majority

nevertheless found no

8.

violation of a trost. This conclusion was reached
because the government had elected not to reveal
whether or not information disclosed by Snepp was
classified.

The Court reasoned that Snepp "has a

First Amendment right to publish anything not
classified".

Pet. 33a.

It is here, it seems to

me, that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the
issue in this case.

The government does not deny -

as a general principal - Snepp's right to publish
unclassified information.

Rather, the issue is the

validity of the preclearance agreement that would
enable the government to determine whether material
proposed to be published includes or could
compromise classified information or sources.
Although the Court of Appeals sustained the
validity of this preclearance procedure and held
that Snepp has violated it, the court nevetheless
seemed to reason that the obligation to preclear
unclassified information - though valid and
enforceable - did not create a trust relation
because of a perceived First Amendment right to
publish "anything not classified."
difficult to follow this reasoning.

I find it

9.

The agreement - by its expressed terms created a trust.

The trust was not limited to

classified material, but included as well the
obligation not to publish any information relating
to the agency or its activities without
preclearance.

Pet. 27a, 32a, 58a, 59a, 6la.

Moreover, as Judge Hoffman stated, the "secrecy
agreement was no ordinary contract:

it gave life

to a fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp
the trust of the CIA".

Pet. 4la.7

The Court of

~

Appeals found that Snepp's violation had Greaeed
"irreparable harm".

The disclosure of classified

information hardly could do more.

The distinction

drawn by the Court of Appeals is one without a
difference.
III
The holding of the Court of Appeals that
there was no constructive trust may well leave the
government, as a practical matter, with no
effective deterrent against similar breaches of
security.

It is conceded that actual monetary

damages from a publication such as Snepp's rarely
can be proved.

The suggestion that nominal damages

10 •

are available is an empty one, certain to deter no
one.

This leaves, under that court's opinion, the

possibility of the recovery in a subsequent iury
trial of punitive damages.

Yet, for the reasons

ably stated by Judge Hoffman, this remedy is likely
to be more illusory than real.
In view of the thoroughness of Judge
Hoffman's opinion on this point, I will not
elaborate.

As the Court of Appeals recognized,

punitive damages ordinarily are not available for
breach of contract. Pet. 36a.

If, as seem

likely,state law determines the availability of
punitive damages, even this speculative recourse
would vary depend upon the jurisdiction in which a
suit can be brought.

More fundamentally, for the

very reason that the government in this case
elected not to rely on the disclosure of classified
information, proof that information is classified
normally will require disclosure and thus frustrate
the purpose of a secrecy agreement.
The majority opinion of the Court of
Appeals largely ignores the seriousness of this
problem.

It held, as I understand its opinion,

11•

that before the government may even attempt to seek
punitive damages it must amend its answer to
Snepp's interrogatories and prove that classified
material was published.

As Judge Hoffman observed

"[o]nce this has been done, [the material]

is

available to the public and the media and the
purpose of any classification has been destroyed."
Pet 40a.

The same point - an obvious one - was

made by William F.. Colby in a

letter to the

Director of the Office of Management and Budqet,
admitted in evidence in this case.
on

In commenting

constraints against the bringing of a criminal

action, Colby stated that "[existing law] requires
the revelation in open court of confirming or
additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes
prosecution".

Pet. 68a.

In sum, the government

rarely will be willing to run the risk of probing
discovery by the defendant and a resulting
disclosure of the very material or information it
seeks to protect.

It is for this reason that the

type of preclearance procedure has been designed by
the CIA. It is intended to protect the national

12.

interest without undue interference with the right
of a former CIA employee to publish innocent
material.
The impressing of the profits of the
violator of the secrecy agreement with a
constructive trust avoids the foregoing problems.
As it is a remedy likely to be swift and certain,
depriving the offender of profits gained by
violation of his trust, it would have a significant
deterrent effect.

The decision of the Court of

Appeals, however, may deprive the government of its
only effective means of asssuring enforcement of
preclearance agreements that the Court of Appeals
has held to be valid.

This could impair seriously

the capability of the CIA to discharge its
statutory responsibilities:

the providing of

secret intelligence essential to decision making by
our government.

I therefore

would grant the

petition and the cross petition in this case, and
summarily affirm the Court of Appeals except its
holding that there was no constructive trust.
to this portion of that court's holding, I would

As

1 3.

summarily reverse and reinstate the judqment of the
District Court.

,,

~
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1.

The second case, referred in the

caption above, No. 79-295 tlnited AStates Av; · Snepp,
is a cross petition.

It is conditioned on the

granting of the petition filed in No. 78-1871.

2.

Snepp also executed a "termination

secrecy agreement" in 1978, upon the eve of his
leaving the Agency.
He thereupon reaffirmed his obliqation
"never" to reveal "any classified information, or
any information concerning intelligence or CIA that
has not been made public by CIA • • • without the
express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 6la.

fW-3.

3.

Snepp advanced several defensesto the

claim he had violated his agreement, all of which
were resolved against him by the courts below.

In

his petition for certiorari, Snepp relies primarily
upon the First Amendment argument that his secrecy
agreement is a prior restraint and therefore
unenforceable.
(Greg will write the answer - briefly the First Amendment argument).

Ftl-

4.

4.

"Although [Sneppl assured, or at least

lead both Admiral Turner and Morrison of the CIA
legal staff to believe that he would submit his
manuscripts for Agency review before publication the Court finds he had no intention of so doing
because [he] was then making secret arrangements
with Random House, Inc. to publish the book - all
negotiations were conducted on park benches, in
restaurants and/or in the public library.

Snepp

admits he did everything he could to keep the CIA
from knowing about it prior to publication."
Sa, 32a.

Pet.

5.

Turner did not attribute the entire

loss of confidence in the CIA to Snepp•s breach of
security.

He said:
" [Snepp•s easel is one, and a very
serious one, of a number of incidents
that have diminished • • • world-wide
confidence in our ability.
"His [case], in particular, because
[he]has flaunted the basic system of
control that we have.
If he is able to
get away with this, it will appear to all
those other people that we have no
control, we have no way of enforcing the
guarantee which we attempt to give them
when we go to work with them." Pet. 7a.

fl/·6.

6.

The CIA was established following

World War II, our government having learned
belatedly that such an agency was essential.

The

need for a central, foreign intelligence agency has
been recognized by every President since Franklin
D. Roosevelt. By definition, foreign intelligence
operations most be secret.

ffJ-7.

7.

In addition to these sources, the CIA

relies extensively on modern technology, including
satellites and other types of sophisticated
survelliance.

The various sources complement each

other, and facilitate verification and
clarification of informaation.

A recent

contemporary comment documents the extent to which
the Soviet Union relies upon espionage, and states
that "many U.S. intelligence experts [are concerned
by] growing evidence that the Russians have been
winning [the] covert war".
Journal, Oct. 4, 1979, p. 1.

The Wall Street

8. It also is evident that the
consequences of the violation of the preclearance
component of the secrecy agreement, as

described

by Admiral Turner, could be no less serious than
the release of some specific item of classified
information.

Pet. 7a, 32a.

.

.
ftl-- 9

9.

Indeed, quite apart from the plain

language of the agreement (see Pet 8a.), the
relationship itself, the nature of Snepp's duties,
and his conceded access to classified material and
secret sources of intelligence, could have
established a constructive trust.

0

No. 78-1871: Snepp v. United States
No. 79-265:

United States v. Snepp

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting:
In
seeks

No.

review of

78-1871,
a

Frank

judgment enforcing

agreement

that

he

signed

employment

with

the

Central

(CIA) .

In

No.

conditionally
refusing

to

W.

when

79-265,

that

the

the

accepted

he

Agency

United

from

profits

III,

secrecy

Intelligence

cross-petitions
find

Snepp,

States

a

judgment

attributable

to

Snepp's breach of that agreement arefmpressed with
a constructive trust.

I would grant the petitions

for

order

certiorari

in

to

reimpose

i

constructive trust

the

I

fr~ I h; ~e..,c":l~~ ~

I

Based on his experiences as a CIA agent,
Snepp published a book highly critical of certain
CIA activities

in South Vietnam.

Snepp published

the account without submitting it to the Agency for
prepublication

review.

At

the

time

he

accepted

employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed

a

secrecy

agreement

promising

that

he

&

2•

would "not

•

. publish •

• any information or

material relating to the Agency,

its activities or

intelligence activities generally, either during or
after

the

term of

[his)

• without

employment

specific prior approval of the Agency."
The

promise

was

in

addition

to,

Pet. 59a.

and

in

aid

of,

Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any
classified

information

relating

without proper authorization."
Government

brought

agreement.
breached

this

suit

to
Id.

to

the

Agency

_l/

58a.

enforce

The

Snepp's

It sought a declaration that Snepp had
the

contract,

an

injunction

requiring

Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication
review, and an order imposing a constructive trust
for

the Government's

Snepp

might

violation
Agency.

earn

of

his

benefit on

from

all

publishing

fiduciary

profits
the

obligations

book
to

that
in
the

~/

The District Court
"willfully,

deliberately

found
and

that Snepp had
surreptitously

breached his position of trust with the CIA and the
[1968)
without

secrecy

agreement"

submitting

it

to

by

publishing

prepublication

his

book

review.

3.

456

F.

also

Supp.

found

176,
that

179

(ED Va.

Snepp

1978).

The

deliberately

court

misled

CIA

officials into believing

that he would submit the

book

clearance.

for

prepublication

The

District

Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust
on Snepp's profits.
The

Court

~

of

Appeals

had breached a valid contract.
that Snepp's failure
prepublication
harm"

on

national
Thus,
future

had

intelligence

the

court

violations

obligation.

"il

that

Snepp

It also agreed

to submit his manuscript

review

security.

J..k- ~---f$, K<..L

agreed

inflicted

activities

595 F.2d 926,
upheld
of

the

"irreparable

vital
935

to

(CA4

injunction

Snepp's

for

our

1979).
against

prepublication

The court, however, concluded that the

record did not support imposition of a constructive
trust.

The

conclusion

rested

on

the

court's

perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right
to

publish

unclassified

Government's

concession--for

litigation--that
classified

information
the
book

Snepp's

intelligence.

Id.

at

and

the

purposes of this
divulged
935-36.

!/

no
In

~"-d-~
~

4.

other

words,

fiduciary
the

the

obligation

secrecy of

- that

court

the

thought

extended

----

classified

Government

that

only

to

Snepp's

preserving

material. F

probably

would

n=

not

g

r-V

divulge

classified information in order to prove that Snepp
had

breach

alternative

his

trust,

remedies.

the

court

First,

the

suggested

court

thought

that breach of contract entitled the Government to
at least nominal damages.
1 held,

proof

l all~w--......_

that

the

Furthermore,

breach

was

tortious

the Government to recover punitive damages.
~~~.......

Judge

..

Hoffman,

........

sitting

by

.

{

.-- ~·-

designation,

dissenting from the refusal to find a constructive
trust.

-

saw

I n an opinion that

no

basis

for

I

find

separating

persuasive,

Snepp's

hlf

fiduciary

obligation to protect classified intelligence from
his

obligation

prepublication
obligations
relationship.

..

to

submit

review.

He

derived
"The

all

concluded

from
1968

the

secrecy

wrote, "was no ordinary

contract~

fiduciary

relationship

and

trust

the

of

CIA."

Id.

manuscripts
that

same

both
trust

agreement,"

he

it gave life to a

invested
at

for

938.

in

Snepp

the

Prepublication

4.

other

words,

fiduciary
the

- -- - -

the

court

obligation

extended

only

that
to

Snepp' s

preserving

--~
----snep_E.

classif ~_ma~.ri .;;tl
R1der A, p. 4

secrecy of
____

LFP/1~

thought

10/23/79

I
It therefore limite

d recoverY to

nominal damages,

of punitive damages if the
and to

t he possibilitY

government

-

in a jury

trial - cou l

d shoW tortious

conduct.

I

~

recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct

obligations, one to protect classified information
and the other to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review.

Both served the purpose of

enabling the CIA to oreserve necessary secrecy and
discharge effectively the duties imposed upon it by
law.

Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations

derived from the same trust relationship, and he
saw no basis for finding that a trust existed as to
one but not the other.

~

5.

clearance
protect

was

part

confidences

of

Snepp•s

associated

undertaking
with

his

to

trust.

Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a
speculative

and

inappropriate

breach.

I

agree

breached

a

proceeds

of

with

fiduciary
his

Judge

remedy
Hoffman

obligation

breach

for

are

Snepp• s

that

and

Snepp

that

impressed

the

with

a

constructive trust.

II

Snepp•s employment with the CIA involved

.

an

~m~high

In the opening

degree of trust.

sentence of his secrecy agreement, Snepp explicitly
recognized

that

relationship.
imposed

the

information
submitting
trial

~/

he

obligation

not

to

undertaking

had

been

and

that he had been granted

classified

assigned

to

the

for clearance.

that--after
11

trust

a

entering

The trust agreement specifically

relating
it

was

publish

Agency

without

Snepp stipulated at
this

obligation--he

to various positions of trust 11

information,

11

frequent

including

access

to

information

6.

regarding
F•

intelligence sources and
at

S u pp •

about

Snepp

.§./

178 •

activities

CIA

on

background and exposure.
his

obligation

to

published
basis

the

4 56

methods~"

his

book

of

this

He deliberately violated

submit

for

material

all

prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret
information with which he had been entrusted to the
risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not
depend

upon

classified
deny--as
publish

whether

a

general

this

book

trust

stage

of

reposed

the

in

that
him,

does

not

riqht

to

does

it

Nor

litigation--that

classified

claims

contained

Government

information.

contains

simply

The

actually

principle--Snepp's

unclassified

Government
special

book

information.

contend--at
Snepp's

his

in

material.
light

Snepp

The

of

the

should

have

given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether
the

material

compromise

he

proposed

classified

to

information

publish
or

would

sources.

Neither of

the Government's concessions undercuts

its

that

claim

Snepp's

failure

to

submit

prepublication review was a breach of his trust.

to

7.
1

The
shows

that

agent

of

undisputed

publication

by

information

activities

can

be

interests.

Admiral

evidence
a

former

relating

to

detrimental
Turner,

in

to

this

case

intelligence
intelligence
our

Director of

national
the

CIA,

testified that Snepp's book and others like it have
seriously

impaired

intelligence

the

effectiveness

operations.

"Over

the

of
last

American
six

to

nine months," he said,
"we
have
had
a
number
of
sources
discontinue work with us.
We have had
more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us.
We have had very strong complaints from a
number of foreign intelligence services
with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue
exchanging information with us, for fear
it will not remain secret.
I cannot
estimate
to
you
how
many
potential
sources or liaison arrangements have
never germinated because people were
unwilling to enter into business with
us."
456 F. Supp. at 179-80.
If

former

agents

may

rely on

their

own

judgment

about what information is harmful, the intelligence
services of friendly nations and the foreign agents
recruited

by

the

CIA

secrecy upon which

cannot

be

assured

of

~ '
their cooperation depends.
In

view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the

District

Court

recognized

that

obligation

to

and

Snepp's

submit

his

the
breach

Court
of

of
his

Appeals
distinct

material--classified

/p./ \

the

or

l

.----

8.

not--for

prepublication

clearance

has

irreparably

~)_
!1/f

harmed the United States Government~

',..~~

III

The
denies
for

decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

the Government the most appropriate remedy

Snepp's

acknowledged

wrong.

Indeed,

as

a
(

practical matter,

the decision may well leave the

Government

no

with

reliable

similar breaches of security.
the

actual

such

as

damages
Snepp's

Nominal damages

after

a

Even

if

jury

generally

against

No one disputes that

attributable

are a

to deter no one.

deterrent

to

are

a

publication

unquantifiable.

hollow alternative,

certain

The punitive damages recoverable

trial

recovered,

are

speculative

they may

bear

and

no

unusual.

relation

to

either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's
unjust gain.

{t_L/-~k~
~ur-sui t"

of""\ the only remedy

Court of Appeals has left it,
may

lose

enforce.

the

benefit of

Proof of the

the

21

that

the

the Government

bargain

it

seeks

to

tortious conduct necessary

8.

not--for

prepublication

clearance

has

harmed the United States Government.

III

irreparably

~

~

~

~

Rider A, p. 8
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Snepp

I
.
'th
In sum~ this was no ordinary fa1lure to comply Wl
.
t'10n.
a contractual ob 1 1ga

It was a deliberate

breach of a very special trust relationship with

our government.

after

a

Even

if

jury

trial

recovered,

are

speculative

they, may

bear

and

no

unusual.

relation

to

either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's
unjust gain.

Court of Appeals has left it,
may

lose

enforce.

the

benefit of

Proof of the

the

21

the Government

bargain

it

seeks

to

tortious conduct necessary

9.

to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the

Government

very

secrets

to

disclose

at

trial

that Snepp promised

some of

to

the

protect. G

t \

___.-)

he

least,

the

Government's

need

Snepp's knowledge, motivation,

to

delve

<;;

into

and representations

to CIA officials may open it to probing discovery

~to

the

confidential

Agency's

~
will the Government
introduced
Colby

at

noted

cases.

Snepp's
the

addi tiona!

in

this

trial,

analogous

Existing

revelation

run

law,

he

open

affairs

risk.

In

former

CIA

Director

in

criminal

problem
stated,

court

information of

Rarely

of

such a

a

letter

"requires

the

confirming

or

nature

that

the

potential damage to the national security precludes
prosecution."

Pet.

68a.

cannot

its

remedy

secure

When

the

without

Government
unacceptable

danger, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand,
protects both the Government and the former agent
from

unwarranted

risks.

It

is

the

natural

ordinary consequence of a breach of trust.

~/

and
It

deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief
to

the

dimensions

of

the

wrong.

If

the

agent

......,.

9.

to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the

Government
secrets

very
e

least,

to

that
the

disclose

at

trial

Snepp promised

Government's

nepp's knowledge, motivation,

to

need

some

of

the

protect. l At

to

_.-J

delve

into

and representations

o CIA officials may open it to probing disco_v_e_r:...y
~-.1.--Rider A, p. 9
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Snepp

I
The trial of such a suit, before a jury if the

5",

.

defendant so elec~, would subject the CIA and 1ts
i\

officials to probing discovery into the Agency's
highly confidential affairs.

cannot

secure

its

remedy

without

unacceptable

danger, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand,
protects both the Government and the former agent
from

unwarranted

It

risks.

is

the

natural

ordinary consequence of a breach of trust.

and

~/

It

deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief
to

the

dimensions

of

the

wrong.

If

the

agent

1 0.

secures
with

prepublication

no

fear

of

clearance,

liability.

requires

obligation,
him

to

faithlessness.

disgorge

Since

the

publish

the

agent

in violation of his
trust

the

remedy

benefits

remedy

is

simply
of

likely to

~1

information

saddle

damages

out of

decision

of

the

the

be

deter those who would place

at

risk.

As

the

remedy

reaches only funds attributable to the breach,
cannot

his

~~1-o

swift and sure, it
sensitive

the

can

~f

Even

publishes unreviewed material
fiduciary

he

all

former

agent

proportion

Court

of

with

to

exemplary

his gain.

Appeals

it

deprives

The
the

Government of this equitable and effective means of
protecting the secret intelligence so essential to
our national security.

I therefore would grant the

petitions in this case '" euler

~

~

t A reinstate.S:he

full judgment of the District Court.

SNEPP: FOOTNOTES

1. Upon the eve of his departure from the
Agency in 1976, Snepp also executed a "termination
secrecy agreement."

That document

obligation

to

"never"

information,

or

reveal

any

reaffirmed

"any

information

his

classified
concerning

intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA .
the

.

• without the express written consent of

Director

of

representative."

Central
Pet. 61a.

Intelligence

or

his

2.

2. At the time of suit, Snepp already had
received

about

$60,000

in

advance

payments.

His

contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits.
(ED Va. 1978).

456 F. Supp. 176, 179

3.

3. The Court of Appeals and the District
Court

rejected

each

of

Snepp's

enforcement of his contract.
(CA4

1979);

456

F.

defenses

to

the

595 F.2d 926, 931-34

Supp.

at

180-81.

In

his

petition for certiorari, Snepp relies primarily on
the

that

claim

unenforceable

as

his
a

prior

is

agreement

secrecy
restraint

on

protected

speech.

~~~PI~ .Le~.fl_J
1\

Service
565

The

claim

Comm'n v.

( 1973),

is

without

merit.

Letter Carriers,

In

413 U.S.

Civil
548,

this Court explicitly recognized that

the Government can

impose reasonable restrictions

on its employees' exercise of their First Amendment
rights

in

order

integrity

and

to

the

preserve

appearance

both
of

governmental

integrity.

See

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Cole v.
Richardson,

405

U.S.

676

( 1972).

The

Government

has a like interest in protecting both the secrecy
of information harmful to our national security and
the appearance of confidentiality so essential to
the effective operation of our foreign intelligence
service.
is

a

See

r.,· ,

'-t,'

reasonable

interest.

infra.
means

Snepp's secrecy agreement
for

protecting

this

vi tal

4.

4.

The

distinguished
Marchetti,

this

466

F.2d

concession

Government's
case

from

1309,

United

cert.

States

denied,

v.

409 U.S.

1063 (1972), on which the Court of Appeals relied.
There,

the

employee

intended

publication
1 31 3.

Government

The

of
court

claimed

agreement

classified

case,

the

former

information.

therefore

to

prepublication review.
this

a

CIA

to violate an agreement against

appropriate remedy for
an

that

Court

did

not

Id.

at

consider

the

~d

the

submit

all

breach of

material

for

By relying on Marchetti in
of

Appeals

overlooked

the

difference between Snepp's breach and the violation
at issue in Marchetti.

5.

5. The first sentence of the 1968 secrecy
agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, III, understand
that

upon

entering

duty

with

the

Central

Intelligence Agency, I am undertaking a position of
trust

in

Pet. 58a.

that Agency of

the Government

"

6.

6. Quite apart from the plain language of
the secrecy agreement, the nature of Snepp's duties
and

his

materials
See

595

conceded
could
F.2d

at

access

to

establish
939

a

(Hoffman,

secret
trust
J.,

sources

and

relationship.
concurring

in

part and dissenting in part).
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Rider A, Footnote 6

Snepp

/
Few types of government employment
higher degree of trust than that

~

involve a

~n
;'\

employee of the CIA with Snepp's duties.

FAI6

Rider
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Snepp

Every major country in the world has a
secret intelligence service.

The CIA, whatever

fairly may be said about some of its past

.

Q

_

/~

.

~~4~4-e•y~~~
activities, is an agency/\ essential to the security
of the United States6, and - in a sense - the free
world.

It is impossible for a government wisely to

make critical decisions affecting foreign policy
and national defense without the benefit of
dependable foreign intelligence. {And the
availability of such intelligence depends in
significant part upon (i)

the sharing of secret

information by intelligence services of friendly
foreign nations, and (ii) espionage conducted
primarily by foreign nationals recruited for the

§ 3 'Z

~" ~

+o-k

7.
r •

'

r·

even

this

Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that
remedy

Government must
punitive damages
damages.

Id.

may

be

unavailable

bring

suit

in a

only

upon

proof of

at

940.

The

if

the

state that allow

Court

compensatory
of

Appeals

majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach
of

a

award.

secrecy agreement will

support an exemplary

See id. at 936 & n.10, 937-38.

8.

q

p.

See

595

F.2d

at

939

(Hoffman,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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In
seeks

No.

review of

78-1871,
a

Frank

W.

Snepp,

judgment enforcing

agreement

that

he

signed

employment

with

the

Central

(CIA) .

No.

when

the

III,

secrecy
accepted

he

Intelligence

Agency

c-,.,-11:· • -.
In

79-265,

the

United

States ) cross-

~

I

4A-

a.

petitions from the part:._ o :E-~ judgment refusing to
find

tif ?{.,a.( ~ Y"~J

that profits Snepp earned by his breachL were

impressed with a constructive trust.

I would grant

the petitions for certiorari in order to reinstate
the constructive trust.

Based

on

his

experiences

as

a

CIA

~o.-.r;

e ~ Snepp published a book highly critical of
certain

CIA

activities

in

South

Vietnam.

Snepp

published the account without submitting it to the
Agency for prepublication review.

At

the

time he

accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however,
Snepp
that

had
he

executed
would

"not

a

secrecy

agreement
publish

promising
any

2.

information or material relating to the Agency, its
activities

or

intelligence

activities

generally,

either during or after the term of [his] employment
without
Agency."
to,

and

"not

Pet.

specific

to

to

of

in

the

addition

Snepp's concurrent undertaking

disclose

relating

approval

The promise was

59a.

in aid of,

prior

any

the

information

classified

proper

without

Agency

.).1
authorization."

Id.

58a.

( !:..!

The

Government

brought this suit to enforce Snepp's agreement.
sought

a

contract,

declaration
an

breached

the

injunction requiring Snepp to submit

future

writings

order

imposing

Government's

that Snepp had

It

for prepublication review,
a

benefit

constructive
on

all

trust

profits

and an
the

for
that

Snepp

might earn from publishing the book in violation of

~

/

his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. !:_l/[fn on
$60, at time of suit]

'

The District Court found
"willfully,

deliberately

that Snepp had
surreptitously

and

breached his position of trust with the CIA and the

1,_,

[1968]
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/

secrecy
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176, ~
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(ED Va.

1978).
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Supp.

The court also found that

-a(

c~~--~~

sc:-4

3.

Snepp

deliberately

believing

that

misled

he

prepublication

would

enjoined

officials

submit

clearance.

5--~

v~herefore

CIA

the

The

into

book

for
Court

District

p, ~ . . . ~-'M')

Lfuture

breaches

of

secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust

~-

profits. ~

on Snepp's

The
had

breached

Court of

a

valid

Appeals

agreed

contract.

~

that

[fn

Snepp

on

1st

a&~> e'll·"l "'"ot'~
It poinet ly fl~ that Snepp' s failure to

Amdnd]

submit his manuscript for prepublication review had
inflicted

"irreparable

activities

vital

harm"

intelligence

on

tl'-"",r

/

926 ,

935

( CA4

injunction

19 7 9 ) .

against

prepublication
concluded

to L national
Thus,
future

the

F. 2d

the court upheld the

violations
The

obligation.

that

595

security.

record

of

court,

did

not

imposition of a constructive trust.

Snepp's
however,
support

The conclusion

rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a
First

Amendment

information

and

right
the

to

publish

Government's

unclassified

concession--for

the purposes of this litigation--that Snepp's book
div ~~ classified

intelligence.

Id.

3 6 • l ~(1:-ffi on M,.;w:.ch.e.t..t.J,- as- a_ c .l_~s s i f •

at 935-
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In

other

fiduciary
the

words,

the

court

obligation

secrecy

that

the

of

thought

extended

classified

Government

that

only

to

preserving

material.

probably

Snepp's

Recognizing

would

not

divulge

classified information in order to prove that Snepp
had

breach

alternative

his

trust,

remedies.

the

court

First,

the

suggested

court

thought

that breach of contract entitled the Government to
at least nominal damages.
held,

proof

that

the

Furthermore,

breach

was

the court

tortious

would

allow the Government to recover punitive damages.
Judge

Hoffman,

sitting

by

designation,

dissenting from the refusal to find a constructive
trust.
saw

In an opinion that

no

basis

for

I

find

separating

persuasive,

Snepp's

he

fiduciary

obligation to protect classified intelligence from
/

his

obligation

prepublication
/

obligations
relationship.

to

submit

review.
derive9
"The

all

He

concluded
the

from
1968

manuscripts

secrecy

wrote, "was no ordinary

contract~

fiduciary

relationship

and

trust

the

of

CIA."

Id.

that

same

both
trust

agreement,"

he

it gave life to a

invested
at

for /

938.

in

Snepp

the

Prepublication

5.

clearance

was

part

of

Snepp's

undertaking

Lc,

protect

confidences

~elathmshiP. :- -

argued,
remedy

Punitive

were both a
for

associated

Snepp's

s ~eia r

Judge

Hoffman

speculative and
breach.

I

+···\.;

~he

with

damages,

to

inappropriate

agree

with

Judge

Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed
with a constructive trust.

r~

II

Snepp's employment with the CIA involved
an extremely high degree of trust.

In the opening

sentence of his secrecy agreement, Snepp explicitly
recognized

J

that

r~ l

relationship.w
imposed

the

information
submitting
trial

he

obligation

for

that--after

entering

trust

a

The trust agreement specifically

relating
it

was

to

not

to

the

publish

Agency

without

clearance.

Snepp stipulated at

undertaking

this

obligation--he

had been "assigned to various positions of trust"
and

that he had been granted

classified

information,

"frequent

including

access

to

information

6.

regarding
F.

intelligence

sources

17~- ~y

Supp. at x x.

v
exposure.
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' Snepp published his book

on

the
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and methods."

basis of

this

t

CIA

background

and

He deliberately violated his obligation

to submit all material

for prepublication review.

Thus, he exposed the secret information with which
he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not
depend

upon

classified
deny--as
publish

whether

a

general

The

this

book

trust

stage

of

reposed

the

in

that
him,

does

not

right

to

does

it

Nor

litigation--that

classified

claims

contained

Government

information.

contains

simply

actually

principle--Snepp's

unclassified

Government
special

book

information.

contend--at
Snepp's

his

in

material.
light

Snepp

The

of

should

the
have

given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether
the

material

compromise

proposed

classified

Neither of
its

he

claim

information

the Government's
that

to

Snepp's

publish

would

or

sources.

concessions

undercuts

failure

to

submit

to

prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The

undisputed

evidence

in

this

case

7.

~ shows
agent
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~
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thati publication
of

by

information

activities

can

be

interests.

Admiral

a

former

relating

to

detrimental
Turner,

intelligence

to

intelligence
our

Director of

national
the

CIA,

testified that Snepp's book and others like it have
seriously

imT?aired

intelligence

the

effectiveness

operations.

"Over

of

the

last

American
six

to

nine months," he said,
"we
have
had
a
number
of
sources
discontinue work with us.
We have had
more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us.
We have had very strong complaints from a
number of foreign intelligence services
with whom we conduct 1 iaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue
exchanging information with us, for fear
it will not remain secret.
I cannot
estimate
to
you
how
many
potential
sources or
liaison
arrangements
have
never germinated
because people were
unwilling to enter into business with u~ ~
- . ~ 456 F. Supp. at ~-.- !(<f --<J;O ..
If

former

agents

may

rely

on

their

own

judgment

about what information is harmful, the intelligence
services of friendly nations and the foreign agents
recruited

by

the

CIA

secrecy upon which

cannot

be

assured

of

the

their cooperation depends.

In

view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the

District

Court

recognized

that

obligation

to

not--for

and

Snepp's

submit

his

the

Court

breach

of

of
his

Appeals
distinct

material--classified

prepublication clearance

has

or

irreparably

8.

harmed the United States Government.

III

The
denies
for

decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

the Government the most appropriate remedy

Snepp's

acknowledged

wrong.

Indeed,

as

a

practical matter,

the decision may well leave the

Government

no

with

reliable

similar breaches of security.
the

actual

such

as

damages
Snepp's

deterrent

No one disputes that

attributable
generally

against

to

are

a

publication

unquantifiable.

Nominal damages are a hollow alternative,
to deter no one.
after
Even

a
if

jury

certain

The punitive damages recoverable

trial

recovered,

are

speculative

they may

bear

no

and

unusual.

relation

to

either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's
unjust gain.
,..-c>.

In

pursuit

-·r

r-emedy

~

-t?.._,
the

~.,_IP;-v-.

GOVernment may lose the benefit of the ~~n ~ it
seeks

to enforce.

Proof of the

tortious conduct

necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages
may force the Government to disclose at trial some

9.

of the very secrets that Snepp promised to protect.
At the least,

the Government's need to delve into

Snepp's knowledge, motivation,

~ to

and representations

..,....~-.,

~41

CIA officials

into

the

Agency's

will

the

Government

introduced
Colby

at

noted

cases.

additional

confidential
run

Snepp' s
the

in

this

trial,

analogous

Existing

revelation

open it to probing discovery

law,

he

open

affairs.
In

risk.
former

court

information of

of

such a

a

letter

CIA Director

problem
stated,

Rarely

in

criminal

"requires

the

confirming

or

nature

that

the

potential damage to the national security precludes
prosecution."

Pet.

68a.

cannot

its

remedy

secure

When

the

without

Government
unacceptable

danger, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand,
protects both the Government and the former agent
from

unwarranted

ordinary

risks.

consequence

It

of

a

is

the

breach

natural

of

trust.

and

_!)

It

deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief
to

the

secures
with

no

dimensions

of

prepublication
fear

of

the

wrong.

clearance,

liability.

Even

If
he

the

can
if

agent

publish

the

agent

1 0.

publishes unreviewed material
fiduciary
requires

obligation,
him

to

faithlessness.

the

disgorge

Since

the

in violation of his
trust

the

remedy

benefits

remedy

is

simply
of

likely to

his
be

swift and sure, it will deter those who would place
sensitive

information

at

risk.

As

the

remedy

reaches only funds attributable to the breach,
cannot

saddle

the

former

damages

out of

all

proportion

decision

of

the

Court

of

agent

with

to

Appeals

his

it

exemplary
gain.

deprives

The
the

Government of this equitable and effective means of
protecting the secret intelligence so essential to
our national security.

I therefore would grant the

petitions in this case in order

to

full judgment of the District Court.

reinstate

the
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seeks

No.

review of

78-1871,
a

Frank

that

he

signed

employment

with

the

Central

In

No.

conditionally
refusing

to

79-265,

that

the
he

when

the

accepted
Agency
States

United

from

profits

a

III,

secrecy

Intelligence

cross-petitions
find

Snepp,

judgment enforcing

agreement

(CIA) •

W.

judgment

attributable

to

Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed with
a constructive trust.

I would grant the petitions

for

order

certiorari

in

to

reimpose

the

constructive trust found by the District Court.

I

Based on his experiences as a CIA agent,
Snepp published a book highly critical of certain
CIA activities

in South Vietnam.

Snepp published

the account without submitting it to the Agency for
prepublication

review.

At

the

time

he

accepted

2

0

employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed

a

secrecy

would "not .

agreement

. publish •

promising

that

he

. any information or

material relating to the Agency,

its activities or

intelligence activities generally, either during or
after the term of

[his]

employment

• without

specific prior approval of the Agency."
The

promise

was

in

addition

to,

and

Pet. 59a.
in

aid

of,

Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any .
classified

information

relating

without proper authorization."
Government

brought

agreement.
breached

this

suit

to

Id .
to

1

the

Agency

.!/

58a.

enforce

The

Snepp's

It sought a declaration that Snepp h.:td
the

contract,

an

injunction

requiring

Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication
review, and an order imposing a constructive trust
for

the Government's benefit on all

Snepp

might

violation
Agency.

of

earn
his

from

publishing

fiduciary

profits
the

obligations

book
to

that
in
the

'!:_/
The District Court found

"willfully,

deliberately

and

that Snepp had
surreptitously

breached his position of trust with the CIA and the

3.

[1968]

secrecy

without
4 56

F•

also

agreement"

submitting
S u pp.

found

it

17 6 ,
that

by

to

179

publishing

prepublication

( ED Va •

Snepp

his

197 8 ) .

book

review.

The court

deliberately

misled

CIA

officials

into believing that he would submit the

book

prepublication

for

The

clearance.

District

Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust
on Snepp's profits.
The
findings

of

Court
the

of

District

Appeals
Court

accepted

the

agreed

that

and

il

Snepp had breached a valid contract.
agreed

that

Snepp's

failure

to

It also

submit

his

manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital
to our national security.
1979).

Thus,

the

court

595 F.2d 926,
upheld

the

935

(CA4

injunction

against future violations of Snepp's prepublication
obligation.

The court, however, concluded that the

record did not support imposition of a constructive
trust.

The

conclusion

rested

on

the

court's

perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right
to

publish

unclassified

information

and

the

4.

Government's

concession--for

litigation--that
classified
other

·the

Snepp's

purposes of this
divulged

book

intelligence.

words,

fiduciary

the

the

In
thought

court

obligation

extended

that

only

to

recovery

to

nominal

Snepp's

preserving

It therefore

secrecy of classified material.

limited

no

damages

and

to

the

possibility of punitive damages if the government--

-;

in a jury trial--could prove tortious conduct.
Judge

Hoffman,

sitting

by

designation,

dissenting from the refusal to find a constructive
In an opinion that

trust.

recognized

that

Snepp

had

I

find

persuasive,

assumed

two

he

distinct

obligations, one to protect classified information
and

the

other

to

submit

prepublication review.

all

manuscripts

for

Both served the purpose of

enabling the CIA to preserve necessary secrecy and
discharge effectively the duties imposed upon it by
law.

Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations

derived

from

the

same

trust

relationship,

and

he

saw no basis for finding that a trust existed as to
one

but

not

the

other.

"The

1968

agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary

secrecy

contract~

it

5.

gave life to a fiduciary relationship and invested
in

Snepp

the

trust

Prepublication

of

the

clearance

_!i. 1 at

CIA."

was

part

of

938.

Snepp's

undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust.
were

Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued,

both

for

a

Snepp' s

speculative
breach.

and

I

inappropriate

agree

with

Judge

remedy
Hoffman

that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation and that
the

proceeds

of

his

breach

are

impressed

with

a

constructive trust.

II

Snepp's employment with the CIA involved
a

uniquely high degree of

trust.

In

the opening

sentence of his secrecy agreement, Snepp explicitly
recognized

that

relationship.
imposed

the

information
submitting
trial
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was

relating

that--after

a

trust

The trust agreement specifically

obligation

it for

entering

not

to

to

the

publish

Agency

without

clearance.

Snepp stipulated at

undertaking

this

obligation--he

had been "assigned to various positions of trust"
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and

that

he

had

classified
regarding

been granted

information,
intelligence

F.
about
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Snepp
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to

and methods.
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the

to
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He deliberately violated

background and exposure.
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including

~I

178.
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0

all

material

for

prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret
information with which he had been entrusted to the
risk of disclosure.
Whbther Snepp violated his trust does not
depend

upon

classified
deny--as
publish

whether

a

general

this

book

trust

Government

information.

stage

contains

simply

The

actually

principle- - Snepp's

unclassified

Government
special

book

information.

contend--at
Snepp's

his

of

in

that
him,

does

not

right

to

does

it

litigation--that

classified

claims

reposed

the

Nor

contained

in

material.
light

Snepp

of

should

The
the
have

given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether
the

material

compromise
Neither of

he

proposed

classified

to

information

the Government's

publish
or

would

sources.

concessions undercuts

7.

its

claim

that

Snepp•s

failure

to

submit

to

prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The
shows

that

agent

of

undisputed

publication

by

information

activities

can

be

interests.

Admiral

evidence
a

former

relating

detrimental
Turner,

in

to
to

this

case

intelligence
intelligence
our

Director of

national
the

CIA,

testified that Snepp•s book and others like it have
seriously

impaired

intelligence

the

effectiveness

operations.
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0ver

the

of
last

American
six

to

nine months, .. he said,
//nwe
have
had
a
number
of
sources
discontinue work with us.
We have had
more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us.
We have had very strong complaints from a
number of foreign in tell iqence services
with whom we conduct 1 iaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue
exchanging information with us, for fear
it will not remain secret.
I cannot
estimate
to
you
how
many
potential
sources or
liaison arrangements
have
never germinated because
people were
unwilling to enter into business with
us ...
456 F. Supp. at 179~80 •
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(/If

former

agents

may

.1-

rely on

their

own

judgment

about what information is harmful, the intelligence
services of friendly nations and the foreign agents
recruited

by

the

CIA

cannot

be

assured

of

the

secrecy upon which their cooperation depends.
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In view of this and other evidence in the record,
both

the

District Court and

the Court of Appeals

8.

recognized

that

obligation

to

not--for

Snepp's

submit

breach

his

prepublication

of

his

material--classified

clearance

has

harmed the United States Government.
9 35 ;

4 56

failure

F•
to

distinct

S u pp • I at

18 0 .

comply with

a

or

irreparably
595 F.2d/ at

This was

no ordinary

contractual

obligation.

It was a deliberate breach of a very special trust
relationship with our government.

III

The

decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

denies the Government the most appropriate remedy
for

Snepp's

acknowledged

wrong.

Indeed,

as

a

practical matter,

the decision may well leave the

Government

no

with

reliable

similar breaches of security.
the

actual

such

as

damages
Snepp's

deterrent

No one disputes that

attributable
generally

to

are

a

publication

unquantifiable.

Nominal damages are a hollow alternative,
to deter no one.
after

a

Even

if

jury

certain

The punitive damages recoverable

trial

recovered,

against

are

speculative

they may

bear

no

and

unusual.

relation

to

9.

either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's
unjust gain.
If it were to pursue the only remedy that
the

Court

of

Appeals

has

left

~I

it,

the

Government may lose the benefit of the bargain it
seeks

to enforce.

Proof of

the

tortious

conduct

necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages
may

force

the

Government

to disclose some of the

. very secrets that Snepp promised to protect.
trial

of

such

a

suit,

before

a

jury

The

if

the

defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials
highly

to

probing

confidential

discovery

into

affairs.

Rarely

trial,

Agency's

former CIA Director Colby noted
Existing

the analogous problem in criminal. cases.
law,

he

court
such

of
a

national
68a.

"requires

confirming

nature

that

security

the

revelation

or

additional

the

potential

precludes

in open

information of
damage

prosecution."

to

the
Pet.

When the Government cannot secure its remedy

without
all.

stated,

the

will

In a letter introduced

Government run this risk.
at Snepp' s

the

unacceptable danger,

it has no

remedy

at

1 0.

A constructive trust, on the other hand,
protects both the Government and

the

from

the

unwarranted

risks.

It

is

former

agent

natural
~/

ordinary consequence of a breach of trust.

and
It

deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief
to

the

dimensions

secures

of

the

prepublication

clearance,

with no fear of liability.
unreviewed material

wrong.

If
he

the
can

aqent

publish

If the agent publishes

in violation of his

fiduciary

obligation, the trust remedy simply requires him to
disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.

Since

the remedy is likely to be swift and sure,

it is

likely

1

deter

information

those

who

at risk.

As

would
the

place

sensitive

remedy reaches only

funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle
the former agent with exemplary damages out of all
proportion to his gain.
of

Appeals

equitable
secret

and

deprives
effective

intelligence

security.

so

The decision of the Court
the

Government

means

of

essential

of

protecting
to

our

this
the

national

I therefore would grant the petitions in

this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.

SNEPP: FOOTNOTES

1. Upon the eve of his departure from the
Agency in 1976, Snepp also executed a "termination
secrecy agreement."

That document reaffirmed

obligation

to

"never"

information,

or

reveal

any

"any

information

his

classified
concerning

intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA • • • without the express written consent of
the

Director

representative."

of

Central
Pet. 61a.

Intelligence

or

his

f&#2.

2. At the time of suit, Snepp already had
received

about

$60,000

in

advance

payments.

His

contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits.
(ED Va. 1978).

456 F. Supp. 176, 179

3. The Court of Appeals and the District
Court

rejected

each

of

Snepp's

enforcement of his contract.
(CA4

1979);

F.

456

Supp.
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to
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'

595 F.2d 926, 931A34

1

1

at

his
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petition for certiorari, Snepp relies primarily on
the

claim

his

that

unenforceable

as

a

agreement

secrecy

prior

restraint

is

on
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As the Court of Appeals held,

the claim

speech.

is

without

Letter

merit.

Carriers,

In

413

Civil

u.s.

Service

548,

565

Comm'n

(1973),

v.
this

Court explicitly recognized that the Government can
impose

reasonable

restrictions

on
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employees'

exercise of their First Amendment rights in order
to

preserve

both

governmental

appearance of integrity.

u.s.

integrity

and

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424

c;;--

1, 25-28 (1976); Cole v. Richardson, 405

676 (1972).

the

u.s.

The Government has a like interest in

protecting both the secrecy of information harmful
to

our

national

confidentiality

security
so

and

essential
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appearance

to

the

effective

operation of our foreign intelligence service.
p.
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infra.

reasonable
interest.

Snepp's
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agreement

protecting
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See

~
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a

vital

~~~4.
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distinguished
Marchetti,
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466

F.2d

Government's
case
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1309,

cert.

concession

United

States

denied,

v.

409 U.S.

:;::::l_
1063 (1972), on which the Court of Appeals relied.
There,

the

employee

claimed

that

a

former

CIA

intended to violate an agreement aga..,.Q~8.

publication
1 31 3.

Government

The

of

classified

court

therefore

information.
did

not

@J~

consider

at ..

the

appropriate remedy for

the breach of an agreement

to submit all material

for prepublication review.

By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of
Appeals overlooked

the difference between Snepp' s

breach and the violation at issue in Marchetti.

5. The first sentence of the 1968 secrecy
agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp, III, understand
that

upon

entering

duty

with

the

Central

Intelligence Agency, I am undertaking a position of
trust

in

Pet. 58 a.

that Agency of

the

Government~ .

"

~Jj6.

6. Quite apart from the plain language of
the secrecy agreement, the nature of Snepp's duties
and

his

conceded

materials
See

c:-

595
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could
F. 2d at
1

and

government
trust

than

access

to
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939

a
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(Hoffman,

dissenting

in

employment

involve

that

secret

reposed

J.,

in

a

and

relationship.
concurring
Few

part).
a

sources

types

of

higher degree of
CIA

employee

with
' I

Snepp's duties.

in

7.

Every major nation in the world has a

secret

intelligence

fairly

may

be

The

service.

said

about

some

CIA,
of

whatever
its

past

activities, is an agency thought by every President
since Franklin D. Roosevelt to be essential to the
security of the United States and--in a sense--the
free

world.

wisely

to

It

make

is

impossible

critical

for

decisions

a

government

about

foreign

policy and national defense without the benefit of
dependable foreign intelligence.

PAl 8.

8. Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that
even

this

remedy

may

be

unavailable

if

the

Government must bring

suit

in a state that allow

punitive

damages

upon

proof of

damages.

Id. \

only
at

940.

The

Court

compensatory
of

Appeals

majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach
of

a

award.

secrecy agreement will

support an exemplary
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1

at
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concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265.

Decided October -, 1979

MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiotari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The /
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent/
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information rela · g
~ the Agency without proper authorization." !d., 58a. 1 The
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-

~Q£~-,.._:2-.,..--,
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Government brought this suit to enforce Snepp's agreement.
/ It sought a declaration that Snepp had breached the contract,
an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for
prepublication review, and an order imposing a constructive
trust for the Government's benefit on all profits that Snepp
might earn from publishing the book in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
·The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib\rately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [19681 secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it i;'prepu51ica 1011 review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. Th.e Dis- .
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
·
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 3 /

I

@

---"""'"'

1\

-frr"'_

/

form ation concerning intelligence or CIA that. has not been made public
by CIA ... without the 'eXJ1ress written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his reprrsentative." Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of su it, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher providE's for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
defen ses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp relics primarily on the claim that his secrecy agreement is unenforceable as a prior restraint on protected speech.
As the Court of Appeals held , the claim is without merit. In Civil
Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973), this Court
explicitly recognized that the Government ran impose rea sonable restric. ns on its employees' rxerrise of their First Amendment rights in order
reserve both governmrntal integrity and the appearance of integrity.
See uckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976) ;j.poze v=:-R1chardson, 405
u~ s. 676 19 ')
h Government has a like inteJ1eSt in protecting both
to our national security and the appearhe· secrecy of information
ance of confidentiality so essentia · to the effective operation of our foreign

Lf;:z.. '-f. u ~ s..

g':z. ~)
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. I d., at
935- 936.4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government--in a jury trial-could prove tortious cor-n~d;..;;u;..;;c.t.--::--~-/
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissen · from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublica.tion review. Both 1!;;
e;:mrpoee of enab~ the CIA tfPreservj~cessary ~
..,ecrecy and dischar~f~ffect)veJy the duties imposed upon it by
law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived
from the same trust relationship, and he saw no basis for
finding that a trust existed as to one but not the other. "The
1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract;

p.~<fnfra.

intelligence service. See
Snepp's secrecy agreement is a
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest.
4 The Government's concession di~tinf£:!ished this case from United Stat es ~
v.'Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 130~cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972),(oR ;,}~~
,
·
There, the Government claimed that a former
~

?..CA +)>

~of- ~ ~~kstf
a

______.,
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it gave life to a fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp
the trust of the CIA." !d., at 938. Prepublication clearance
was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences asso/ ciated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman
argued, were both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for
Snepp's breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp
breached a fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his
~each are impressed with a constructive trust.
·

I

II

Snepp's employment with the CIA involved
high
degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a trust
relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed the
obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information, including
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178. 6 Sncpp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for
prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret information with which ·he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
. Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-

__

.__

The first Eentenoe of the 1968 secrecy agreement read: "I, Frank W.
Snepp, III, understand that U!)On entering duty with the Central Intelligence Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
Go'."ernment ... .'" Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the secrecy agreement, the
nature of Snepp's duties and his conceded access to secret Rources and
materials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d., at 939
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types of
govermnent}employment invo[v,e a higher degree of trust than that reposed
in a CIA et'iployee with Snepp's duties .
5

"

.

....
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Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the \(J~~~~'7
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
a former intelligence agent of information relating to in tell llgence activites can be detrimental to our national interests
Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp s
\ book and others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six
to nine months," he said,
~
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.

,_.gy_

If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de~
pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, bot~ / .. ·

-

Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service. · se
.· ~
~:yhateve r fairly may be said about some of its pa ·t activities,J.is a~J.-- J7l~e.C/A
encf'thought by every President sinl'e Franklin D. Roosevelt to be fesntial to the security of the United States and-in a sen se-the free
world. It is impossible for a government wisely to make critical decisions
7

L __
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the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
~
nited States Government. 595 F. 2d, af--- - 935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Governent's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
·
pursue the only remedy that the Court of
Appeals has le t it,! the Govern:m~m~ay-l~ the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. ProofOf tne~ortwus conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
~
·jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and it~
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
about forrign poli cy and national defense without the benefit of dependable
foreign intelligence.
8 Judge H offman's dissent suggests that even this rem edy ma y be unavailable if the Government must br.ing suit in a Sta.te thal allovv. 1unitive
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. !d., at 40. The
Court of Appeals majority, how('ver, held a a matter of federal law
~
that the nominal damagrs recoverable for any breach of a secrecy agr~e
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n . 10, 937938.
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In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable
it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the o Jier hand, protects both the;___,-------;
overnment and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 1i£i'" k ls ~t'!d'1
is the natural and ·~Ul:~ consequence of a breach of trust. 9 L
_
It deals fairly with 5oth parties by conforming relief to the
dimensions of the wrong. If the agent secures prepublication
clearance, he can publish with no fear of liability. If the
agent publishes unreviewed material in violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. Since the remedy is
likely ~ swift and sure, it is ·
to
place sensitive information at risK.
c;'h;:;-;:;;;:;;:;:::;r,;-;~;r:;-;;-;;-:::;-:.:::;;,.~--:::-only funds attributabTe to the breacli,
former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to
his gain. The decision of the Court of Appeals deprives the
Government of this equitable and effective means of pro· to ~ national
tecting the secret intelligence
security. I therefore would grant t e pe Ition m this case
and reinstate summarily the full judgment of the District
~-Court.

9 See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) .
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, ~' Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., 58a.1 The
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a "termination secrecy agreement ." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
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Government brought this suit to enforce Snepp's agreement.
It sought a declaration that Snepp had breached the contract,
an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for
prepublication review, and an order imposing a constructive
trust for the Government's benefit on all profits that Snepp
might earn from publishing the book in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the f1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it..te("prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 3
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the expre~s written con ent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of suit, Snrpp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher providrs for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Snpp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Court of Apprals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses to the enforcrment of his contract.. 595 F. 2d 926 , 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp rdies primarily on the claim that his secrecy agreement is unenforceable as a prior restraint on protected speech.
As the Court of Appeals held , the claim is without merit. In Civil
Service Comm'n v. L ette1· Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973), this Court
explicitly recognized that the Government ran impose rra::;onable restrictions on its employres' exercise of their First Amendment. rights in order
to pre erve both governmental integrity and the appearance of intrgrity.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Cole v. R ichardson, 405
U. S. 676 (1972) . The Govcrnmen1, has a like intei,cst in protecting both
the secrecy of information harmful to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. I d., at
935-936. 4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissen~
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both
served the purpoEe of enabling the CIA to preserve necessary
secrecy and discharge effectively the duties imposed upon it by
law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived
from the same trust relationship, and he saw no basis for
finding that a trust existed as to one but not the other. "The
1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract;

/

intelligence service. See p. x, infra. Snepp's secrecy agreement is a
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest.
4 The Government's concession di~tinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), on which
the Court of Appeals relied. There, the Government claimed that a former
CIA employee intended to violate an agreement against publication of
classified information. Ibid., at 1313. The court therefore did not consider the appropriate remedy for the breach of an agreement to submit all
material for prepublication review. By relying on Marchetti in this case,
the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's breach
and the violation at issue in Marchetti.

~
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it gave life to a fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp
the trust of the CIA." I d., at 938. Prepublication clearance
was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman
argued, were both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for
Snepp's breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp
breached a fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his
breach are impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved a uniquely high
degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a trust
relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed the
obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information, including
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178. 0 Snepp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He
deliberately vfolated his obligation to submit all material for
prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny- as a general principlefi The first Eentence of the 1968 secrecy ngreement rend: "I, Frnnk W.
Snepp, III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Int elligence Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of tho
GoVIernment . .. ." P et. 58a.
6 Quite apart from t1JC plain language of the secrecy agreement, the
nature of Snepp's duties and his conceded access to secret sources and
rn::~t e ri a l s could est ablish a trust. relationship . See 595 F. 2d ., at 939
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and di s~e nting in part). F ew types of
government employment involve a highc r degree of trust than that reposed
in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publicatiol'l
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activites can be detrimental to our national interests.
Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's
book and others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six
-to nine months," he said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179- 180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation depends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
7 Every major nation in the world has a secret int elligence service.
The
CIA, whatever fairly mny be said about some of its past activiti es, is an
agency thought by every President sinPe Franklin D . Roosevelt to be essential to the security of the United States and-in a sense-the free
world. It is impossible for a government wisely to make critical decisions

6
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the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
terial-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has ineparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
parably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
If it were to pursue the only remedy that the Court of
Appeals has left it, 8 the Government may lose the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable
foreign intrlligence.
s Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy rna~
available if the Government must bring suit in a Statr that allow.Jpunitive
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. !d., at 940. The
Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any b11each of a srcrery agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937938.
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In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable ~r. it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent, fJ:~Hfl ttnwa.rrantea risks. -It ;ris the natural and cwaiNfY!.Y consequence of a breach of trust. 11
It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the
dimensions of the wrong. If the agent secures prepublication
clearance, he can publish with no fear of liability. If the
agent publishes unreviewed material in violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. Since the remedy is
likely to be swift and sure, it is~ o e er t ose w o would
reac es
place sensitive information at risk. As t 1e reme
only funds attributabTe to the breach, it cannot saddle the
former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to
his gain. The decision of the Court of Appeals deprives the
Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligence -SO ess~ntial o ~ natwna
security. I therefore would grant the petition in this case
and reinstate summarily the full judgment of the District
Court.

9 See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

-----
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871. Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not . .. publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
(
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d.,~~
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a "tt>rmination secrecy agrt>ement." That rlocument reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any cla::;sified information, or any in-
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract. an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Suepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 3
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not be€n made public
by CIA ... without the f'xprPs:; written con:;ent of the Director of Central'
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a..
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in advance payments. His contract. with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Co~1rt of Appeals and the Di:;trict Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses td the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp reliei:i primarily on the claim that. his :;ecrecy agreement is unenforceable as a prior restraint ou protected speech.
As the Court of Appeals held, the claim is without merit. In Civil'
Setvice Coinm'n v. Lette1· C'anie1·s, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973), this Court
explicitly recognized that the Government can impo::>e rea::>onable restriction::> on its !employees' exerci::>e of their First Amendment right;; in order
+to pre:;erve both governmental integrity and the a 1 earance of inte rit ;.
tf.l,. ~ ~
See Buckley v. Valeo 424
. 1 25-28 197 · reer v. Spack 424 U.S .
~~' 8<~~ (Pow•LL, J., "'"''""'U>o); Gok v. RUohocd,on, 405 U. S..
1
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted ''irreparable harm" on
intellige11ce activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926. 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged uo classified iutelligence. ld., at
935-936.' In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both
aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obliga.tions derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
676 (1972). The Gov<'rnmf'nt has n like interest in protecting Loth the
serrecy of information important to our national ;;rcurity and thr appearance of confidentiality ;;o e:;;;ential to the effective operation of our foreign
intelligrncr service. Ser p. 5, i11/ra. Snrpp'~ ;;rcrecy agrrrment is a
remmnable meam; for protecting thi~ vital interest.
4 The Governmf'nt's conce:;:sion di~tinguished thi;; ca,;e from Uuited States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1::!09 (CA4) , cert. denird, 409 U.S. 1063 (HJ72).
Thrre, the Governmrnt claimed that a former CIA employer intrnded to
violate his agreemrnt not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at
131:3 . Marchetti tlwrrfore did not considf'r the appropriate rrmedy for
the brrach of an agrerment to l'ubmit all material for prepublication
rf'view. By relying ou Marchetti in thi:s cal:le, thr Court of Appt>ab ovfrlooked the differeuce between Suepp's breach and the violation at i,;sue
in Marchetti.
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existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiduciary relationship and in vested iu SHepp the trust of the
CIA." I d., at 938. Pl'epuLlication clearance was part of
Snepp 's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Puuitive <.lamages. Judge Hotfma.u argued. were
both a speculative aud inappropriate remedy for Snepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman tha.t Snepp breache<.l a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after uudPrtaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information. including
information regarding intelligence sources an<.! methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178. 0 Snepp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for
prepublication review. Thus. he exposed the secret information with which he had been eutrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained c~assified information.
"The fir:>t ~cntrnoP of tlw l!J6R ~c·crrcy agn•rment I'Pad: "I. Frauk W.
Snepp, Ill, uudpr,-taud that upon Pntrring duty with tht' CPutral Intt>llig~>nce Agrucy, I am uudt'rtaking n pu~ition of tru~t in that Agency of the
GoVJernment. ... " Pet. 58a.
u Quite apart frcm t.lw plain languagt' of the :secrecy agreemc·nt, the
1mtun~ of Snepp'~ duties and hi~ conreded arce~:; to ::;ecret. ::;uurcPs and
m:.tterial::; could e~tahli:sh a tm:st rrlation~hip. SPe 595 F. ~d., at 939
(Hoffmau, J., conrurring in part aiHl dis:s<•ntiug in part) . Few types of
governmental l:'mploymmt involvt> a highrr degree of t ru:st than that
repo~Sed in a CIA employee with Snepp's dutie:;.
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"fhe Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former inte1ligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turuer, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about contiuuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct lia.ison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations a.nd the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation depends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence ~ervice.
Whatever fairly may be said about some of its past activitie:;, the CIA is
un agency thQught by every Pre:;ident ~ince Franklin D . Roosevelt to be
1
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r~TTED
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the District Court anu tlw C'ourt of Appt'ab rt'eognized that
bn>aeh of his distinct obligation to submit his material-elassifif•d or· not--for prepublication elearanct- has irreparably harmed the rnited :-itates Goverllluent. .1H5 F. 2d, at
035; 4.)() F. Supp .. at. 180. This was no ordiuary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. 1t was a deliiJ<'rate
breach of a very spPcial trust rolatiouship with our
Gover·nrucnt.

~n<'pp's

III
The dt•eision of the C'our·t of Appeals uenies the Govemment
the wost appropriate remPdy for Surpp's acknowledgeu wrong.
I nde(•d. as a pmctieal mattPr. the <lecisiott may well leave the
Gowrnlllent with no reliable deterrent against similar
brt>aclws of security. No Oil<' disput:Rs that tlw actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp 's generally
ar·e unquautifiable. X ominal damages are a hollow alternativ<'. certain to detrr 110 one. The punitive damages recoverabh• after a jury trial ar<' speculative ami unusual. Even if
rrcovered. ·they may bt'ar no relation to either the Government'1:! irreparablt' loss or S11epp's unjust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the only remeuy that the
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to e11force. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclosf• some of the very secrets that
Suepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
('~~ l' utial

1o tlw ~ermit~ · of the l inited Rtal!·~ and-in a ~~·u~~~lh!' fn·c
world. H i~ impo~:;ibh~ for a govf'l'lllllPilt wi~el~· lo mak!' !'ritiral d1·cision:s
t1boul fon·ign puli1·~· all!l national drfrn:-o~• wi1hout lh1• ],euPfit. of d!•pt•udable
for~>ign inll'lligeHr<•. ~f'!' getwrally T. Powers, The ::\fan Who K1·pt the
~('('1'!' 1,;

(197!)).

.Tudg!' Hoffmnn'>< di,.:.~pnt ~ug;ge~l,.; that l'V('ll tlu:< n·nwd~ · mar IJf• llll:wailahh· if the Govf'rnment mu,.;t bring :<nit in a Slat!' that allow~ punitive
rhunngp;; on!~· upon proof of compen:;atory damage:;.
. at
1c
Court. of .\Jll*:il" majorit~·. huw(·v<•r, hPld a~< n malt!•r of jt'drml law
!lull 1ht- :uomiuul dnmag;t' :< n•!'O\'t•rnbl(' for an,\· lJI•P:I!'h of a :<PI'I'!'t'.\. agn•t•nwut will ~upport an exPmplary nward. Sl'e id ., at D:1ti, aud 11. 10, 9a7b
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jmy if the defcnda.nt so elPct.o;;, would subject the CIA ami itl:l
officials to probing discovery in to tlw Agency's highly coufidential affairs. Rarely will the GoverllllWllt ruu this risk.
Tn a ](~tter introduced at RuPpp's trial. former CIA DirPctor
Colby 11otcd tlw analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, lw stated, "requires the revelatiou in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a. nature that the
potential damage to the natioual security precludes prosecutiou." PPt. 68a. Wlwn the Government eannot secure its
rernedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust. 011 the other hand, protects both the
Govf'rnment and the forlller· agent from unwarranted risks.
This remetly is the natur·al a11d customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 11 Tt deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secur£>s prepublication clearance, he can publish with uo fear·
of liability. If the agent publishes umeviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary obligation. the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgorge the beHefits of his faithlessness.
Sine<> the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
renwdy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
aU proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives thl' Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligeuce that may COil~
tri~te to national security. I therefore would graut the peti'-/~in this case aud reinstate summarily the full judgment
of thr District Court.
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Snepp (Rider A, p. 2)

10/31/79

When Snepp accepted emnlovment with the CIA,

voluntarilv

h~

siqned the aqreement that expresslv ohliqated him to submit
any proposed oublication for prior reviP.w.

He does not claim

that he executed this aqreement under duress.

Indeed, he

voluntarily reaffirmed his obliqation when he left the
Aq ncy.

MorPover, this Court's cases make

cle~r

that the

GovernmPnt - even in the absPnce of an exnress aqreement could have imposed reasonahle restrictions on Aaencv
employees' exercise of their First Amendment riq ts in order
to protect substantial qovernment interests.
Comm' v. Letter Carriers, 413
Buckley v• Va1eo, 424
424

u.~.

Cole v.

82A (1Q76);
~ichardson;

u.s.

..!:2.·
405

u.s.

548,

56~

Civil Service
(1973); see

1, 25-28 (1976); Greer · v. Soock,

at 844-848 (Powell, J., concurrinq);

u.s.

676 (1972).

new fn 8:
Since concurrent findings of fact by t
Court and the Court of Appeals establish that Snepp's
the most restrictive part of his agreement has caused
r
irreparable injury, we are unpersuaded by~ MR. JUSTICE STEVENS'
claim that the trust agreement was unreasonably broad. Post, at
4.
Indeed, the analogy between Snepp's contract and an employee's
covenant not to compete is unenlightening. The analogy simply
points out that certain unreasonably restrictive contracts are
against public policy. But MR. JUSTICE STEVENS offers nothing to
suggest why Snepp's agreement was an unreasonable restriction on
any of Snepp's rights. Cf. note 3, supra. Nor does MR. JUSTICE
STEVENS show why this agreement, the breach of which has caused
irreparable injury to our national interests, is contrary to
public policy.

SNEPP: INSERT A??

'---------------~~

on p5, 1st full ' ' before las

Had Snepp
honor his agreement,

misled the CIA into believing he would
e Government could have secured an
to submit his material for

injunction that
prepublication rev

United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309

CA4), cert. deni d, 409

u.s.

1063 (1972).

Thus, neither • • .
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on page 6, as last

~~

j

in Part I I:

~A

Snepp's conduct was no ordinary failur ~:o comply with a
contractual obligation.
It was a deliberate bre ch of a very
special trust relationship with our Government. The contract in
which Snepp agreed to undertake his "position o trust," supra, at
4 and n.5, was designed to protect some of the ost sensitive
information in our society from inadvertent dis losure.
It also
was designed to protect the appearance of invio able
confidentiality upon which the success of intel igence operations
so vitally depends.
Snepp specifically promise not to publish
any material related to his employment without iftSnr~q that
publication did not compromise these goals. His obligations to
avoid the risk of inadvertent disclosure and to preserve t~e _
appearance of confidentiality were ~~r~~~~~~-&e
his obligation not to divulge the confidential inlOrrnation which
those conditions allow his employer to obtain.
fn 9 Snepp's
breach of this fiduciary obligation entitles the Government to an
adequate, equitable remedy.

J'l'~ 9:

BRO[pP.r~ J;;'E~

O.U.I?
conceeds that, even in the absence of a
written contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to
protect confidential information obtained during the course of his
employment. Post, at 3. He also conceeds that all personal
pr~fits gained from the exploitation of such information are
impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the employer.
Post, at 5.
In this case, he seems to think, the common law would
n:'Ottreat information as "confidential" unless it were
"classified." See, e.g., post, at 3. We should have thought that
the common law obligation was considerably more expansive. See,
e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency§§ 396(c), 400 and Comment c,
~and Comments b, d (1958); V Scott on Trusts§ 505 (1967).
But
since this case involves a specific written contract, we have no
occasion to linger over that question.

~-

j

~

rv P ' : '9,

"

"

/:/V

~~t-o~,_

~ i'4ri- J.LL

·. "v.'.

/t...~t<-- 9 ~

-~-o;~~
9~

f

1~

d

~UJ¢1

November 2, 1979
Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 ...

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .

No.

79-265

UNITED STATES
vs.

SNEPP

Relisted for Mr. Justice Powell.

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

Burger, Ch. J .......... .
Brennan, J ........................... .
Stewart, J ........................... .
White, J ............................ .
Marshall, J .......................... .
Blackmun, J ......................... .
Powell, J ........................... .
Rehnquist, J ........... .
Stevens, J ........................... .

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
N

POS'l'

DIS

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NO'l' VOTING

November 2, 1979
Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 . . .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No. 78-1871

SNEPP
vs.

UNITED STATES

Relisted for Mr. Justice Powell.

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN'l'
N

POST

DIS

AFF

MERITS
REV

MOTION
G

AFF

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

D

Burger, Ch. J .......... .
Brennan, J ........................... .
Stewart, J ........................... .
White, J ............................ .
Marshall, J .......................... .
Blackmun, J ......................... .
Powell, J ........................... .
Rehnquist, J ........... .
Stevens, J .......... ................. .
•

•

•

•

•

0

••••

0

•••••••

0

••••

0

0

•••

•••

0

•••••••

••••••••••••••

0.

0

0

0

0

••

0

•••

0.

0

••

0

0

•••

0

•••

0

•••

0.

,I

Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum

____________________lL/-'-----· 1--?
19 ..

~~~yvv

~~~-~

/;t~~~~~i!Y~·

,Iff\

~
.r hr~ / w•J ·
~
4

~ f/1'} #w~

~:

on

1

Mp.._J

November 9, 1979
Voted on .................. , 19 .. .
Assigned .................. , 19 . . .
No. 79-265
Announced ............... . , 19 .. .

Court ................... .
Argued .................. . , 19 .. .
Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

UNITED STATES
vs.

SNEPP

Relisted for Mr. Justice Powell.

HOLD

FOR

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN'l'

CERT.
G

N

D

POST

DIS

MERITS

AFF

REV

MOTION

AFF

G

ABSEN'l'

NOT VOTING

D

Burger, Ch. J .......... .
Brennan, J ........................... .
Stewart, J ........................... .
White, J ............................ .
Marshall, J . ......................... .
Blackmun, J ......................... .
Powell, J .............. .
Rehnquist, J ........... .
Stevens, J ........ . . . ..... . .......... .
0

••••••••••••••

0

•••••••

•••••••••

0

••••••

••••

0

••

•••

0

0

0

0

0

••••

0

••

0

••

0.

0.

0

0

•••••

0

•••••••••

November 9, 1979
Voted on .................. , 19 .. .
Assigned .................. , 19 . . .
No.78-1871
Announced ................ , 19 .. .
~

Court ................... .
Argued ................... , 19 .. .
Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

SNEPP
vs.

UNITED STATES

Relisted for Mr. Justice Powell

HOLD
FOR

Burger, Ch. J

0

•••

0

0

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN'l'

CERT.
D

G

N

•••••

Brennan, J ........................... .
Stewart, J ........................... .
White, J

0

0

••••••••

••

0

0

0

0

•

0.

0

•••

0

•••••

Marshall, J .......................... .
Blackmun, J ......................... .
Powell, J ........................... .
Rehnquist, J ........... .
Stevens, J

.

0

0

0.

0

0

0.

0

0

0

0

0

0.

0

0

0.

0.

0

0.

0

0

0

0

POST

DIS

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

,jup:rtntt '!Jottrittf tJrt~~ ~bdtg
Jhu~~ ~. ~ 2!l~~$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 16, 1979

Re:

78-1871 and 79-265- Snepp v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please add my name to your dissenting opinion
in these cases.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

'l' o: 'l'h>

c:

p

Jwt•v·
t~ r' • I I, I 'r t3nmnan
1J r. h .. ·, t • c:e SteT1art

.-

,..

,.' , Ir..

3

i

.Jur~

t • Ct'

rJ'Ut.~·r. i

.'JG

vih!te
)l{nrsha.ll

r. Junt1co Rlaolr.mun
l.!r. ,Justice RAmquiat
~J r .

J uatioa Stevena

From: Mr . Justice Powell

Ciroulatecl:1
1st DRAFT

6 NOV

1978

Reciroulatad: _____________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STAT~

FRANK W. SNEPP, III v. UNITED STATES and
UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
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COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October-, 1979

MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.

~~d..A4Lfl.

In No. 78-1871, Frank W. S pp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the~· reementJ hat he signed when
he accepted employment with tlie Centrailntelhgence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

c_
u_

/,
~AV~ i . •
\~
/ · ~-~)

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly eritical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the GIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
~_,=~~reement promising that he would
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities ' or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in additiou to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a. 1
1 Upon the eve of his departurr from the Agrncy in 1976, Snepp also
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed'
his obligation "never" to reveal "any clas~ified information, or any in~

,...... .... c..__
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the coJJtract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 17(), 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp dE>liberatRly misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication cleat·ance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
ecrecy: greement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
pr s.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 3
form;1tion <'Oncerning intelligence or CIA tlmt has not been made public
hy CIA ... without the t>xpre~~; written con~ent of the Director of Central
IntelligPncc or hi~ n·presentativc." Pet. 61a.
~At the 1ime of Ruit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in advance pa~·ments. His contract with hiH publisher provides for royalties
and oOwr pot.-ntial profi1..;. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The Court of Appral:-; and the Di,;trict. Court rejeeted each of Snepp's
dl•frnHrN 1o thr enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979); 45G F. Supp., at 180-181. In hi::; petition lor certiorari,
Snepp rrlil',; primaril~r on the claim that his Cecr~tgreement is unenforceaule as a prior rr,;traint on protected spee~
AN thr Court of Appr:ll~ hrld, thr claim i~ without mrri1. Whrn Snrpp
acerptrd emplo~·mrnt with 111P CIA, hr vohmt;\rily ~ignrd the agr<-'rment
that cxprr~~~~· obligntPd him 1o ~ubmit an); propo::;Pd publication for prior
review. HP dorN not. claim f hat hr exreuted thi~ agrePmen! undrr chrrpss.
Indeed , he yo]untaril~· reaffirmed hi:; obligation wlwn he left the Agency.
Morrover, this Comt 'Ncn~r~ makP elrar that. thr Govcrnment-(•vrn in the
ab::;cncc of an CXJJre~:;; agrcemeut-could have impo:;cd rra~ouablc re,:tric--·

__.--~
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the ·c ourt upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. ld., at
935-936.~ In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both
tions on AgmH'? employN•s' exereioe of their First Amendment rights in
order to protect substantial govt'rnment. interests. Civil Service Comrn'J;/
v. Letter Can"ie1·s, 413 U . S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valry,~4
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Gree1· "· S7wck, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id,Cat 844848 (PowF:LrJ, .J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 ......U... S. 67() (1972) .
The Govermnent has a sub~t..mtial interest in protec;ting both the sec:'recy
o informatiOn to our national Re<'mit~· nnd trC appeanm<'e of eonfidentiality so ep ,..ent.ial to tho effective op
1011 of om foreign intelligence
ncpp '~ scc rec · llgreement i8 a reaf'onableJneans
service. See p. 5, infra..
I'
t__
for prot!.'f'ting this vital inter!.'s .
4 The Government.':; eoncession di~tinguished this case from United States
v. Mm·chetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agreement not to publi~h any classified information. Ibid., at
1313. Marchetti therefore · did not consider the appropriate remedy for
the breach of an agreement to ~ubmit all material for prepublication
review. By relying ou Marchetti in this case, the Court of App!.'als overlookro thfl difference between Sn!.'pp's breach ~:~,nd the violation at if'sue
· in Marchetti.
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aided the CIA ill preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively the ctuties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluued that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
existed as to o11e but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was par·t of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were
both a speculative . and inappropriate remedy for Rnepp's
breach. I agree with Juuge Hoffman that Snepp breached a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

L

ft
, ·-r ~

fi--

ll
/
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an xtremeJ
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence o~f~
agreement~ Snepp explicitly recognized that he w~~
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information. including
information regarding intelligence sources anu methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178.n Snepp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this backgrouuu and exposure. He ..--~
"-'c.;;:_-
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material-for
" The fir~t ~c·u1etH'Ie of the 1968 ~tgreement, read: "I, Frank W.
SnPpp, III, unclPrstand that upon ·e ntenng duty with thP Central Intelligrnce AgPtlC)', I am undprtaking a po:;ition of tru:;t in that Agency of the
Guw·rnnwnt . .. ." Prt. 58a .
__.n Quite apart from tho plain languagp of the ~-agre;ment, the
nature of Snopp':; dutie::; and hi:; conceded aeee::;::; o :;ecret ::;ources and
materials could e::;tablish a tru:;t relation~:>hip. See 595 F. 2d., at. 939
(Hoffman, .J., concurring in part and dis"entiug in part). Few types of
government AI emplo.n nent involve a higher degree of tru::;t than that
repo~ed in a CIA employee with Sncpp's duties.

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it conteud-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp' book
contains classified material. The Government sim
claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him nepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determi 1e whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. ·We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us:" 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
be assured of the secrecy upou which their cooperation de-

6
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pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his material-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publicatiou such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The puuitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear uo relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
7 Every major nation in the world has a st>cret intt>lligence st>rvice.
Whatevt>r fairly may bt> ;;aid about :;omc of its past activitit>8, the CIA is
an agt>ncy thought b~· evt>ry Prt>~idt>nt ~ince Franklin D. Roosevelt to be
e~sPutial to the scrurity of the United State:; and-in a :;en:;e-the free
world. It i;; impo:;::;ible for n government wi:;ely to make critical decisionl:l
about fort>ign policy and national defen::~e without the Lenefit of dependable
foreign intelligence. See generaHy T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the
Srrrcts ( 1979).
8 .Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government mu:;t bring suit in a State that allows punitive
damagl's on!~· UJlOil proof of comp(•n:<atory dmnagt>:<. 595 F . 2d., at 940.
The Court of AppPal:< majority, however, held al:l a matter of fedetal law
that. the nominal dmnages recoverable for any breach of a :>ecrecy agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-

93&
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'i

flecessary to sustain an· award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant RO elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery iuto the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecu__...
J_.
tion." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
;f\.~& V'remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. \/;. . ,_ J-- ~
,..,..
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both thy'"
......
Government and the former agent from unwarranted rmks.
_,..,..
This remedy is the natural and customary cons~u nee of a
breach of trust. 0 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the w~. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, hy.-ean publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent pu J.isnes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary
igation, the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgor e the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligence that may contribute to national security. I therefore would gra.n t the petitions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.

0:)
t::

'0

See id., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., ronrurring in pa rt and

di ~~e nt i ng

in pa rt.).
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari jn order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization.'' ld., at 58a.1
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in~
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib.erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA .•• without the expre:ss written con~Sent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or hi;,~ representative." Pet. 61a.
2 At. the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with hii! publisher provides for royalties
and other pot~ntial profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Comt of Appt'nl:s and the Di8trict Court rejected each of Snepp's
defense:; to the t.>nforcement of his contract. 595 F. "2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In hi:s petition for certiorari,
Snepp reli(•s primarily on the claim that his secrecy agreement is unenforr(;ll.tule as a prior re~;traint on protected speech.
As the Comt of Appeal~ held, the claim is without merit. When Snepp
accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed the agreement
that. expressly obligiited him to submit. any proposed publication for prior
review. He doe8 not claim that he executed this agreement under duress.
Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed hi:s obligation when he left. the Agency.
Moreover, thi"' Court';; ca'*"l make clear that t.he Govemment-even in the
absence of ~w expre88 agreement- could have imposed reMonable restric--
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979) . Thus, the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. Id., at
935-936. 4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both
tions on Agency employees' exercise of their l<~irst Amendment rights in
order to protect substnntial government interests. Civil Service Co-mm'n
v. Letter Carrie1·s, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo , 424
U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); id .. at 844848 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Cole v. Richal'dson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972) .
The Government has a substantial interest in protecting both the secrecy
of information to our national seeurity and the appearance of confidentiality so enssential to t.hc effective opemtion of our foreign intelligence
service. See p. 5, infra. Snepp':; secrecy agreement is a reasonable means
for prot<'cting this vital interest.
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 ·F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at
1313 . Marchetti therefore· did not consider the appropriate remedy for
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over·
looked the difference between Snepp's brea,ch and the violation at issue

' in Marchetti.
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aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a
trust relationship.fi The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information, including
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for
" The fir::;t srntenoe of the 1968 secrecy agreement read : "I, Frank W.
Snepp, III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence Agency, I am undertaking a po::;ition of tru~t in that Agency of the
· Government ... ." Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the secrecy agreement, the
nature of Snepp'~ duties and hi::; conceded acces~ to ~ecret sources and
material~ could establi::;h a tru~t relationship. See 595 F. 2d., at 939
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and di&;enting in part) . Few types of
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified infonnation. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified
information or sources. Neither of the Govennnent's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure td submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. ·We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us:" 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
· information is· ha.rmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
-be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
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pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his material-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust ·relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
7 Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service.
What,ever fairly ma.y be said about some of its past activities, the CIA is
an agency thought by every President since Franklin D . Roosevelt to be
e~:;sential to the security of the United States and-in a ~en~:;e-the free
world. It is impo~:Jsible for a government wisely to make critical decisions
about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable
foreign intelligence. See generally T . Powers, The Man Who Kept the
Secrets (1979).
8 Judge· Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may he unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
dnmage:s only upon proof of eompPnsatory damages. 595 F . 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appeals majority , however, held a;s a. matter of federal la,w
that the nominal damages recovernble for any breach of a secrecy agree•
ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-

~38..

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

,

~ec~ssary to sustain an· award of punitive damages may force
,the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 9 It deals fairly with ·both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligence that may contribute to national security. I therefore would grant the petitions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.

'o See id,, at 939 (Hoffman, J ,, ronrurring in part and di::;senting in part.):
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In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of l!._
judgment enforcing iRe ~ene:;:\agreement that he s1gned when
he accepted employme11t with"the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) . In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.
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I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly ()ritical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed rf._ seere~ agreement promising that he would
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment . .. without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Ageucy without proper authorization." !d. , at 58a/
1 Upon the eve of his departurP from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
execut ed a " termination sec recy agreement." Thai document reaffirmed'
his obligation "never" to reveal "a ny clas:sified information, or auy i/
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that SHepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp dPliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
~gr~ agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's ...-v
profits.
<1
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid coHtract. 8 ~
formation concerning intelligenre or CIA that has not been made public
hy CJA ... without the ·express written con~ent of the Director of Central
Intelligenco or hi~ repre:>Pntativc." Pet. fila.
~At the I ime of ~nit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in udvuncP payments. His contrart with hi:; publisher provide::; for royalties
and other pot••ntial profit .~. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The C'ourt of Appeal~ and the Di;,;trict Court rejected each of Snepp's
defrnHf>s to the <·nforeement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979) : 456 F. Supp., at 180--lRl. In hi~:> petition for certiorari,
Snepp relir,.; primarily on the claim that his ~agreement is unenforct•ablP as a prior re:<traint on protected speech.
As t hr Court of AJlJlPal,; lwld, thr claim i~ without mPrit. Wlwn Snepp
accrpled rmplo~·mpnt with the C'IA, he voluntarily ~igned the agn·rment
that. cxprr;;,.;[~· obligat{'(l him to ~ubmit. any propo~ed publieati011 for prior
revirw. Hr dor,.; not claim that hr exPcutrd thi::~ agrePlllPilt under clmPss .
Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed hi,.: obligation wh('ll ll(' l<'ft the Agrncy .
1\foreovcr, thi,; Court ',.: ensp,.: mak<' elPar that the Governmeut-Pven in t·hc
ab::;cncc of an cxpreo;::; agreenwnt-eoulcl have impo::;c<lrra~o!lable rc,.;tric--

~

\1

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

3

It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus. the ,c ourt upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. !d., at
~ ~
935-936. 1 In other words, the court thought that Sne~~- .JL .1:. ·~ IJ.~

the,.....,,~ of=r~~,.~

fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nommal

-

damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation , dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information aud the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Bot~

A~trtH')' rmplo~·c•t·s' exrrri~r

Fir~t

in~

tions on
of tht•ir
Anwndment right><
order to protrrt ~ubstantial gowrnmrnt interests. Civil Service Cvmrn'n
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (197a); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 25-28 (197£)); Greer'"· Spack, 424 U.S. H28 (1H76); icl .. at 84484 (PowELL, .T., coneurring); Cole v. Richardso11, 405 Tl. S. 6i(i (1972).
Thr GoYrrnment has a Rub~tantial interel't in protrcting both thr ~rerpcy
of informatiOn o our national set•mit)· and thP appc•an111C'e of C'onfidentiality ~0 ('l'~ent.ial to tlw ptf(•f'tivr operation of Ullr forPign intdligPnce
service. s:r p. ~~ il~fra... 8uf pp'*ee~ ngreenwntli~ a rra~o!lHble mean~ /1-..e_ -ft.:,.f" S.....a.,<~f:?
ior protPrtmg thrs vtbd mtPrest .
/...
s:;r<t..-..e.c/.
4 The Govcrnment.'s rmH'f'~>sion di~tinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government rlaimed that a former CIA employee intruded to
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at
1313 . Marchetti therefore · did not consider the appropriate remedy for
the brPaeh of an a11:rrement to submit all material for prepublication
review . By relying on Marchetti in thi,; case, tlw Court of Appeal~; over~
lookf'd the difference between Snepp's brench and the violation at iRsue
· in Marchetti.
/
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aided the CTA in preserving necessary
and discharging
effectively the dutif's imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
existed as to one but not the other. ~e 1968 seer~ agreement,~ wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Sncpp the trust of the
CIA." !d., at 938. Prepublication cleara11ce wa..<; part of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a
fie! uciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
__/..-----~
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of ·liis~er~ ofl-e- CZj.,_oa- -e...-..7~tSnepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a ft..'a.+- l-.e.- !9it;r--..~)
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation- he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified info9rration. including
information r·egarding intelligence sourc~,s and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178." Snepp publish
his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this b ground and exposure. He
deliberately violated his oblig ion to submit all material for

J

5 The fir;:;t ~Pntenec of tlw 196~ ~ agrl'l'lllPut read: "I, Frank W.
SnPpp, III, under;:;tand that 11pon PntPmJg duty with the Cl'ntral Intelligl'nC\l Agetlry, I am tmdertakiug a po:;itiou of tru:;t in that Agency of the
C:ov,pmml'nt .. .. " Pet. 5Ra.
0 Quite apart from t.ht• plaiu lang;nage of lhe ~ agn'l'meut, the
nature of Snepp':,; dutif•::; ami hi:; ('Onceded a('ce:;:; to .~ o:oun·p~ and
material:; eould c:;tabli:;h a tru::;t rPlation::;hip. S(•e 5951.7. 2df, at 939
~Hoffman, J., coucurring in part and di:;:;enting in part). Few types of
govPrnmcntal emplo~·ment involve a higher degrl'e of tnt~t than that
n·po~ed in a CIA employee with Sncpp':; duties.
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the~ information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
~Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
~at in light of the special trust reposed in himjSnepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust .
.- The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will Bot remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potentia.} sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
·
F. Supp., at 179-180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
·be assured of the Sf'crecy upon which their cooperation de-
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pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
Snepp's breach of his Elis6it~fpbligation to sUbmit his material-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

lii
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Iudeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Govermnent with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unqua11tifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certaiu to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Governmeut's irreparable loss or Snepp's uujust gain.
,
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the
~
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of~
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
1 Every major nation in the world has
~ intelligence sf'rvice. - ......
Whatever fairly ma~· bf' ;;aid about ::;ome of it,: past activities, the CIA is
an agencr thought b~· every PreRident "iuce Franklin D. Roosevelt to be
css!'utial to the Rccurity of the United State:i and-ill a ;;en~e-tlw free
world. It i;; impo;;;;ible for a government wi~ely to make critical decision::;
ahout foreign poliey and national defen~ without the benefit of dcpPnclable
for<'ign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the
Sr•rrrts ( 19i9) .
8 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even thi~ remedy ma~r be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows puuitive
dnrnagP~:~ only upon proof of compen~atory damagf'~. 595 F . 2d., at 9-!0.
The Court. of Appeab majority , however, held aH a matter of fedl'ral law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of tL
agreement will support an exemplary award . See icl., at 036, and n. 10, 937-
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1-1ecrssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclose some of the very ~ that c""'""'/?t!J~12.-$
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust.u It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
ViOlation of his fiduciarykbligation, the trust remedy simply
4.--.:D. ~---4- ac..-4..-:a t
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting ifte se~ intelligence that may con- --1/
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti- (J
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.
~
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See id., at 939 (Hoffm an, .T., ronrurring in pa rt and

di ~~r nting

in pa rt.) :
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly ·critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to 1 and in aiel of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a. 1
Upon the eve of his departurr from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a. "termination serrec~' agrrement." That document reaffirmed'
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in1

2
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the coutract., an injunction requiring Snepp to submit. future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing t.he book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Rupp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8
formation concerning intelligeiwe or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the {'Xpre~;; written consent of the Director of Central
Iutelligf'IH'P or hii'( rPpre::;entativc." Pet. 61a.
~At. the time of Ruit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in advnnee pa.~·mpnts. His contract. with hiH publi~her provide~ for royalties
and othrr pot.,ntial profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The Court of Apprali'( and the Di,;trict. Court rejerted each of Snepp's
defPnsPH to thr, ~·nforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979): 456 F. Supp., at 18(}-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Rrl('pp reliPs primaril~' on the claim that his secrecy agreement. is unenforn•able as a prior re;;traint on protected speech.
As the Court of Appeal:< lwld, thr claim i;; without mNit. Whrn SrH'PP
ac<·rpted rmplo~·ment with the CIA, he voluntaril~· ~igned thr agrermrnt
that rxprr~~~~· obligatPd him to :-;ulJmit. auy propo~ed pul>lieatiou for prior
rcviP\\'. He doe:-; not. claim that hr rxrcutrd thi~ agrrPmenl undPr dmess.
IndPrd , he voluntarily reaffirmed hi;; obligation wh£•n hP left the Agrncy.
J\forpovPr, thi~ C'ourt'~ ra~r~ make <'IPar that the Govemme11t-even in the
ab;;encc of au expre~,; :tgrrenwnt-rould have impo;;cd rca:<onablc re~tric"-
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. !d., at
935-936. 4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by qesignation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both
tions on AgrtH')' rmplO)'f'(•s' exerc·ioe of their Fir~t Amendment rights in
order to protret ;;ub;;tantial government. interest~. Ci1•il Service Cumrn'n
v. Letter CcuTie1'S, 41:3 U. S. 548, 5G5 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 25-28 (197(i); Greer,.. :S7Jod·, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); id .. at R44848 (PowELr,, .J., concurring); Cole v. Ri1·hardson, 405 t r. S. 6io (1972).
Tlw Govrrnment has a f<Ub~hllltial interest in protrcting both the seerrcy
of informa ton to our national Rec·nrit)' and the appParance of C'Onfidentiality l:!O el:'~ential to tlw rffl'rtivr OJWration of unr foreign intrlligence
service. Srr p. 5, infra.. Snrpp':; l:!enecy agreement i~ a rea~nable mf'an:;
for protPrting this vital interest.
4 The Gowrnmeut.'::; ronce~sion di~tiugubhed this ca:se from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agreemrnt not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at
1313. Marchetti therefore did not consider the appropriate remed)· for
the brearh of an a~reement to submit all matrrial for prrpubliration
review. By n•lying on Marchetti in this casr, the Court of Appeal:; overlooked the difference between Snepp's bre:wh and the violation at iRsue
· in Marchetti.
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aided the CIA i11 preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it. gave life t.o a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the
CIA." I d., at 938. Prepublication clearance "·as par·t of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Rnepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a
trust relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any infonnatiou relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information. including
information r·egarding intelligence sources and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178.n Snepp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for
G The fir::;t ~C'n1enec of the 196R ~Pcrecy agreenwn1 read: "I, Frank W.
SnC'pp, III, und<>rstand that upon <t·ntt->ring duty with thE' Central lntellig(•nce A~!.'IH:y , I am uuuertuking tt po::;ition of tru~t in 1hut Agency of the
Gov~Prnmpnt. . . ." PPt. 58a.
"Quite upar1 from the plain languag(• of the ::;ecrec~· agrerment, the
nature of SnC'pp'::; dutie::; and hi::; eonceded aeee::;::; to ~ecret ::;ource~ ami
material,; could Cl:ltablil:lh a trul:lt n'lationl:lhip. S(->e 595 F . 2d. , at 939
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dis::;enting in part). Few types of
govPnmwntnl ('mplo~·ment involvC' a higher degrE>e of truRt than that
repo~ed in a CIA employee with Snepp's dutie:O.
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prepublication review. Thus. he exposed the secret information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the lit-igation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admira.l Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. ·We have hao
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us. " 456
F. Supp., at 179- 180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-

6
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pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his material-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publicatio11 such as Snepp's generally
are unquautifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no o11e. The pu11itive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Governmeut's irreparable loss or Snepp's uujust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
1 Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service.
Whatever fairly ma~· be said about some of its past activitie~, the CIA is
an agency thought b~· every President ::;ince Franklin D. Roosevelt to be
essential to the security of the tTnited State::; and-in a seu;:;e---the free
world. It i:; impos:>ible for a government wit>ely to make critical decisions
about foreign policy and national defenl:iC without the benefit of dependable
foreign intelligence. Sec generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the
Secrets ( 1979) .
8 .Tudg(~ Hoffman's dissent suggests that even thi8 remedy may be unavailable if the Government mu~t bring suit in a State that allows punitive
damag<'~ ouly upon proof of f'Oill]H'II>'atory damage:-<. 595 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court. of AppPal" majority, howewr, held a~ a. matter of fnletal law
that the nominal damage:; recoverable for any breach of a :;ecrecy agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n . 10, 937-
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flec<>ssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated. "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the natio11al security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust.u It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary obliga.tion, the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligence that may contribute to national security. I therefore would grant the petitions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.

0
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employme11t with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted em.ployment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not .. . publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term o{ [his] employment . . . without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to , and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization ." /d. , at 58a.1
Upon the eve of his departurr from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a " termination secrery agrerment." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" t o reveal "any c l a10~ified infonnation, or any in1

.
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Thus, Rnepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearancE>. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the colltract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prt>publication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Rupp. 176. 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8
formation ronrerning intelligerwe or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... witho11t the •expre~:; written consent of the Director of Central
Jutelli~euro or· hi~ repre,-entativc." Pet. fila.
~At the time of ~11it, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in advanrfl paynwnts. Hi~ <'ontract. with hi:; publi::lhrr provide:; for royalties
and otlwr pot{•ntial profitl:i. 456 F . S11pp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The C'o11rt of Apprab and the Di:;trict Court rejected each of Snepp's
dt•fpnsrs to thr t•nforcemeut of his co11tract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979) : 45U F. Supp., at 180--181. Iu hi::; petition for certiorari,
Snepp relic•,.; prima ril.v on the rlaim that his ~ecrecy agreement is unenfurr·eHbl<• as a prior rr~traint on protected speech.
A~ iiH• C'omt of Appt•~tb hrld, thr claim i;; without merit. Whrn Snt'PP
art·epted rmplo~·ment with the CIA, he ,· ohrntaril~· ~ ignrd the agreement
that, exprr,;~]~· obli!l;att•d him to "ubmit any prupo ~t' d publieation for prior
rC\·i<'W. Hf• do<',.; not daim that hr <'Xecuted thi~ agn•rmPnt undPr clurrss.
IndPed , lw yo]untaril~· rPaffirmed hi,; obligation wht•n he ld't the Agency .
1\for<'over, thi ~ Court',; <':t~P~ makP elrar that tlw Government-<·vl•n in the
ab::;cnce of an cxpre~:; agreemenl-eoulcl have impo;-;<'d rea:;onablc re::<t.ric"-··
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. /d., at
935-936.~ In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both
tions on Agrnry rmplo~·(•ps' exerei~c of their Fir:;t Amendml•nt rights in
ordPr to prot.rrt ;,;ubstantial govrrnmrnt. intNests. Civil Service Co-mm'n
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer ,., Spock, .t2-1 TJ. S. 828 (Hl7(i); id .. at 844848 (PowgLr,, .J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 67() (1972) .
Thr Govrmment has u sub~tuntial intrrest in protpcting both the ~ccrecy
of information to our national seeurit~· nnd the appearance of confideutiality :-;o e~~;.;ent.ial to tlw effertive operation of our forrign intdligrnce
service. Sre p. 5, infra. Snepp'~ secrecy agreement i:> a reasonable metms
for protrrting this vital intf'n•st.
4 The Government.':; roncrssion di:;tinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the GoYernment claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agreement not to publish any cla~sified information. Ibid., at
1313. Marchetti therefore did not consider the appropriate remedy for
the breach of 1111 agreement to submit all material for prepubliration
review. By rel~·ing on Marchetti in thi~:~ rase, the Court of Appeals overlooked 1he cliff ere nee bet ween Sm·pp 's brench and the violation nt.. i.~sue
· in Marchetti.

>,
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aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
existed as to Olle but not the othC'r. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued. were
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that--after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information. including
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178. 11 Snepp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this background ami exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for
c The fir::;t ~rnt<>nee of the 196R ~ecrecy agrcenwnt, read: "I, Frank W.
Rnrpp, III, understand that upon <'ntering duty with tht• Central Intelligence AgeiH·~·. I am undertakiug a po:;ition of tru::;t in that Agency of the
Gowrnment. . . ." Prt . 58a.
6
Quite apart, from t.he plain language of the ::;ecrecy agrerment, the
nature of Sncpp';; dutie:,; and hiti conceded a<·ce~ti to Hecret :,;o urc e~ unu
materials eould e:;tabli:;h a trutit I'Piatiou~hip . See 595 F. 2d., at 939
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and di~:;enting in part) . Few type;.: of
govrrnmental employment involvr a higher degree of trust than that
repo;;;ed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified infonnation. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us. " 456
F. Supp., at 179- 180.

If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-

6
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pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his material-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
lllCleed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nomi11al damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
7 Evrry major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service.
Whatever fairly ma~· be said about ~ome of it~ past activitieti, the CIA is
an agenc~' thought b~· evPry Pretiident ~ince Franklin D. Roosevelt to be
e~~t'ntial to the security of the Unitt•d State~ and-in a ~entie--tlw free
world. It i~ impo:s~ible for a government witiely to make critical decisions
about foreign policy and national defen1le without the benefit of dependable
foreign intelligence. See generaHy T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the
Secrets (1979).
8 .Tnclge Hoffman's di&;ent suggests that even thi;o remedy may be unavailable if the Government must hring suit in a State that allows punitive
damag(·~ on!~· upon proof of t•ompt·ll~atory damag<>~. 5D5 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court of AppPab majority, however, held a:; a matter of fedeml law
that, the nominal dmnages recoverable for any breach of a tiecrecy agreement will support :m exemplary award. See id., at D36, and n . 10, 967-
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J:Jec('ssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that
Snepp promisE>d to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or aclditional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A co11structive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 0 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligence that may contribute to national security. I therefore would grant the petitions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.

0

See id., at. !)39 (Hoffman, J., ronrurring in part and

di~~rrtting

in part.).
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
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Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979

MH. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.

In No. 78- 1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not . . . publish .. . any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment . . . without specific prior approval of the Agency. " Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." /d., 58a. 1
1 Upon the eve of his depar ture from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executPd a " terminat-ion ,;ecrecy agrPement ." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-

/
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
011 all profits that Suepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
~
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8 ·~
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the <f'xpr!'~H written con~ent of the Director of Central'
Intelligence or his repre~entativc." Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in ad-·
vance payments. His contract. with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Cot1rt of Appeals and the Di~trict Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses td the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926 , 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp relies primaril~· on the claim that. his ~ecrecy agreement is unenforceuble as a prior restraint ou protected speech.
~
As the Court of Appeals held, the claim is without merit ).fllCiVil'
IWW!l':-'f';"'m'J'Z'm'l.n-rr-.Drttf!f'l"'iiT.l'T:;;;r;;--,t1"it--'l"r:"1=t--54?rlffi:'l'l"litT!rt':"Ttti's Court

---

-----

lfp/ss

10/31/79

Snepp (Rider A, p. 2)

When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily
signed the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit
any proposed publication for prior review.

He does not claim

that he executed this agreement under duress.

Indeed, he

voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when he left the
Agency.

Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that the
/'

/

Government - even in the absence of an express agreement /

could have imposed reasonable

restric~ ions

on Agency

employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in order
to protect substantial government interests.
eomm 1~v; - Letter - earriers,

Buckley - v; - Valeo, 424
424

u.s.

u.s.

413

u.s.

eivil - Service

548, 565 (1973); see

1, 25-28 (1976); Sreer · v: - Spock,

828 (1976); id.)at 844-848 (Powell, J., concurring);

eole - v; · Richardson; 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
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It l:Llso agreed that S11epp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm " on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926. 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunction against future violatious of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support impositio11 of a constructive trust. The conclusiou rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged 110 classified iutelligeuce. Id., at
935-936.'1 lu other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Goverumeut--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a coustructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distiuct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the othe;
/
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both/
aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust ~ ~

""t¥.3T9+. The Clovrrnnwnt has n ~· intere~t in protecting both the
secrecy of information important to our national :security and the appear.
ance of confidentiality so es~ntial to the effective operation of our foreign
intclligrnrc service. See p. 5, infm. Snepp'::; ,;ecrecy agreement is a
g ~ 1J
reasonable means for protecting thi,; vital interest.
~
4 The Governmrnt's conce,;sion di~tinguishecl this cwse from United States
Y. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4) , cert. clt>niPd, 409 lT. S. 1063 (1972).
Tht>re, the Government claimed that a former CIA employt>r intPnded to
violate hi::: agreemPnt not to publi~h any classified information . Ibid., at
131:3 . Marchetti thrrl'forr did not ronsic!Pr the appropriate remedy for
the hn•urh of a11 agrPement to ~ubmit all material for prepublication
revirw . By relying on Marchetti in thi,; ca~e, the Court of Appeal;; ove/ lookecl the difference between Suepp's breach and the violation at i~~uc
in Marchetti.

~76

I

+
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existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the
CIA." ld., at 938. PrepuLlication clearance was part of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffma.u argued, were
both a speculative aud iuappropriate remedy for Snepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Suepp breached a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy
agreement. Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish a'ny information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after uudertakiug this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information, including
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178.n Snepp published his book about C I Y
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material fo
prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually coutained classified iuformation.
" The fir~t :::cn(~;>ll0t' of the l!:J6S l:it•cr~;>cy agrremPut read: "l, Frank W.
Snepp, lll, undPr~hllld that upon rnteriug duty with thP Central lntt'lligrnce AgPucy, I am unut:>rtakiug a po~ition of tru::lt in that Agency of the
GoVlernment . . . . " Pet . 58a.
0 Quite upnrt frcm thr plaiu language of the secrecy agreement , the
uature of Snepp'i:i dutie::l ami hi~ conceded aeceso> to o>ecret sourCC'l:i and
m~ttPrials could cl:itahlil:ih a tnt::lL relaticnship. See 595 F. 2u ., at 939
(Hotfmau, J., t·on<'UITing in part Hucl dis::lenting in part). Few types of
govPrnmenta) eiTII1ioyment involve a higiwr degrPe of trul:it than that
reposed iu a CIA employee with Snepp'l:i dutie:s.
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"fhe Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because people were unwilli11g to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreigu agents recruited by the CIA canno~
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation depends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, bot
7

Every major nation in the world has a ::;ecret intelligence service.
Whatever fairly may be said about some of it:s past activitie::;, the CIA i:s
nn agency thought by every Preiiident since Fra.nklin D. Roosevelt to be

6
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the District Court atH.l tht> Court of Appeal!:! recoguizeu that
•'ncpp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his mater'ial-classifh•u or not---for prf'publication clearanct> ha::; irreparably hamwd tlw rniteu ~tates GovertliUf'llt. .~95 .F. 2d, at
935; 456 .F. Supp .. at 180. This was no ordiuary failure to
com ply with a contractual obljgation. It. was a delilwrate
breach of a very sp<-·cial trust relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriatP remeuy for Snepp's acknowledgeu wroug.
fudel'd. as a practieal matu~r. thP decisiou may well leave the
Gowrument with no reliable deterrent against similar
brraclws of security. No ollP disputes that tlw actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to cleter no onP. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial ar<• speculative and unusual. Eveu if
recovered. -they may bear 110 relation to either the Governmeut's irrPparable loss or Snepp 's unjust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the ouly remedy that t h e /
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of
the bargaiu it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain au award of punitive damages may force
the Government t,() disclosf• some of the very secrets that
Suepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
p;;~Pnlial

1o tiH' ;;prmit~· of the llnitPd Shtl!·~ and-in a ~l'n::-t~tlw frpe
world. It j,.. impos:;ible l'or a goverunlt:'nt, wi~cly 1o make <"l'itiral dt·cisions
nl.>oul for£>igu poli!'y a)](l national drfense without !lw benPfit. of d(•pPudable
fnrc•ign intrlligt•nrc· . Rrl' gPIWrally T. PowPrs, Til(' Man Who K('pt the
RPrrr1~ (19i9).
~ .Tudgr Hoffman'" di"'~Pnt sugge~1" that even !hi~ rt·mNiy mar be un:wailahiP if the Governmeut must bring ;;.uit in a Statr that allow:; mnitive
rlamage,; onl~· upon proof of compenoa tory damage::;.
., nI 940. The
I
Comt of Aj>pealto: majorit~·, hoW('V!'l', liPid u::; n ma1!l'r of frdrml law
. t't'tlwf 1he llOOlUY.d damage~ l'!'!'OV('fiiUir for an~- bi•raeh of a ~Pf'l'!'l'Y a g y
mcut will support nn exrmplary award . Sec id., at 936, allll 11. 10, 937-

sas F:lJ.

938.
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Jury .if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Govemment run this risk.
In a lettf'r introduced at S11epp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby uotf'd the aualogous problem in criminal cases. :Existing law. he stated, "requires the revelation in opeu court of
confirmiug or additional information of such a nature that the
pott-n tial clamag(~ to the national security prec] udes prosecutiou." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at ali.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natutal and customary consequence of a
brPach of trust. 9 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secun's prepublication clearance, he cau publish with no fear"
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary obligation. the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And siuce the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the brea.ch, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
ali proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Governmeut of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret iutelligellCe that may contribute to national security. I therefore would rant the Jetition in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.
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PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) . In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.
MR. JusTICE

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term o{ [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." ld. 1 at 58a.1
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "a ny classified infonnation, or any in-
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, delib.erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
SnPpp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8
iormu.tion concerning intelligence or CIA tllat has not been made public
by CIA ... without the expre:;s written con~;ent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or hi~ representative." Pet. 61a.
2 At. the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. Hi~; contract with hi;; publi:;her provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176,· 179 (ED Va. 1978) .
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp•s
defenses to the !'nforcement of his contract. 595 F . "2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp rt>li<•s primarily on the claim that his secrecy agreement is unenforreaule as a prior restraint on protected speech.
A;; thE' Court of Appeul,; held, the claim i~; without merit. When Snepp
aceepted employment. with the CIA, he voluntaril~· J,; igned the agrwment
that. expressly obligHted him to J,; Ubmit. any proposed publication for prior
review. He does not claim that he executed this agreE-ment under duress.
Indero, lte voluntarily reaffirmed hilS obligation when he left. the Agency.
Moreover, this Court';; ca!*'8 make clear that t.he Government-even in the
ab8ence of an E'Xpi'Cti$ agreE-ment-could have imposed rE-asonable rcstric--

r
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a. constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. ld., at
935-936. 4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both
tions on Agency employees' exercitle of their Fir;;t Amendment rights in
order to protect substantial government interests. Civil Service Camm'n
v. Lette1· Cm'l'iers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976) ; Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id .. at 844848 (PowELL, .J., concurring); Cole v. Richa~·dson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
The Government has a substantial interest in protecting both the secrecy
of information to our national secmit~· and the appearance of confidentiality so eassenHal to t.hc effective operation of our foreign intelligence
service. See p. 5, infra. Snepp'~> secrecy agreement is a reasonable means
for prot('cting this vital interest.
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 ·F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at
1313. Marchetti therefore· did not consider the appropriate remedy for
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's brettch and the violation at issue
· in Marchetti.

4

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a
trust relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information, including
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178. 6 Snepp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for
G The fir:;t srntenoo of the 1968 secrecy agreement read: "I, Fnmk W.
Snepp, III, understand that upon €ntering duty with the Central Intelligence Agency, I am undertaking a. po:;ition of tru::;t in that Agency of the
Government . . . ." Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart, from the plain language of the llecrecy agreement, the
nature of Snepp':; duties and his conceded a.cces:; to :;ecret sources and
material::; could establi:!h a tru::;t relationship. See 595 F. 2d., at 939
(Hoffman, J., concurring in part and disoonting in part). Few types of
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified infonnation. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure tdsubmit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. · We have ha<l
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us:" 456
F . Supp., at 179-180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
· information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
-be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-
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pends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his material-classified or notr-for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
7 Every major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service.
Whatever fairly may be said about some of its past activities, the CIA is
an agency thought by every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt to be
essential to the security of the United States and-in a sense-the free
world. It is irnpotSsible for a government witSely to make critical decisions
about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable
foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the
Secrets (1979).
8 Judge· Hoffman's dissent suggests th!lt even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
dnmage;,; only upon proof of eompen;,;atory damages. 595 F . 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appeals majority , however, held a;; a matter of jede1'allaw
that the nominal ili1mages recoverable for any breach of a secrecy agreement will support an exemplary award. See id ., at 936, and n. 10, 937-
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~ec~ssary to sustain an· award of punitive damages may force
.the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
'Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 9 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligence that may contribute to national security. I therefore would grant the petitions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.

to See id ., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., roncurring in part and dis~enting in part);
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MR.

PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of ~ _
judgment enforcing \.he ~ePee~agreement that he Signed when
he accepted employmellt with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.
JusTICE

~

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed aJ.. seeFe~ agreement promising that he would
"not . .. publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of. Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a. 1 / '

-""/4'

1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a "termination secreey agrerment." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any clas~ified information, or any i/
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the co11tract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Suepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Rupp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
·'i@QrQ~ agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's --1/
profits.
<1
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
__..--8
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. , . . . . , - formation concerning intelligenre or CIA that has not been made public
hy Cl A ... without the 'l':'xpre~s written con~ent of the Director of Central
Jntellil{t'IH'<) or hi~ rt'pre~entativc." Pet. 61a..
~At. the time of ~nit, Snepp already had receiveu about. $60,000 in advnnrP paymmts. His contract. with hi;; publi~her provides for royalties
:mel other pot~·ntial profits. 456 F . Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va.. 1978).
3 'l'lie Court of Appenb and the Di;;trict Conrt rejretcd rach of Sncpp's
clefrnsr;; to the <·nforeement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979): 456 F. Supp., at 180--181. In his petition for certiomri,
Sm•pp rrli<·:; primarily on the claim that his ~ agreement is unenforre;tulr a~ a prior re~tmint on protrctecl speech.
As t hr Court of App(•:tl,; lwld, the claim i~ without merit'. When Snepp
fH'erptrd rmplo~·rnf'nt with the CIA, he voluntarily :,;ignPd the agrf'rment
that. cxpres~l~' oLiigated him to submit. any propo:;Pd publieatio11 for prior
rcvirw. H(' dor,; not claim that h(' exE'cutE'd thi:; agrerm<'nt undPr duress.
Indeed, he Yoluntaril~· !'<'affirmed hi~ obligation whrn he Jt.ft. the Agency.
1\forco\'rr, thio Comt ',.; cmw~ makP elrar that the Governmeut-(•ven in the
ab:;cncc of au cxpre;;~ agreement-could have irnpo:;ed reasonable mstric--

~
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus. the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. ld., at
-:;:;:::,; ~
1
935-936. In other words, the court thought that Sne1fl
~· JL . 1:;, ·~ /J.~
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nommal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information aud the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Bot~

,..,.~ of~-~~

A!J;rnr~· emplo~·rp~' exerri~e

Fir~t

in~

tiom; on
of their
Amendmt•nt right s
order to ]Jrutrrt ,.;ubstantial gowrnmrnt intt'rests. Civil Service Cvmrn'n
v. Letta Carriers, -l13 U. S. 548, 565 (1970); se<> Buckley v. Valeo , 424
U.S. 1, 25-28 (197()); Greer Y. l::ipock, -l2-l U.S. 828 (1H76); id .. at 844848 (PowELL, .J., concurring); ColeY. Richardson, -l05 11. S. 67ii (1972).
Thr Go\'!'rmneut ha~ a sub~tantial inter£>f't in prot£>ctiug both the ~errPcy
of informatiOn o our national SP<'mit~· and thr app(•aranec of confidentiality ~0 r~:~"ent .ial to tlw PH'Prtive opemtion of 0111' forPign intPiligPnee
servic('. S~r p. ~~ i1~fra .. Sncpp'*eeJ~ agreenwntli~ :l rea~onablt' lllf'an~ 1/...L -fl,:J.:f S.,..a.,4f7
lor prot<>Ptmg tlus v1tal mt<•rest.
/...
6 ,, 1 ....,e_4
4 The Government-'s ronce:;sion di~tinguishecl this ca:;e from United States
v. Man·hetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), eert. denied, 409 U . S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government elaimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agrrement not to publi::;h any classified information. Ibid ., at
1313 . Marchett i therefore · did not eonsicler the appropriate remedy for
the brPaeh of 311 agreement to submit all material for prepublication
rPview . By rPlying on Marchetti in thi::; rase, the Court of Appeab overlooked the difference between Snepp '. breach and the violation at issue
~
· in Marchetti.
/

r
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aideu the CIA in preserving necessary..ge.er-e-tw-.
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived fr·om the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
existed as to one but not the other. ..KThc 1968 seer~ agreement,~ wrote, "was no ordinar·y contract; it ga.ve life to a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearailce was part of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Rnepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

~

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
//----~ - high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of 'Ais~er~ ·fl..e.. z;zjvQP ·e....-..T
~JSnepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a ft....~r t...e... !9'<;""~)
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that--after undPrtaking this obligation-he. had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified infoyrtation. including
information regarding intelligence source and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178. 11 Snepp publish
his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this b ground and exposure. He
deliberately violated his oblig ion to submit all material for

J

" The fir::;t ~rntenoo of the 196R ~ agreemrnt read: "I, Frank W.
Rnc•pJ), III, under:;tand that 11p011 Pnterlllg d11ty with thE' Central Intelligeuce Agem,,·, I am mH1ertakiug a po::;ition of tru~t in that Agency of the
Guw•rnment .. .. " PPt. 58a.
0 Quite apart from th1· plaiu languagr of the ~ agreement, the
nature of Suepp'::; dutie::; and hio; !'OllcPded a1•ce~o; to .~ ~our<'e~ am!
lllat~·rials COUld CtitabJio;h H tru"t. reJatiou"hip. S~·e 5951". 2df, at 939
fHoffrnau, J., eoucurring in part and diso;entiug in part). Few types of
goven1mcntal emplo~·ment involv~' a higher degree of tm::;t than that
n·poHed in a CIA employee with Sncpp's duties.

~
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the~ information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
_..Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information . Nor does
it contend- at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
"that in light of the special trust reposed in himjSnepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
-- The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will uot remain secret. I
caunot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us. " 456
F. Supp., at 179- 180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign ageuts recruited by the CIA cannot
be assured of the st>crecy upon which their cooperation de-

c..le2-s.:;~=!)_

v

~..,.,.+ -IL. ";;J_t-

6

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recogniL~ed that
Snepp's breach of his elis~i~fphligation to~ sUbmit his material-classified or not--for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

iii
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Imleed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no. reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
.The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the
~
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of~
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
7 Ewry major nation in the world has
~ intelligence st>rvice. Whatever fairly ma~· be ~aid about i'iome of it~ 11ast activities, the CIA is
an ngmc~· thought b~· every President ~ince Franklin D . Roosevelt to be
cssputial to the ~ccurity of the United State~ and-in a ~en~e-the free
world. It i;; impo~;;ible for a government wi~ely to make critical decisionl::i
about foreign policy and national defen::lC without the benefit of dcpPndable
fon•ign intelligence. Sec generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the
SPrrets (19i9).
8 .Tud11:<~ Hoffman's dissent suggests that even tlli~ remedy tna~r be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
damagPi:i ouly upon proof of eomp<·n~atory damage:<. 595 F . 2d., at 9-!0.
The Court of Appeal" majority, however, held m; a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any bl'each of a.
agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n . 10, 937-

aJ.
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Bec<>ssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclose some of the very ~ that cO"'--PdJe-..-c...t2.-$
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 9 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
ViOlation of his fiduciarykbligation, the trust remedy simply
'3. .......J2 a._.._-f-ac.-4.. -:;;. /
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the se~ intelligence that may con- .-j./
tribute to national security. I therefore would grant the peti- (J
tions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
~
of the District Court.
~

0

See id., at

9:~ 9

(Hofftn<tn, .J., ronrurring in part and

di ~~enting

in part.) :
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MR . .JusTICl!l PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

1
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
the Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a. 1
1 Upon the eve of his departurr from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a. "termination sccrec~' agrrement." That document reaffirmed'
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in~

2
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulgE> classified information
ami not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Rupp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Suepp had breached a valid contract. 3
formation concerning intelligenc•e or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the expr<>,;;; written con;;ent of the Director of Central
Tntelligc-•nrc· or hii< repre:>entativc." Pet. fila.
~At. the time of Ruit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in advllncc• paynwnts. His contract. with his publi,;her provide::; for royalties
and other pot<"ntial profit.-;. 456 F. Snpp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The Court of Appra],. and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
dt·fl'nl:lP~ to the ('llforcement of his contract.. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979): 456 F. Supp., at. 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snt•pp rrlif'>l primaril~r on the claim thut his secrecy agreement. is unenfore~·<~hh• as a prior rr~t raint on protected speech.
A,; thr Court of Appra],; lwld, thr claim is without mrrit . Whrn Snrpp
arc·r])ted rmplo~·ment with the CIA, he voluntaril~ · signed the agn-·rmrnt
that CXJH'C';;~]~ · obli!l;atPd him to submit. any propo;;rd publicatiou for prior
revirw. Hr dor;.; not. claim that hP exrcuted this agrePment under dnres~ .
Indred , he voluntaril~· n•aflirmPd hi~ obligation when hr left the Agency.
Moreover, thi:: Court '~ ca~e~ make- elear that the Govcmmellt-rven in the
ab:scncc of au cxprc:s::; agreenwnt-eould have impol:led rea:;onable re"'tri<-"-
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus. the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. !d., at
935-936. 4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to submit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both
tions on Agenrr emplo~·rt·s' exerri~e of their Fir,;t Amendment rights in
order to ]Jrol.ert substantial gowrnmrnt. interests. Civil Service Comrn'n
v. Letter Carriers, 41:3 U. S. 548, 565 (197:3); sf'e Buckley v. Valeo , 424
U.S. 1, 25-28 (19i(i); Greer"· SJJock, 424 U.S. 828 (Hli6); id .. at 844848 (PowELL, .J., concurring); Cole v. Rit·hardson, 40!) F. S. 6ifl (1972).
ThP Govrrnment has a. f'ub;;htntial interrst in protrcting both the l'ierrrcy
of informa JOn to our national l'ii'!'Hrit~· 11nd thr HJl]Wilr<lllCf' of eonfidentiality so f'~~~ential to tlw rfft·rtivr oprration of om forrign intrlligPilCC
servicr. RN• p. 5, infra.. Snrpp'~ :scereey agreement i» a rra;>onable mran:;
for protPPting this vital interest.
4 The Gowrnmcnt.'::; ronce:;sion di:stingui,;hed this ca;,;e from United States
v. Marchetti, 46() F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) .
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA pmployee intended to
violate his agrt-emPnt not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at
1313. Marchetti therefore · did not considPr thp appropriate remedy for
the breach of an agrt-ement to :;ubmit all matPrial for prt-publiration
review. By relying on Marchetti in thi:,; case, thp Court of Appeals overlookl'd thP difference between Snepp's brencl1 and the violation at i~sue
· in Marchetti.
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aided the CIA i11 preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
existed as to one but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Pu11itive damages. Judge Hoffman argued, were
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Rnepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Rnepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy
agreement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a
trust relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information. including
information regarding i11telligence sources and methods." 456
F. Bupp., at 178." Snepp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for
" The fir::;t ~l'utenoo of the 1968 ~ecrPcy agrcenH'nt, read: " I , Frank W.
Sn<:'pp, III, tmd!'f:>tand that upon ·<·ntering duty with the Central IntelligPnce A~ ency , I am undertakiug a po::;ition of tru:st in that Agency of the
Gow·mmrnt. .. ." Pet. 58a.
11
Quite apart from tho plain languag(' of the ::;eerecy agrerment, the
nature of Sncpp'~ dutie::; and hi:; eoncrded tH•re::;::; to ::;ecret :sources ami
material,; could cstabli::;h a tru::;t relation~hip. See 595 F . 2d., at. 939
(Hoffmnn, J ., eoncurring in part nne! di:;::;enting in rntrt) . Few types of
government a! employment involve a higher degree of tru::;t than that
rcpo,;ed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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prepublication review. Thus. he exposed the secret information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. ·We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179- 180.

If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-

6
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pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his material-classified or uot--for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
93.3; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Iudeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
hreaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no 011e. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Suepp's unjust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
7 Every major nation in the world has a SPcret intPlligmce sPrvice.
Whatever fairly may bP said about some of its past nctivitiPs, the CIA is
an ngPncy thought b~· cvPry Pm;ident ~ince Franklin D. HoosevPlt to be
p;,;8ential to the Sl'curity of the United State~ and-in a sen~e--the free
world. It is impos~ible for a government wi:;ely to make critical decisions
about forPign policy and national defent~c without the bPnefit of depPndable
foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the
Secrets (1979) .
8 .Tm.lge Hoffman's dissent suggPsts that. even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government mu;,;t bring suit in a State that allows punitive
th1111agP~ only upon proof of <·omp<·n~atory damage~. 595 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court of App<'al~ majorit~·, howevc•r, held a;; a matter of federal law
that the nominal dnmages recoverable for any breach of a ~Pcrecy agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-

93&
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J.J.ecPssary to sustain an award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that
'Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at S11epp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 0 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligence that may contribute to national security. I therefore would grant the petitions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.

9
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not ... publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term ot [his] employment .. . without specific prior approval of the Agency. " Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.1
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executed a "termination F:ecref'y agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any clasRified infonnation, or any in-
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish a.n y information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Sncpp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the colltract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prE'publication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiducia.ry obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Rupp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp df'libPrately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid co11tract. 8
formation eonrerning intelligen<'e or CIA tlmt has not been made public
by CIA ... without. the expre;;:,; written consent of the Director of Central
Jntellig!'IH'!' or· hi~ rrpre~entativc." Pet. fila.
~At. the ( ime of ~nit, Snepp already had received about. $60,000 in advmwo pn.ynwnts. Hi~ !'ontract. with his publi;;her provide::; for royalties
and otlwr pot~'ntial profit.~. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The Court of Appeal>< and the Di;;trict Comt rejected each of Snepp's
cJ!'fpn:,;r>; to thr (•nforcemeut of his coutract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979): 45() F. Supp., at 180-lRl. In his petition for certiorari,
Sm•pp reliP:> primaril,v on the rlaim that his ~ecrecy agreement is unenforf'ealllP ail a prior rrstraint on protected speech.
A~ ilw Court of Ap]WaJ.-; held, ilw claim i;.; without merit. Wlwn Snrpp
ae<·t•ptrd rmplo.nnrnt with the CIA, he \·oluntaril~· ~igned the agr<·rrnPnt.
thai expr('s~J~· obligatPd him to ;.;uLmii any propo~ed publication for prior
rcvirw. H<· dm•,; not claim thai hr rxecuted thi~ agrN'IIlPIIt under duress.
Ill(ked, he Yolnntarily n'affirmrd hi,; obligation when he ldt tlw Agency.
Morrovcr, thi::: Court '~ ea;.;c·~ make e!Par that thP GoverruneHt-Pven in the
ab;:;cncc of :111 expre~~ agreement-eould have impo~rd n·a~onab](' ro><tric"--
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It also agreed that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 :F.
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. !d., at
935-936.~ In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation , dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. In an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two distinct
obligations, one to protect classified information and the other
to subrnit all manuscripts for prepublication review. Both
tions on Agrnr~· rmtllo~·(•ps' eXrr(·i~e of their Fin;t Anwndmrnt rights in
order to protret :;ubstantial gowrnmrnt interests. Civil Service Comrn'n
v. Lt•tter Carrie1·s, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (19i3) ; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 25-28 (l9i6) ; Greer, .. Spack, ~24 TJ. S. 828 (Hl76); id .. at 844848 (Powf:LL, ,J., coneurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 6iH (1972) .
Thr Gowrnmcnt has a sub~tantial intrre~t in protrcting both the ~ccrrcy
of information to our national ~el'urit~· and the appearance of eonfidenli:tlity so r~~~ent .ial to tlw dfPetive operation of our forPign intelligenee
servicr. See p. 5, infra. Snepp's sc('recy agreement i;; a reasonable means
for protecting this vital interest.
4 The Gov(•rmnent.'~:~ concesHion di,;tinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Gon'rnment claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate hi ~ agreement not to publish any classified information. Ibid., at
1313. Marchetti therefore · did not consider the appropriate remedy for
the hrearh of an agreement to ~:;ubmit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in thi::: C"ase, the Court of Appeals overlooked 1hP difference between Sm·pp's hrencl1 a.nd the violation at i"~ue
in M archt:tti.
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aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively tlw duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concludf'd that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust
existed as to o11e but not the other. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiduciary relationship and invested in Sncpp the trust of the
CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of
Snepp's undertaking to protect co11fidences associated with
his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued. were
both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a
fi<.l uciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high df'gree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy
agrE>ement, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a
trust relationship.r. The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligation not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
grallted "frequent access to classified information. including
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178. 11 Snepp published his book about CIA
activities on the basis of this background aud exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material for
:; The fir::;t

~rn1Pnoo

of thP 196R

~Pe!'('CY

agreenwnt, read: "I, Frank W.

8nPpp, III, understand that upon •e ntering duty with th~· Central Intelli-

gence Ageney, I am undertaking a position of tru;;t in that Agency of the
Gowrnment . .. ." Prt. 5Ra .
6 Quite apart from the plain languagr of the Hecrecy agrerment , the
nature of Sucpp':; dutirs and hi::; l'Onceded al'cess to ;;ecret ~;ourcPH and
materials eould establish a trust rrlation::;hip. See 595 F. 2d. , at. 939
(Hoffman, J., concurring iu part and di8~entiug in part). Few types of
governmental employment involvr H higher degree of trust than lhat
repo~ecl in a CIA employee with Sncpp's duties.

·'
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prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the secret information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise 'Classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admira.l Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us;" 456
F. Supp., at 179- 180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
nations and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA cannot
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation de-

6
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pends. 7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
Snepp's breach of his distinct obligation to submit his material-classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. This was no ordinary failure to
comply with a contractual obligation. It was a deliberate
brE:>ach of a very special trust relationship with our
Government.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed. as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Goverument with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nomillal damages are a hollow alternativE>, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recoverf'd, they may bear uo relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's uujust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the only remedy that the
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
7 Evrry major nation in the world has a secret intelligence service.
Whatever fairly ma~· be said about some of it« past activitie~, the CIA is
an agrncy thought b~· every Pre~ident ;;iuce Franklin D. Roospvelt to be
e~;sential to the security of the United State::; and-in a ~en.~e-tlw free
world. It i;, impo::;~ible for a government wi::;ely to make critical decisionl:i
ahout foreign policy and national defen~ without the benefit of dependable
foreign intrlligcnee. Sec generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the
SPrrets (1979).
8 .Tudg(' Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must briug suit in a State that allows puuitive
damagP~ onl~· upon proof of eomp(·u;;atory dmnage,.;. 5l:J5 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appeals majorit~·. however, held aH n matter of fedl!ral law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of n :secrecy agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at \:!06, and n . 10, 90793&.
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J.Jecessary to sustain an· award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclose some of the very secrets that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely will the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or arlditional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 9 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary obligation, the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligence that may contribute to national security. I therefore would grant the petitions in this case and reinstate summarily the full judgment
of the District Court.

0
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
In No. 78- 1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing the secrecy agreement that he signed when
he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreement are impressed
with a constructive trust. I would grant the petitions for
certiorari in order to reimpose the constructive trust found by
the District Court.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book highly critical of certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to
t.he Agency for prepublication review. At the time he accepted employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed a secrecy agreement promising that he would
"not . . . publish .. . any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally,
either during or after the term of [his] employment . .. without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was in addition to, and in aid of, Snepp's concurrent
undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization ." !d., 58a.1
1 Upon the eve of his depar ture from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
executfd a " terminat ion ,;ecrecy agrfement ." That documen t reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any in-
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on a11 profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligatious to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would submit the book for prepublication clearance. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp's
secrecy agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's·
profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
~
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8 ·~

---

lfp/ss

Snepp (Rider A, p. 2)

10/31/79

When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily
signed the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit
any proposed publication for prior review.

He does not claim

that he executed this agreement under duress.

Indeed, he

voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when he left the
Agency.

Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that the

Government - even in the absence of an express agreement could have imposed reasonable restrictions on Aqency
employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in order
to protect substantial government interests.
eomm'~v. - Letter ~ earriers,

Bcck1ey · v; ~ valeo,

424

u.s.

413

u.s.

eivi1 ~ service

548, 565 (1973); see

1, 25-28 (1976); 6reer · v; · Spock,

424 U.S. 828 (1976); id.)at 844-848 (Powell, J., concurring);
eole - v; · Richardson; 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
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It a,lso agreed that S11epp's failure to submit his manuscript
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm " on
intelligeuce activities vital to our national security. 595 F.
2d 926. 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court uphe~d the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support impositio11 of a constructive trust. The couclusioll rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's co11cession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged 110 classified intelligence. !d., at
935-936.'1 Iu other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligatiou extended only to preserving the secrecy of
classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal
clamages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Governmeut--in a jury trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to fiud a constructive trust. Iu an opinion that I find
persuasive, he recognized that Snepp had assumed two disti11ct
obligations, oue to protect classified information and the othe~
/
to sub111it all manuscripts for prepublicatiou review. Both/
aided the CIA in preserving necessary secrecy and discharging
effectively the duties imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that both obligations derived from the same
trust relationship, and he saw no basis for finding that a trust ~ ~
~.

The Governnwnt has a ~ intere:;t in prot<'cting Loth the
secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearauce of !'onfideutiality so e:s:;eutial to the effective operation of our foreign
. .,....
4 Cf" I'
intclligPnrr service. See p. 5, infra. Suepp':s "ecrecy agreement is a
Sf Ill
rea:sonnble mean:; for protecting thi:s vi1al intere:;t.
-,;:;4 The Government's conce:;:;ion di~tinguit~hed thi:; ca:;e from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1:309 (CA-!), cert. dt>nird, 409 F. S. 1063 (l!J72).
There, the Governmen1 claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate hi~ agrt>ement no1 to pnbli:;h any classified information. Ibid., at
131:3. Marchetti 1hrn·fore did not rousidrr the appropria1l' remedy for
the breach of an agreement to ~ubmit all material for prepublication
n•view. By rel~· ing on Man·hetti in thi~ ca:;e, the Court of AppPal~ o v e / ]ooked tlw difference between Suepp's breach <tnd the violation at i:-;sue
in Marchetti.

4
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existed as to one but uot the other. "The 1968 secrecy agreement," he wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a
fiuuciary relationship anu investeu in Snepp the trust of the
CIA. " ld., at 938. PrepuLlication clearance was part of
Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with
his trust. Punitive uamages. Judge Hoffma.u argued. were
both a speculative aud iuappropriate remedy for Snepp's
breach. I agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breacheu a
fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are
impressed with a constructive trust.

II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved au extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of his secrecy
agreement. Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a
trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically imposed
the obligati011 not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting it for clearance. Snepp stipulated
at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been
"assigned to various positions of trust" and that he had been
granted "frequent access to classified information, including
information regarding intelligence sources and methods." 456
F. Supp., at 178. 0 Snepp published his book about
activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He
deliberately violated his obligation to submit all material fo
prepublication review. Thus. he exposed the secret information with which he had been eutrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually coutained c~assified iuformation.

cry

" The fir~t :::cult>UC+' of the HI6H ~ecrt>cy agn.>t>ntent rPad: "l, Frank W.
SnPpp, III, undrr:;taud that upou rntt>riug duty with thr Central lntPlligrnce AgPncy, I am unuPrtaking a JlOHition of tru.,;t in that Agency of the
GoV~ernmeut . . . . " Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart frcm thP plaiu languagP of the st>crecy agreement , the
natur<:> of Snepp's dutie.,; and hi,; conceded acce:>:> to .,;ecret .,;ourcc·~ untl
lll ctterials could c~tablish a tnt~(. relationship. St•e 595 F. 2d. , at 939
(HotTman, J., <'OIH'UITing in part and dis,;enting in part). Few types of
govrrnmrntal employmrnt involve a higher degree of trust than that
reposed iu a CIA employee with Snepp's dutie::;.

t'
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"l"he Government tloes not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contentl-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposetl in him, Snepp should
have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the
material he proposed to publish would compromise classified
information or sources. Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust.
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that publication
by a former intelligence agent of information relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to our national interests
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified that Snepp's book and others like
it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct lia.ison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilliug to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.
If former agents may rely on their own judgment about what
information is harmful, the intelligence services of friendly
~
nat!ons and the foreign agents recruited by the CIA canno~
be assured of the secrecy upon which their cooperation depends.7 In view of this and other evidence in the record, bot
7

.Every major nation in the world has a :;ecret intelligence service.
Whatever fairly may be said about l:iOme of it::; past activitiel:l, the CIA i::;
nn agency thought by every Preiiident ~ince Franklin D. Roosevelt to be

6

S
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STATF.S

the Distt·ict Court all(] tht> Court of Appeals recognized that
Rnepp's breach of his distinct obligatio11 to submit his material-classifit•d or not--for prepublication elearanct> has irreparably harnwd the rnited ~tates Govemment. .!)95 F. 2d, at
933; 436 F. Rupp .. at 180. This was no ordiuary failure to
comply with a contractual obljgation. It. was a delilwrate
breach of a very special trust relationship with our
Go vemmen t.

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals cJenies the Goverument
the wost appropriatl:' remecJy for Snepp's acknowledgecJ wroug.
TndeecJ. as a practieal matter. tl11:' decision may well leave the
Gov<•rnment with no reliable deterrent against similar
brl:'aclws of security. No Ollf> disputes that thf> actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are uuquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to <leter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial ar<' speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered. -they may bear 110 relation to either the Governmeut's ir-rf>parable loss or Snepp 's unjust gain.
The Government cannot pursue the o11ly remedy that t h e /
Court of Appeals has left it 8 without losing the beHefit of
the bargaiu it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious concJuct
necessary to sustain au award of punitive damages may force
the Government to disclosf• some of the very secrets that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
P>'~Pntial

to tlw ~Prnrit~· of th<• 1Tnitecl Stalt·::: !lllu-in a ~r·n,.t~tlw frpc
world. It i:o< impo:;:;ible for a goverument wi,;cly to make t'ritiral dt•cisions
nboul for£"ign polit·y and national drfrn>*' without tlw lJeHt>fit. of d<'llt'lldable
forf'ign iHtrlligt'llrf'. Ree griwrally T . PowPr~, Thr Man Who Kt•pt the
Rt>rrt>t:-< (1979).
~ .Judge Hoffman',:: di"-~f'ut ~llgl!;l':-<t~ that even thi:< rt·nwdy ma~· be unavailahiP if the Govrrnmt'Ht must bring suit in a Statf' t IJHt allow~ mnitive
F
rlamagp:; onl~r upon ru·oof of compen~atory damages.
., at 940. The
I
Court. or Appeal..: majorit~·, hOW('V('I', held liS n lllH1tl'r of /l'rlt:'l'lll Jaw
flwt tlu• DOOliJ.I",d damage::: n•<•ovc·r11blt> for an~· b[l(•aeh of a. :-:N·rPt·~· a'g
t'- Y t
mcut will support an exemplary awanl. Sec id., at 9:l6, :uul 11. 10, 9;j7-
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Jury if the defendant so elects, would subjeet the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confid<>ntial affairs. Rarely will the Govemment run this risk.
In a letter introduced at S11epp's trial. former CIA Director
Colby 11oted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
coufirmiug or additional information of such a. uature that the
potPntial damage to the national security precludes prosecutiOlJ." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at ali.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 0 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublicatiou clearance, he ca11 publish with no fear·
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violatiou of his fiduciary obligation. the trust remedy simply
requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness.
Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those
whQ would place sensitive information at risk. And siuce the
remedy reaches only funds attributable to the brea.ch, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of
ail proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of
Appeals deprives the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting the secret intelligence that may contribute to national security. I therefore would rant the Jetition in this case aucl reiustate sumrnarily the full judgment
of the District Court.

0~Sre

lll

~~""'""'• at 939 (Hoffman , l., ClijllCIIIrting in
Jlli:U't) •.

])aJ:t

and cli~::;enting:;

'"'· .
.•

~u:punu <!faurl ttf flrt 'Jlfui:ttb ~bdt.tt
~ulfingtcn. ~. Q}. 2Ubi~.;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE W•c J. BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

January 4, 1980

Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265 Snepp v. United States

Dear John:
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have
prepared in the above.
Sincerely,

I~
Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference
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Jnauary 11, 1980

78-1871 Snepp v. United States

Dear Potter:
Here is a second draft of the Per Curiam in the
above case. I would appreciate your takinq a look at it
before I circulate it.
Mv Primary purpose is to emphasize that the
aqreement to oreclear is essential to protect the aqreement
not to publish classifi~d information.
In footnotes, I have undertaken specificallY to
reply to John. It seemed to me that some of his statements
were quite vulnerable. Do you think my replies are too
sharp?
I

would appreciate vour views.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss

·'"

GM: 1-12-80

Mr. Justice,
Mr. Justice Stewart called today at noon to respond to
your note about the redraft in Snepp.

He said that he did not

think the replies to JPS's dissent too sharP and that he would not
suggest you change them.
He did, however, have one suggestion about note 8 on
page 6.

He cannot accept the sentence that says "We have held

consistently that the Government can restrict its employees'
exercise of their First Amendment rights in order to protect
substantial government interests."

He thinks that tantamount to

saying that the Government can violate the Constitution.

Instead,

he would say something like "We have held consistently that the
Government can, in·order·to·protect·sabstantial·qovernment
interests; ·restrict· its· employees· in·a_c tivi_ties·that·might· in
other·contexts·be·protected·by·the·First·Amendment."
I think that Mr. Justice Stewart's suqqestion is
acceptable, but I note that language almost identical to that he
finds offensive here appears in note 3, page 3, lines 6 through 9.

Greg

,.
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Rider A; - fn;; - 8 - (Snepp'

In questioning the force of

~

Admiral~ LO

testimony, Mr. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion would
place the blame for the concern of foreign intelligence
services not on the desired hazards of allowing an aqent like
Snepp to publish whatever and whenever he pleases, but upon a
perceived failure of the CIA to classify what "should have
been classified or of the foreign government's disagreement
with our government's classification policy".

~'

at 6-7.

Apart from the fact that Mr. Justice Stevens' views in this
respect find no support in the record, they reflect - we
think - a misappreciation of concern reflected by Admiral
Turner's testimony.

If in fact information is not properly

classifiable or is in the public domain neither the CIA nor
foreign agencies would be concerned.

The problem is one of

making sure in - advance, and by proper procedures, that only
information not detrimental to national interests is
published.

Without a dependable preclearance procedure no

intelligence agency or responsible government official could
be assured that an employee privy to sensitive information
might not conclude on his own - innocently or otherwise that it should be disclosed to the world.
The dissent finds an "implication in the Court's
opinion" that the CIA should have

"carte - bl~nche

to censor"

'·

2.

employees' publications.

The obligation undertaken by Snepp

is no more than a preclearance procedure subject to judicial
review.

If, in this case for example, Snepp had lived up to

his obligation and he and the Agency had failed to aqree, it
would have been incumbent upon the latter -

if deemed

necessary - to seek injunctive relief aqainst publication.

~,-·

Mr. Justice,

I have reexamined the passages on page 5 that Mr.
Justice Stevens seems to be miscontruing.
to read them.

We both agree that

the~quite

I also have asked Ellen
clearly express the

view that you intend them to express and that they do not say what
Mr. Justice Stevens thinks they say.

And neither of us can think

of a rewording that could make the point more clearly.

So,

despite my earlier inclination to do a partial redraft, I have
come to the conclusion that there is nothing more for us to say.

Greg
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No. 78-1871: Snepp v.

u.s.

Mr. Justice,
I have marked a number of changes in the draft per
curiam.

Some were made necessary by changes in Mr. Justice

Stevens' language.

See per curiam, at 6-7, n.8.

clarify language and punctuation.

Others simply

Now that Brown v. Glines has

been announced, I think that we should cite it in footnote 3,
where we discuss the Government's right to place restrictions upon
its employees.

There is some language about prior approval in

.

'

Glines, at 8-9 & n.13, that seems relevant and that meets Mr.
Justice Stevens' argument that no prior case has upheld prior
approval requirements.

See dissent, at 5 n.10.

Greg

'

.

'

'

10, 1980

ann 79-265

~nepp

In vour ahsenc~, I have h~~ nv cl~r ~eliv~r
clerk my fourth draft of the PC in this case.
The only chang s , other than a~dinq a reference
n. 3, are ch nqes in n. 8 (np . 6, 7) that e m
in liqht of your most recent chanqes.
I have not circulated bv fourth draft because, in
the inte~est ~f having this case ready by the February 1S
Conference, I would like to ma e sure that you ann I have
comnleted our resp ctive writinq . If you wish to make anv
additional chanqes, and would let me see thP.m, I could then
deci e whether my fourth draft is r ady for circulation.
Absent anv chanqes by you, I ill circulate mv fourth draft
in it pr sent form .
I do hope vou and 1aryan found the same we ther in
that Jo and I left there . W~ were proud to have vou
Rich~ond .
You were a biq hit with my bar.

~ --·~---------
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Gentlemen:
In the event you missed it, I enclose a copy of the
Star's editorial on the Court's Per Curiam in this case.
At least one newspaper person has reao and
understood the opinion. The news stories, typically, iqnored

~

the fact that we were doinq nothing more than applyinq a

,p

contractual obligation that created a trust. Not even the
Star mentioned that both the DC and CA4 aqreeo that Snepp's
violation of his contract had caused irreparable harm to our
country.
Little wonder that the public remains confused.
Sincerely,

"~'''

The
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Chief Justice
Justice Stewart
Justice White
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist

lfp/sA

'

'
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Some of the press stories and commentary suggest

that the Court's opinion Snepp was motivated by publication
of The Brethren and a desire of the Court to create a
precedent that would enable it to prevent "leaks".
speculation is wholly groundless.

This

Indeed, any careful lawyer

who reads the opinion would recognize that - despite the
breast beating by some ACLU lawyers - the case focuses on the
CIA and the necessity of such an organization to maintain
secrecy and the appearance of its ability to do this.
A similar situation could exist with respect to
highly sensitive national security matters known only at the
highest levels of government in the White House, National
Security Council, State and Defense Departments.

Even none

of these requires quite the same necessity for the appearance
of an ability to protect secrecy, as does the CIA.
In any event, my file totally refutes the press
implications and speculations.

Snepp was discussed first at

a Court Confernce on October 5, 1979, at which time I
expressed the views that later were incorporated into my
opinion.

My opinion was first circulated, as a first draft

of dissent, on November 16, 1979 - two weeks before the

2.

Woodward book was published.

There is no relationship in

fact or in principle - except in the minds of some newsmen between the Snepp opinion and The Brethren.

L.F.P., Jr.
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MEMO TO FILE
United States v. Snepp
Some of the press stories and commentary suggest
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that the Court's opinion Snepp was motivated by publication
of The Brethren and a desire of the Court to create a

'

precedent that would enable it to prevent "leaks".
speculation is wholly qroundless.

Indeed, any careful lawyer

who reads the opinion would recoqnize that -

~espite

the

breast beating by some ACLU lawyers - the case focuses on the
CIA and the necessity of such an organization to maintain
secrecy and the appearance of its ability to do this.
A similar situation could exist with respect to
highly sensitive national security matters known only at the
highest levels of government in the White House, National
Security Council, State and Defense Departments.

Even none

of these requires quite the same necessity for the appearance
of an ability to protect secrecy, as does the CIA.
In any event, my file totally refutes the press
implications and speculations.

Snepp was discussed first at

a Court Confernce on October 5, 1979, at which time
expressed the views that later were incorporated into my
opinion.

My opinion was first circulated, as a first

' of dissent, on November 16, 1979 - two weeks before the

.. ~
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~,. ·~;
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Woodward book was published.
fact or in principle

There is no relationship in

except in the minds of some newsmen

between the Snepp opinion and The Brethren.
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GM:4-25-AO
Re: Snepp
Mr. Justice,
The attachen article on

C~4's

decisions in Rnepp and

Marchetti iust appeareo at 14 Harv. CP-CL L. Rev. 655.

It

predictably takes a view at odds with this Court's decision in
~~'

but it miqht be a worthv addition to vour file since it

lavs out the relevant 1st
addressed in other cases.

~mendment

case law that miqht have to be

(Ree esoeciallv oo. 672 et - seq.)
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Mr. Justice Bl"enrlfiD.
Justioe Stev:att
Justice Wbite
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

th-9~

~~

FRANK W. SNEPP, III v. UNITED STATES and
~ ~
UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
-~

/1 )
(_'

JA~N

/'~ • - . . ,

~~

PETITION FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

'-'t-)

Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided January -, 1980

JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency
any information he intended to publish about it for prepublication review. 1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classi~~~ d, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the
.c-Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926,
~r ~4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.
_
1 _ .
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), eert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063.
~~ ,tt.--l.f[_ In this case Snepp a~nittedly breached his duty to submit
~ L--1,.....;'
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for
c...c.- /
,
prepublication review. However, the Government has con~ .~ ~ ceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic rna~
teriaJ.2 Thus, by definition, the interest in _co~fidentiality1
hat Snepp's contract was designed to protecthas not bee~ ""'.4-~·~
R.

e:t:r ~

~

Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made
the same commitment.
2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that
~ :
~
" ... Decent Interval contains classified information or any information
"";l...LJ,/ P I
..
_9'!lc.erning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA,"
~vernment stated that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintiff does
~ ~ liO contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession,
~ ~ i;he district judge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts
v' r::i"\ , l . q- F?S ~ ermine whether Decent Interval in fact contains information that
H
\..V
~ ~ the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral
_..,._.~ ~ ~tansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu,
~ .. S...u...}' 5' ~he CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153.
,,
1
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SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Government unprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a
constructiv~ trust over th e profitS derivcd by Snepp from tlw
sale of the book. Because that remedy is not authorized by
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for
the Court to dispose of this novel issue summarily on the
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, 1 respectfully dissent.
I
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported
b',· statute. by the contract, or by thr common lfLw. Although
Congress has enacted a number of criminal statutes punishing
tlw unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified
information/ it h::s not seen fit to authorize the constructi\'f'
trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor docs either of the
contracts Snepp signerl with the agency provide' for any such
remed"· in the event of a breach. 4 The Comt's per curiam
opinion suggests that its res11lt is supported hy a common-law
blend of the la'v of trusts and the law of contracts. But neither
of these branches of tlw common law supports the impo~ition
of a constructive trust nnder the circumstances of this case.
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a settlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for
~ RrE', e. g .. 18 U. S. C. §70S, which impo~rs a prison trrm of 10 years
:md a ~10.000 fino for knowi11gl~· nnd willfully publishing rNtain typrs of
cln~sified information; 18 U. S. C. § 704, which makes it a niminnl offE'nRe
puni"hnble by life in pri~on to commun iratr national clrfrn~r informntion
to a foreign government; ::mel 5 U. R. C. § 312, which withdraw8 thr
right to government retirempnt hrnrfit~ from a per:.;on ronvirtrct of Yiolating these statutE's. Sec al~o Exrr. Ordrr No . 1206.5, .50 U. S. C. § 401,
\\"hirh provides admini~tm tiw cnnct ion~, including cli~chnrgr, ilg:l in~t rmplo~·ce;;; 'vho publish classfied informntion.
1 In both hiR original employment ngrcrmrnt and thr trrmination ngrrf'mrnt. SnPpp arknowlrclged t hr criminnl prn~1li ies th::~t might nti nrh to nn)·
p11hlicntion of cla~Rified information. In hi~ rmplo)'mcnt ngrrE'ment he
nl~o agreed that a brcnch of the agrremrnt would be cause for termination of his employmE'nt. No othrr remeclirs were mcntionrd in either
[ll!l'E'rment.

1
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the use and be11efit of dC'sig nntc>d l)('neficinries. Rather, it is
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses
fiduciary obligations arisi11g out of his d~t of lo alty to his
1e o hose obligations, long recognized by the
en in the absence of a written employment
agre 1
, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified"
~ · 10 mation. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the com~
mon law would support the implication of a constructiw trust
, ,~ +'
~ npon the benefits derived from his misuse of conficlrntial
v(
information. 5
But Snepp did not breach his ch1ty to pt'otect confLdC'ntial
'nfonnation. Rather, he breached a contmctual duty, im~ ... ~
)osed in 'd of thr b si
Jt ilo maintain conficlentialit;t"o
~,obtain prepublication clearance. In or er to justify the im~
position of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to
.f,..vf·
equate this contractual duty with f\nepp's duty not to dis, .A.~...
closr, labeling them both as "fiduciary." T find nothing in).
rv-the common law to sup])Ort such an approach.
~
~.'
Employment agreemrn s o en contain covenants clcsignC'd
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies
"-ith his duty not to disclose or mism:e confidential informa~
tion. OnP of the most common is a covrnant not to rom~ AJ.-/~
l~ c011trary to the majority's UpprO'dch:::OiifiiiTs Casf.""'tl"7e
~~ AAV'f./
courfs 11ave not construed such covenants broadly simply
~-r
L.o •
])('canse they support a hnsic flrlueinr~· duty: nor havr the?
{!;-- 1 ... .tfr
granted sweeping remedies to cnforcr them. On the contrar.v,
....A --t""
~
because such cov0nnnts arr agr0cments in rPstraint of an in1/ \
~ ,....
cliviclual's freedom of trade. tlwy are pnforceable only if thry
~~~
can survive scrutiny under thr "~ " That rule.

l

JAV-:

/P

V ·

tJ:!

5

~;,u..;

5
, ee, e. g., Spe1'ry Ranrl C'nrp. "· A-T-0. Inr. , 447 F. 2cl 13~7, 1302
(Ci\.1. Hl7l), cert. drnircl, 40.'i P. S. 1017 (Virgini[L law); TlapPk v.
C'hPvron Oil Co, 407 F. 2d 1120 (C.1\~ 19f\O) (ArkanKas bw); Structnntl
1mics Resea1'ch Corp. v. Rnginel'l'i11g Merhanirs Research Corp .. .JOl

'

Rupp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mirh. 1!175) (Mirhignn law) ; Reslnlement
econd) of Agency§ 396 (c) (195~) ("Unlr~s otherwi.<e ngrrrd, aftrr lhr
minntion of the ngrnc~· the agent: . . . (r) h ~l~ n duty to nrcount for
p~~~:~ ade by tho ~a le or u~r of trndr ~rrre1~ :1nd other ronfidrnlial
inf
t 'on, whrthrr or not in rompelition with thr principal. . . . ").

~

akl~ok
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origiu ally laid clo·wn in the seminal cnse of Mitchel v. R eynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181. 24 Enp;. Rep. 347 (171l ), requires tllnt
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimatn
interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidentiality), that the employer's interest not be outweip;hed by the
public intercst, 0 anrl that the covenant not be of any longrr
duration or wider georaphical scope than necessary to protect
t h c em p 1oyer's in tercst. 7
The enforceability of Rnepp's eontractual agreement to snhmit to prepublication review is doubtful when the rule of
reason is applied to it. The interest t a t c breement
m1s deSigned to protect-the confidentiality of classified infor c tio11-has not bef'n offcnclerl. by wh ~t Rncpp did: the
.....:1
- [l;rf'emcnt i = c intere~ in the nnrestrictecl
rli.ssemma 10n o unc assi cd i.nforma ion; ancl the commitment was of indefinite dmation and scope-a factor that
""on]d make most similar covenants unenforceRble.R This

n \H the Court. held in Herbert Morris. Ltd. Y. Sa:t'l'iby. 1 App. C'nl'.
HlHll 6(( . 704, the cmplovcr'R intcre~t in prot crt ing j r:~de RC'C'l'CtR dorR
~'.. . ~ n0t. 0\lhYC'. igh the public intrrrst in krrping the cmplo~·ee in thC' w0rkforre:
LM...~ · · " ... IA]n rmployer rnnlnot] preYent his cmplo~·ee from n:.;ing the
~
Rkill and knowlrdgC' in his trnde or JlrofeR~ion whi<'b he ha~ lenrnt
~- -~
in the rourBc of hi~ cmplo~·mcnt h~· mean~ of directions or in~trurtionR
~fi'Om the employer. That. informntion nne! th:~t aclditimwl skill he i~
rnt itlecl to usc for thr bC'ncfi t of himsrl f and 1he bcnefi t of 1he pu bl ir
who gain the ndyantagc of his haYing hnd snrh ndmirnblP in ~truetion.
The rase in which the Court
for the
of protection
~
whrrc u~c is mnclc. not of the ~kill whirh the mnn m:1v h~':(' nrqnir<'d,
, .-~J /
lmt of thr scCrE'ts of the trade or profe~,·ion whi r· h he had nn right to
v~rrYC'nl to an~· one rlsc . . . . "
7 Rce, e. g.. Brigos v. R. R . Donn e/ley <e· Sons Co .. 580 F. 2d 39,41 (CAl
07R) (Illinois law); AmNican Ifot Rod Assn., lnr. \'.Carrier, 500 F. 2cl
2()\), 1277 (CA4 Hl74) (North Cnrolin:1 law); Alston Studios, Inc. v.
~
lo11d V. Gicss <t· Associates, 4~t; F. 2d 270, 282 (CA4 1974) (Viru;inin
law); Mixing Equipment Co. \'. Philadrlphia. Gear, In c, 43t) F. 2cl 130R,
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law); liVater Servi('('S, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc .. 410 F. 2cl 163, 167 (Cl\5 1069) (Georgia law); Rr,;tatrment
(Second) of Contracts § 330 (Tent. Draft No. 12, Mnrrh 1977).
8 Rec, e. g., Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Giess &: A8sociates, 402
F. 2d 279, 2, 3 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Yirginia lmv a ro\'rnnnt
,...
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combination of factors might " ·ell porsuade a common lnw
court to hold the covrnant unenforceable in equity.
But even if the Court were correct n9..,a matter of CQlll.IJ,l.Oll )_.,
~thaTSTiepp's duty to~ jwcp'Uhlicati~ rev~,. was a
fiduciary duty, the constructive tmRt rr>medy im )Osecl hr>rc
would not be apprOJ~riaJ:.e.
hen
employee uses hi~
ployer's confidential 1nfonnation for his own personal profit,
~
a constructive trust over those proftts is obviously an appro._-- _
priate remedy because the profitR arc the direct result of
the breach. But Rnepp aclmi Ltcclly did not usc confidcn t ia 1
information in his book; ll £!' were the p!:_2fits fron 1 his _hook
~ ?
in any sense a product of his fnilm·e to sub1nit the book for
pr~ ; b JH·~;v,·. '?or ~ ,.;71 if RnC'pp had submitt('d
the book- to t h e agency for ]Wopublication review, the Government's censorship authority would ~urely have been limited
to tho excision of classified matcrinl. In this case, then. it
would have heen...obligcd to clear tho book for publication in
~
preci8oly the same form as it 1101v stands. 0 Thus. Snepp has
LA. ~ ~
not p1inrd anv pronts ns a result of h" brf'nrh; the Govern~ ~
ment, ratl10r than Snrpp . \Yill hr un.iP"il\' cnrirhecl if 1w i~
~ ~
re 'J.H!rocl . to .rli.s~orgr , profits attrilll'tnh1c cntirclv to his own }.,., '"
/
1 Llr>p.:1tlmn.t0 ad1\1ty.~
~ ~

an

em-}

I

J 4 v-v-'t

~!1~ t-'k

with no geographical limi t:1t ion): Amrricrtn !lot Rod Asw., Inc. 1·. Cnrrin, 500 F. 2d 1269, 1279 (CA4 Hl7 q (holding vrid unrler l'\orth Carolin a law a coYenant with no durntional or r.:rogrnpl,ir:1l limitntion): E. TJ.
CnnwPll <t· r'n. "· Gutberlet. 429 F. 2cl 5~7, 52~ ((' \4 1970) (holding yoid
nndcr Mnr~·lancl lnw a eown~mt with no dnr:lf ionn l or grographirnl
limibtion).
9
Tf he had i'ubmit led thr hook to thr ngenr~· nnd thr ngene~· had rrm"d to ron~rnt to thr puhlirntion of crrtnin mnlrri:-~1 in it, Snrpp could
:1rr ob!ninNl jndirinl reYirw to drtrrminr whrth"r tlw :-~gene~· m1s rorrrt. in ron~idrring the mttcrial rh~~ifird. Sec United States v. Marchetti,
Gfl F. 2d 1309. 1317 (CA4 1972), rrrt. dcnird, 409 U. S. 1063.
10
A~ thr Coml of .-\p]lr·,l~ hrld, to the r~trnt tl:nt thr C10vernmrnt ~"rk~
to punish Sncpp for brr:1rhing hi~ ohligntion to ~nbm it thr mnm 1~ <·ript
for prrpnh 1 ir"1t ion review or to dt·t "I' other" from rngaging in ~imi l:tr
brcnrhps, punitiYr dnm ~1r.:r;; nrr clrnrl~· :1 more npproprinte rcmed~· thnn n
con~tructive tn18t, " . . . ~inrr a ron"trurtivc tn1"t drpend~ on thr concept of unjust enrichment rather than dcterrenrC' nnd puni~hmrnt. Sec

ti

~I
~

L~

~~,·

I
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Although recognizing that Sncpp dicl not divulge any confidential information in his book, tlw Court nevertheless states
that the Go\·ernment has been harmed by its publication. It
Jnakcs this factual determination on 1c asis of testimony
by the Director of the CIA. Admiral Stansfield Turner, stating that Snepp's book and others like it have jeopardized the
CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence services by making them unsure of the agency's ability to maintain confidentiahty. Admiral Turner's truncated testimony docs not
<'Xplain whether these unidentified "other" books actually
contained classified information (unlikr Snepp's) or whether
for! ign age!1 ~ ics fear the publication of unclassified information which Sncpp nml othrr CIJ\ emplovcrs have a
First Amendment right to disscminatc. 11 If th<' fornwr is
true, I fail to see how Snepp's hook. which does not reveal
confidencrs. has exacerbated the problem. And if the latter (
is true, th<'n thr reluctance of foreign governments to work
with~1r ~ovcrmncnt must be accepted as a1: incvitablr hy-

s

n. Dohhs, T.;n,· of Rrmcdi('' 8.D ;If 201i and § 4.:) at 2·H1 (Hl7.'3) ." lin!i
F. 2d. nt !107.
11 Thr Di~trirt . .Tud!!r Fu~t n inrd t hr Gon•rnmf'nt's ob.irrt ion~ to qur::;tions conrrrning thr idrntit~· of other ngrnts who harl. puhliRhrd thr nnnnthorizrd works to which /\rlmiral Tmnrr rrferrrd. Tr. 1.'3fi. Howrnr,
Admiral Turnrr did tr~tif~· th·1t thr l1nrmful matrrinb involwd "rplrimuih· t hP aprrnmnrr in thr Pnit cd RtatrR mPdin of idrnt ifirat ion of
~curers nnd methods of rollrrting intrlligrnrr . . . . " Tr. 14.'3. This t~·pr
of information is CC'ftainl~, ronficlrnti:tl nml is sprcifirall~- tlir t?P<' of information thnt Sncpp has maintninrd hr did not rc,·rnl in Df'Crnt Intaun1.
Rrr, e. g., Snepp's Dcrrmhrr 7, 1!l77 intrr\'irw on the Tomorrow show,
in "·birh he >=tntcd: " ... I hrt\'C madr t1 ver~' dcterminrcl ·rfl'ort not to
rxposp ROUI'CCS or mrthod~ . . . . " C:oYrrnment ';; nrqnests for Admissions,
nrcord Itrm 1!l.
Snrpp';; attorneys wrrr nl~o forf'rlosrd from a~king Admiral TurnN
whethN p~rtirnlnr foreign ~ourrrs lwd stopped cooprrating with United
Rtatrs' aulhoritirs ns n dirert rrsult of thr pnblir:ltion of De,·rnt lnten,a1.
Tr. 13R. Tim~, it. iR unrlear whrthrr or why forri11:n so11rrr::: m~1,. hnw
rradrd nnfnvornbly to its puhlirntion. IIowe\W, Willinm F.. Colby. the
CTA'~ former Director, did indicate in hi~ tr:::timony thnt forrign nntions
g~"nrmll~· have a stricter :::rrrrr~· rodr than dors the United Stntes. Tr.
17.">-176.
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product of the exerc r of First Amendment rights by gov-

el·~es.

II
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The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari i.s
.iust as unprecedented as its clis])Ositi.on of the merits.
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunction requiring him to ~mbmit all future manuscripts for prermblication review and remanded for a determination of
whether punitive damages -vvere appropriate' for his hilme to
snbmit D ecent l11terval to the agency prior to its publication.
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a crosspetition for certiorari; the Govrrnment specifically stated.
ho\\·ever, that it was cross-prtiti.oning only to bring the <'ntirc
co :;-~ befor~ the Court in the r·:ent that the Court should clPcick
to grant s~wpp'r.: petition. The Govcrnnwnt rxp1ained thnt
"[h lrcause the contract rcnwdy provided b:v the court of apncals appears to be suffirirni in this rase to protect the Agcnc:v's
intNest, the governmrnt has nnt independc11tly ~ought rcvirw in
thi" Co11rt." In its ronclndinr: ]lara.gmph tlw GovernPl"nt
stated that "filf this Court gmnts fRnepp'sl ... petition for a
writ of crrtiorari in No. 7'R-1R71. it '+onld nlso !?;rant thi~ cross1)('-fition. Jf tlw petition in ::\l"o. 7R-1871 iR denied. this p<'t ition -::hould D1so be denied.'' Petition. nt G.
Given the Government's position. it would be highly inappropriate, and perhaps even beyond this Conrt's jnrisdiction.
to !:!rant the Government's pet1tion while dcnyinf!: Rnrpp's.' 2
Yet that is in essence what has been done. The majority
obYious]y does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this
Court's consideration , for they nre dismissed in :1 footnote ns
manifestly "without merit." Ante. at 2. n. 0. Tt is clear that
12 I have been unable to cli~ con-r nny preYious cnFe in whirh thr Court
hn,.; acted as it docs toda)', rcarhing; thr merits of a conditionnl cro~s
prtit ion despite its belie-f t hnt the petit ion dors not merit g;r:111t ing
ccrt iorari.

-..
I

•.
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Rnepp'o; 11etition WOlllcl not have been granted on its own
merits.
The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this
Court should not rearh out to decide a question not necessarily
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive
dnmage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests. the
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the
grounrls (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not
provide tho Government with a "reliable df'ierrent agn.iust
similar breaches of security," ante, at 6, and (b) that it mi.g:ht
reqnire thf' Government to reveal confidential information
in comt. that the Government might forgo d11mages rather
than make such disclosures, and that the Govcrnmer'\t might
thus be left with "no remedy at a11," ante, n,t 7. It scc1ns
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon citl,er
ground by the Govenl_E!~nt's acquiescence in the 1nni.tiw
damage remedy. Moreover, the second rationale ~ is entirely
speculative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wro11g.
The Court states that:

- --

1

"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an
award of punitive damages might force the Government
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised
to protect."
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepublication review and thRt the Government relied on these misrepresentations to its detriment. I fail to sec how such a
showinp; vvould require> the CovC'rmncnt to reveal any confidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 7.
''~·which, it should be noted,
ment's 5-page cross-petition.

doe~

not apprar anywhere in the Govern-

I

SNEPP

1'.

Fi\TTED STATES

III
Tloe lminhibited rharartcr of todn.y's exercise in lamnnking
is highlighted by the Court's cJjsrcp;n.rd of tm) ycncrnhlc
principle.,:
_...., th2t favor a 1norr consc•n·atiw approach to this
C,:JSe.

First. for cc>nturies the English-·spc~king judiciary refused
to grant equitable relief unless thr plaintiff could show thnt
his rrmcd~· at la.w was innclrcpwte. 'Yithout waiting for flll
o 1portmnty to apprm:.:r t 1r ac c•qWH'f of thr pvnitivc dmn:w:rs
r0mc>dy in this Cfl-'"C, thr Cnurt h:~s .imnprd to thr ro,lclnsion
that cqnihhl" relief is nccr~"ary.
fk•conrl. n nd of ;Yrcntf'r importnncr . t.1r Conrt Sf'rmP. nnn\1 nrr
of th0 fart t.h'lt its dr11stic nrw rt•nwcly l1a:- been fashio'1rrl to
0nforrP a epnciPs of prior rcstrnint on a citi't,rn's ri12·ht to
criticizr his I!Overnmrnt." Inherent in this prior rrstraint is
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its autl•ority
to delay tlw publication of a critical work or to persuade an
a.nthor to modify the eonte11ts of his work bryond the clcm::mds of serrecy. The character of tlw covenant as a prior
rrstrnint 011 frr(' speech c::nrrlY impose•<: an ec::prci::::llv hcnyy
burclcn on the censor to .i u::;tify thr remedy it seeks. It
would take more than the Court has written to pcrsur1dc me
that that burden has been met.
I rC"'JY' ctfu llv dir.:s01l t.

1 1
The mrrr f<tri that thr ngrncy hns i hr authority to rrYirw ihr Irxl
of a rriiirnl hook in ~enrrh of r!aR~ifird information brforp it is publi~hrd
is bound to haw an inhibiting rffrrt on the :-~uthor's writing. :.1orroYrr.
th right t.o drlay publication until thr rrvirw iR completed is it.self a form
of prior re~traint. that would not be tolernicd in other context:::. Src.
e. a.. New York 'l'imes Co. v. United Slates, 403 U. S. 71~; Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart. 427 U. S ..5~0.
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Both the District Court and Court of
Appeals found that publication by a former
intelligence agent of unreviewed material relating
to intelligence activities can be detrimental to
vital national interests even if the information is
unclassified.

If a former agent may rely on his

own judgment as to what information may be
detrimental, classified information could be
revealed by him without the opportunity of the CIA
- with its broader understanding of what may in
fact expose secrets or sources - to prevent
publication.

Sources relied upon include the

foreign intelligence services of friendly nations
as well as secret agents, often operating in
foreign countries.

The continuing availability of

these sources would be jeopardized if the CIA could
not, by the preclearance process prevent

'

compromising them and even endangering the safety
of agents.
Admiral Turner, director of the CIA
testified without contradiction • • •

lfpjss
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As Snepp would have access to highly sensitive
information, the Agency required as a precondition
to his employment in 1968 that he execute an
agreement "not to disclose any classified
information relating to the Aqency without proper

~~JLd.d:r?
authorization."

Pet. 58a.

~the

same agreement

1
Snepp promised not to publish "any information or
material relating to the Agency its activities or
intelligence activities generally, either during or
after the term of [hisl employment>

without

specific prior approval of the Agency."
59a.

Id., at

lfp/ss
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:Footnote ~ J:?~ ; ··tSnepEl

Despite express findinqs to the contrary
by the courts below, Mr. Justice Stevens - at the
outset of his dissent - states that "the interest
t

a....v
~ confidentiality that Snepp's contract was

"

designed to protect have not been compromised".
~'

1.

Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at

odds with the record in this case, the dissent
bifurcates the secrecy agreement of September 16,
1968, and treats the two interdependent provisions
thereof as if they were separate and unrelated
obliqations.

Mr. Justice Stevens suqqests that

~"{~
under

the preclearanceA aqreement is unenforceable
common law principles, and analoqizes Snepp's

undertaking to a "covenant not to compete". He then '
argues that it would not survive under the "rule of
reason".

One hardly would have thouqht that an

analogy drawn from the private world of business
has the slighest relationship to an express
agreement entered into pursuant to the National
Security Act by the Director of the CIA for the
purpose of "protectinq intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure".
§403(d)(3).

50

u.s.c.
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Greq:

Add a footnote along the following lines:

~/

In belittlinq Admiral Turner's

testimony, the dissent by Mr. Justice Stevens
states that if our country loses the cooperation of
foreiqn

intelligenc~ervices

this "must be

accepted as an inevitable byproduct of the exercise
of First Amendment rights by qovernment employees".
~'

6, 7.

We would not have thouqht that a CIA

agent with access to sensitive intelliqence
information can be viewed as just another
"government employee".

Indeed, it is more than a

little surprising that one would suggest seriously
that the government of the United States is
helpless, by virtue of the First Amendment,

to

prevent the disclosure of information vital to the
security of our country and hence, perhaps, to the
preservation of all freedoms.
Nothinq in the decisions of this Court,
zealous as we have been to protect First Amendment
rights, justifies the dissent's position.
3, snpra, and cases cited therein.
v: - Minnesota,

u.s.

(19::).

See n.

See also, Mears
In any event

2.

the dissent's argument is irrelevant

~
~

this case.

Here we have an express undertaking by Snepp,
voluntarily assumed as a precondition to being
employed by the CIA, pursuant to which he agreed to
the preclearance procedure.

lfp/ss
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~

~evision·of·Proposed · In~ert~B ----

In deprecatinq Admiral Turner's
testimony, the dissent states that damaqe to our
nation's ability to cooperate with foreiqn
intelliqence services "must be accepted as an
inevitable byproduct of the exercise of First
Amendment rights by qovernment employees".
6, 7.

Fost,

This statement that the government is

helpless to protect sources of intelliqence
information that may be vital to the preservation
of national security or the conduct of foreiqn
affairs finds no support either in reason or in the
decisions of this Court.
sopra.

See cases cited, note 3,

One would have thought that these

precedents apply with special force to the Central
Intelligence Agency and its responsibility to
protect sensitive intelliqence and sources.

In any

event, the dissent's statement is scarcely relevant
in liqht of the express obliqation that Snepp
voluntarily undertook as a condition of his
employment with the CIA.
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In deprecating Admiral Turner's
testimony, the dissent states that damage to our
nation's ability to cooperate with foreign
intelligence services "must be accepted as an
inevitable byproduct of the exercise of First
Amendment rights by government employees".
6, 7.

~,

This statement that the government is

helpless to protect sources of intelligence
information that may be vital to the preservation
of national security or the conduct of foreign
affairs finds no support either in reason or in the
decisions of this Court.
snpra.

See cases cited, note 3,

~

One would have thought that these

-'\

precedents apply with special force to the Central
Intelligence Agency and its responsibility to
protect sensitive intelligence and sources.

In any

event, the dissent's statement is scarcely relevant
in liqht of the express obliqation that Snepp
voluntarily undertook as a condition of his
employment with the CIA.
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FRANK W. SNEPP, III v. UNITED STATES and
UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATEIJ
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979
PER CURIAM.

In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). He contends that imnitive damages are an inappropriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all
writings about the Agency for prepublica.tion review. In
No. 79- 265, the United States conclitionaliy cross:-petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the j udgment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book about certaii1 CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ...
publish ... any information or material relating to the
Agency, its Activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [his l employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the , Agency without proper authorization." ld., at 58a.i
1 Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge cl<Msified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [ 1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would permit the book for prepublication cleara11ce. Finally,
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss."
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future
breach es of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp 's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any information conrerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the ,express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of suit, Snepl? already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and othrr potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp'gdrfenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F . 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F . Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable'
as a prior restraint on protected speech.
When Suepp accepted employment with tlw CIA, he voluntarily signed
the agrecm<'Jlt that expre:;::;ly obligated him to :;ubmit any proposed publit•a1ion for vrior review. He doe~ not claim that he executed this agree-·
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936. 4 In other words,
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material.
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the
ment under duress. Indeed, he voluntaril~r reaffirmed his obligation when
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's
agre!'mrn1 is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's
statutory mandate to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorizrd disclosme," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932.
Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that the Government-even in the
absence of an express agreement-could have imposed reasonable restrictions on Agency employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in
order to protect substantial gov!'rnment interests. Civil Service Comm'n
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973) ; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id., at 844848 (PowELL, J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
Thr Government has a compelling interest ir• protecting both the secrecy
of information important to our national security and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service. See p. 5, infra. The agreement that Snepp signed is a
rem;onable means for protecting this vital interest.
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United StateB
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agreement not to publbh an~· classified information. 466 F. 2d,
at 1313. Marchetti therefore did not con,.:idN the appropriate remedy for
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review . By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue

in Marchetti.
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial- could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d.,
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were boh a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust.
II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance.
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obligation- he had been "assigned to various positions of trust"
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified
information , including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178. 6 Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: " I, Frank W. Snepp,
Ill , understand that UJ1on entering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agrncy, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
CoVlernment. . . ., Pet . 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of
Snepp'~ duties and his conceded nccess to confidential sources and material;; could rstablish a trust relationship. See 595 F . 2d, at 939 (Hoffman , .T., concnrring in part and dissrnt.ing in part). Few types of
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that.
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Shepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intellige11ce agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources. the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire.
Whatcvrr fairly rna~· be :;aid about ::;ome of its past activitie::;, the CIA (or it:!
predcces~or the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since
Franklin D . Roo, evelt to be e::;sential to the ;;erurity of the United States
and-in a sense-the free world. It i~ impossible for a government wi;;ely
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defr>nse without. tlw benefit. of dependable foreip:n intelligencr. Sre generally T. Powers,
The Man Who Kept th(' S<'crets (1979}.
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security of information that might compromise them and
evell endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operatious. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material8 In deprrcnting Admiral Turnrr's iestimony, Mn. Jus•rrcE S•rEVENs'
di:;Henting opinion declares that damage to our Nation'i:l ability to cooperatr
with forrign intelligence servires "mnf;t b, accepted as an inevitable
byproduct of the exercise of First Amendment rights by govemment
employees.'' Post, at 6-7. This notion tlwt the Government is helpless
to protE-ct Hoorces o·f intelligence which may br vital to the preservation
of national security and the conduct of foreign nffairs finds no support
either in rrason or in the decii:lions of thi~:J Court.. We have held consi:;tentl~· that the Government can rrst rirt its employees' exercise of their
Fir~t Amendment rights in order to protect substantial government inter<'sts. See ra~e;; cited, at n. 3, supra. Onr should have thought that those
prrerdent~ applied with i:iperial forcr to a CIA agPnt who had access to
Re n:;itiw intrlligence. In any !:'vent, thp d],;:;ent 's statPment is scarcely
relevant in light of thr exprl.'~,; obligation that Snepp voluntarily tmdertook
as~~~ cbnditioll of his employment with the CIA.
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935;
456 F. Supp., at 180. 0

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that
0 Although hoth the District Court and thr Court of Apprals expn·~sly
found othrrwi::;e, :\IR . .Tus'l'ICE STEVENs say:-< that "the intrrrst in l'onfidentiality that Snepp's contract wnl' de~igned to protect has not been
eompromisrd." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on tlw basi~ of a premi::w wholly nt
oddi:i with thr rrcord, the dissent bifmcate$ Surpp's 1968 agreement And
treatH its interdeprndent provisionH as if they imposed unrelated obligations. MR. JusTICE S'!'EVENS then analogize~ Snepp's prepublication revif'w
agrf'ement with the Government to n privatr employee's covrnant not to
compete with hi rmployer. A bod~· of private law intended to preserve
eomprtition, howrver, simp!~· ha:> no bearing on a contract made by the
Director of thP CIA in conformity with his statutory obligatiou to
"proterrtJ intdligence sources and mf'thodH f10m unauthorized disclosure."
50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3).
10 .Tudgr Hoffman'~ di~sent suggel:lt:'< that fvrn this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937938.
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a.
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would thf' Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing. law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risk!l, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 11 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we reinstate the full judgment of the District Court.
SrE' id., at 939 (Hoffman, .J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) .
1\TR..lt'::>'l'IV~' .. TE\'ENH ('OnC'rdl':< that, ('V<'ll in thr ab8ence of n writtrn

11

contract , an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3.
He also eoncrdes that all pert;anal profit;; gainrd from the exploitation of
such information are impressed with a con ~ tructive tru:;t in favor of the
crr'lployet . 11 ost , at 5, In this rase, he ~eems to think that the common
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law would not treat information as " confidential" unles~ it were "classified."
Sec, e. g., post. at 3. We havr thought that the cornmon-IHw obligation
wa>i con~iderably more expansive. Srr, e. g .. Hr:;tatement (Srcond) of
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comment:; b, d (1958);
V Scott on Trusts § 505 ( 1967). But since this ca::;e involvrs R written
contract ~Jwcificnlly designed to prevent thr disclo:;ure of confidrutial
information, we have no occasion to lingrr over that question. Therr i~
no nerd to invoke common-law principles in order to impose a con:-;tructive
trust on Snepp's profits .

...
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tn No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment en~orc·6g an agreement that he signed when he
accepted emp,l yment with the. ?enttal lntelligence. Agency
(CIA). He ·ohtends that iJumtive damages are an mappropriate reme~y for the breach of his promise to submit ali
writings about the Agency for prepubiication review. In
No. 79- 265, the tJ nited States conditionaliy cross,. petitions
from a judginent refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book about certai!1 CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, h-e-wev8l', Snepp had
executed an agreem~n~promising - that--he would "not ...
\ publish ... any information or material relating to the
" Agency, its hctivites or inteiligence activ1tes generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. q'i(e
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the . Agency without proper authorization." ld., at 58a.1

-

1 Upon the eve of: his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also

\

·
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally,
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss."
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 3
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the express written consent of the Director of Central
IntelligPnce or his representative." Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp'S'
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceableas a prior restraint on protected speech.
When Snepp accepted employment with thr CIA, he voluntarily signed
the ngrN'ment that exprl":;;;ly obligated him to submit any propot;l"d public~tion fur vrior review. He doe; not claim that he executed fhis agree-·
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
''irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
11ational security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936. 4 In other words,
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material.
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the
mrnt undrr duress. Indred, hr voluntarily reaffirmrd his obligation when
he left thr Agenc~·· We agrl:'e with the Court of Appeals that Snl:'pp's
agrrrment is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Dirl:'ctor's
statutory mandate to "protrcft] intf'iligl:'nce sources and methods from
1111authorized disclosure," 50 U . S. C. § 40:3 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932.
Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that the Government-even in the
absence of an express agreemPnt-could havP imposed reasonable restrictions on Agency employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in
order to protect substantial government interests. Civil Service Comm'n
v. Lette1· Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976); .Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); id., at 844848 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
The Government has a compelling interest ir' protPcting both the secrl:'cy
of information important to our national srcurity and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service. See p. 5, infra. 'The agrl:'ement that Snepp signed is a
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest.
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimrd that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agrrement. not to publi:<h an~· classified information. 466 F. 2d,
at 1318. Marchetti therefore did not considrr the appropriatl:' remedy for
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review . By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's brea.ch and the violation at issue
in Marchetti.
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial- could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote . "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." !d.,
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were b<J:. a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust.
II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance.
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obligation- he had been "assigned to various positions of trust"
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified
information , including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178. 6 Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. HP deliberately and surreptitously
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica5 Tho first ~entence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp,
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in tha.t Agency of the
Go\llernment ... _,, Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature or
Snepp's dtlties and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials could Pstablish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types or
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that.
reposed in a ClA employee with Snepp's duties.
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified informa.tion with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources. the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire.
Whatcvrr fairly may be said about f:ome of it8 past activities, the CIA (or its
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be essential to the serurity of the United States
and-in a sense-the free world. It is impossible for a. government wisely
to make critical deci~ions about foreign policy and national defPn~e without the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers,
The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1979).

,•
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security of information that might compromise them and
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us tbat they are very
nervous about continuing work with· us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you bow many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material8

In

let)l'f'8atiRg AdmirHI Turnrr's testimony, MR. JuSTICE STEVENS'
opinion declares that damagr to our Nation's ability to cooperate
with forrign intelligence services "mn;;t bP accepted as an inrvitable
byJH'odnct of thr exercisr of Fin;t Amrndment rights by government
employres." Post, Ht 6-7. This notion that the Government is helple::;s
to protect sources of intelligencr which m!ly br vital to the prrserva t ion
of nl\tional security and tbr conduct of foreign affairs finds no support
uiflw.t:.. in ~(·nsen er in the deci::;ions of this Court. We have hdd con~istrntl:v that the Governmrnt cll!l rr ·t tirt its employees' exercise of their
Firo;t Amendment rights in order to protect substantial government interests. See <'a.se::; cited, at n. 3, supra. Onr ;fuould have thought that tho::;e
prrcf'clrnt:-; applird with i:lpecial forcr to a CIA agrnt who had acres:-; to
AensitivP intrllig('nce. In any ev('nt, t h(' diss<:'nt's stat('ment is scarcely
rclrvant in light of the rxpr<'ss obligation that Snrpp voluntarily und<:'rtook
UH ~~ <'blldition of his employmrnt with the CIA.
di~~enting
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
harmed the Uuited States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935;
456 F. Supp., at 180. 0
·

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that

7~t,

0 Although both the District Court and thr Court of Ap]wals expre:ssly
found otherwi~(', ::VTR . .JusncE STEVENs saY~ that "the interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract waR de:signed to protect has not bePn
compromi::wd ." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on tlw ba:;i:; of a premil:W wholly at
odds with the record, the dissent bifnrcate;; SnPpp's 1968 agreement :md
treats its interdependent provision~ as if they imJlO::>ed unrelated obligations. MR . .JusTICE S·rEVENS then analogizet:: Snepp's prepublication revi""w
agreement with the Goverpment to a private employee's covenant not to
compete with his employE'!'.,\ A bod~· of private law intended to pre:::erve
competition, however, simp!~· has no bearing on a contract made by the
Director of t h(' CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to
" proter[t] intelligence sources and methodR from unauthorized disclosure."
50 U . S. C . § 403 (d) (3).
10 .Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
dama~res only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n . 10, 937938.
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a.
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. ·E xisting law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable riskfl, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 11 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
____=se a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and ~{P@ii'
~ =::..:: the full judgment of the District Court.
...f . .,

.

tL See id .. at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and di~senting in part).
1\fR. .Tu::;Trcf: , n:vENH conerdf>,.: that, t>vrn in thr abo;ence of a written
contract, an rmployee ha:.; a fiduci~try obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during the courtlP of bis Pmployment. Post, at 3.
ftp al~o roncrdes that all pPrso nal profit:.; gai!H'd from the exploitation of
tluch info'r mation are imprPs ·ed with n con~tructive trust in favor of the
employer. Por>t, at 5, In thiR raHe, he sPems to think that the common
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"ro nfidPntial " unle:;s it were "classified."
that thP eommon-law obligation
was considNably more expansive. Set', e. g .. Rrstatement (SPrond) of
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Commrnt c, 404 and Comment:; b, d (1958);
V Scott on Trusts § 505 (1967). But since this casP involves n written
contract :;ppcificnlty designed to prevPnt thP disclosure of confidential
information, we have no occasion to lin~<>r over that quPstion. There i:;
no nePd to invoke common-law prinripl<>s in order to impose a com;tructive
trust on Snepp':; profits.

:SN·, e. g., post. nt 3. We hav<'

thou~ht
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In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
ce )ted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
. ~-l--(i;C'::::I:"';'A"7)-.1 In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally
cross-petitions from a Judgment refusing to find that profits
attributable to Snepp's breach of that agreeme.!tare impressed
w1th a constructive trust. We grant the petitions for certiorari in order to J:4iin~pose t,he ~H&truGtlVIS- tl/lst found b~
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Based on his ex.J2_eriences as a CIA agent Snepp published
ook highly g~iga~ certam CIA activities in South Vietn. Snepp ptiblishect the account without submitting it to
e Agency for prepublication review. AHhe/tm.e he~ ~~....
~
~employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
c
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executed an agreement promising that he would "not . . .
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publish .. any Information or material relating to the
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge clasS'ified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings _for prepublica-tion review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). 'The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officia1s into believing that he
w uld submit the book for prepublication clearance./Th_e_,D~is-----,
trict Court therefore enjoined future breaches fJ Snepp's
agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 3
formation concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA . .. without the •express written consent of the Director of Centraf
Intelligence or hi. representative." Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978) .
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
,..,
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Sm·pp relies primarily on the claim that hi;; agreement is unenforceable:
~ts a prior rrst.raint on Jlrotected speech.
AS"1:he Gouf't ef Aprleals hffi:l, tl+e·elzcim i~ wit-hot~.Ji> When Snepp h '
acrepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed th · :r'grcement 11
that expressly obligated him to submit any propo~ed pub atwn for pnor
review. He does not claim that he executed thi~ agrr nent under duress.
r----------~~
n_dced, he voluntarily reaffirmed hiH obligation when he left. the Agency .
Moreover, thi;; Court 's cases make clear that the Government- even in the>
absence of an express agreement-could have imposed reasonable re~1ric"!lons on Agency employee~§' exercbe of their FirHt Amendment rights 111'
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~.also~;re!f- that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript .,...S_p_e._(;:._,--=c...~:ljt2 1-< L-_--,
for prepublication review had inflicted "irreparable harm" on
intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F .
2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979) . Thus, the ·c ourt upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did
not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First
Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the
Government's concession-for the purposes of this litigationthat Snepp's book divulged no classified intelligence. l d., at
935-936. 4 In other words, the court thought that Snepp's
fiduciary obligation extended only to---Preserving the confidentiality of classified material. / lf"'therefore limited recovery
to nominal damages and to thefPossibility of punitive damages
if the Government-in a jury trial-could prove tortious
cond
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. He- recognized that-Snep)?
had assumed two distinct obligations, one to protect classifie~
iffie.rma.ti{}n and th other to- submit all manuscripts for pr~
,.,.--""\,P_u_b_l_ica._
. _t_ion rev.ie,.w.. Both a.idect the- CIAilL preserving nece~
order to J1rot.ect. substantial government. interests. Civil Service Comm'n
v. Letter Ca1Tier8, 413 U . S. 548, 565 (1973) ; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976) ; Gree1· v. Spoc/,;, 424 U. S. 828 (1976) ; id., at. 844848 (PowELL, .L, concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U. S. 676 (1972) .
Thr Govrrnmen1 bas a iuhst~~ interest in protecting both the secrecy
of informatiOn important to our national secur1ty and the appearance of
eonfidentia.lit.y so es ~ential to the pffecttve o]wrat.ion of our foreign intelligellco service. Sec p. 5, infm. The agreement that SncrJP signed is a
rea8onable me :m ~ for protrcting this vital intere::lt .
4 The Government's conces8ion distinguished this case from United StateS'
v. Ma1·chett1 , 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972) .
There, the Government cln.nned that a former CIA employee intended tn
violate bis agrrement tlot to puhli~l1 any cla~ 8 ified informatwn . 460 F. 2d,
nt 1:3la. Ma.rchett·t thPrefore did not consid(•J' the appropriatr rrmcdy fol'
the breach of a11 agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review . By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference betwrcn Snepp's breach and the violation at, issue·

in Marchetti.
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SNEPP v. UNITED STATES
saq~ --COnfide.u.tialitjl-.and discharging effectively the dut~
imposed upon it by law. Judge Hoffman concluded that bo}f
obligations derived from the same- trust relationship, and ~
saw no basi,s fer finding that a trust-existed as to one but ll]2!
the-other;;~ The 1968 agreement, he wrote, "was no ordinary
contract; it gave life to a fiduciary relationship and invested
in Snepp the trust of the CIA." ld., at 938. Prepublication
clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge
Hoffman argued, were both a speculative andUnappropriate
remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with Judge Hoffman
that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust.

~-

"

II

·

Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship. 5 The trust agTeement specifically Imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance.
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positiO\lS of trust"
and that he had been granted "frequeut access to classified
information, including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.r. Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back~ound and exposure. He deliberatelyjviolated his obliga-

a,...J

5 ..... ..-.,..e.J4-h·fcws£,

Tho first; sentenee of the 1968 agreement read : " I, Frank W. Snepp,
Ill, understand that upon rntering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I am undertaking a position o! tru~t 111 that Agency of the
GoV'ernment . . . . " Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of
Snepp's dutie:;; and his conccoded acce~s to confidential sources and materials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J ., eoncurring in part and di:::sentmg in part) . Few types or
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
5

·~·

l: .

'·
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j
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-tion to submit all material for prepublic · ion review. Thus,
he exposed the classified information with which he had been
entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Goverument's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust .

-

.........--The undisputed evidence in this ease sho-ws-t.S.art-publicati~

T

by a former intelligence agent-Of-in.for.matiGn relating to int~
li.ge.n.ce activitiss-ean.. be detrimental to our national inter~
even if the information is unclassified. Admiral Turner, ~
rec~r- G£-the. CIA, testifie~ that Snepp's book and others hke
it have seriously impai!ied the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. "Over the last· six to nine months," he
said,
"we have had a mimber of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging informatiOn with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwi!Hng -to enter into business with us. " 456'
F . Supp., at 179- lSO.'o/
~neF-agents·

ma.y rely o:n their own ,iudgmeHt-about

wha~

i:nformation 1-8--ha.rmi.Ht,. the--intelligence- serviee of -friendl~

'
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INSERT A
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to
vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified.

When a former agent relies on his own judgment

about what information is detrimental, he may reveal information
that the CIA--with its broader understanding of what may expose
classified information and confidential sources--could have
identified as harmful.

In addition to receiving intelligence from

domestically based or controlled sources, the CIA obtains
information from the intelligence services of friendly nations
and from agents operating in foreign countries.

7

The continued

availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's
ability to guarantee the fs ecurity of information that might
compromise them and even endanger the personal safety of foreign

agents.
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA
agent's violation of his obligation to submit writings about the
Agency for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to
perform its statutory duties.

Admiral Turner, Director of the

CIA, testified without contradiction

NO. 78-1871: SNEPP V. U.S.

INSERT B
~ In

deprecating Admiral Turner's testimony, MR.

JUSTICE STEVENS' dissenting opinion declares that damage to our
Nation's ability to cooperate with foreign intelligence services
"must be accepted as an inevitable byproduct of the exercise of
First Amendment rights by government employees."

Post, at 6-7.

This notion that the Government is helpless to protect sources of
intelligence which may be vital to the preservation of national
security and the conduct of foreign affairs finds no support
either in reason or in the decisions of this Court.

We have held

consistently that the Government can restrict its employees'
exercise of their First Amendment rights in order to protect
substantial government interests.
supra.

See cases cited at
1

n~

@

3,

One should have thought that those precedents applied with

special force to a CIA agent who had access to sensitive
intelligence.

In any event, the dissent's statement is scarcely

.

'

\

.

.

relevant in light of the express obligation that Snepp voluntarily
undertook as a condition of his employment with the CIA.

;

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES
~nd

the. foreign agents r-ecruited by the CIA

cann~

~-0-f th8-~Ct:ecy'-Upo.n.-whi.ch-their - cooperation ~
~ In view of this and other evidence in the record, botli

J

the District Gourt and the Court. of Appeals recognized that
Si1epp'syt6"ach of his oxplicit obligation to submit his ma. terial-jClassified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at
935; 456 F. Supp., at 180~1'his was 110 or~r~ t;p
~~gntr.a.Gtual .obligation. ·rt- -was a- deliberatehreMh of ..a.. very special trust relationship with ou
G&v 1ment

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication sucb as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. 1.'he punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government could not pursue th<' only remedy that
the Court of Appeals left it..q without losing the benefit of
...-...... 7

Evrry major nation in thr world has an iutPiligmce Rervtcr WhatcvPr fairly may lw ~aid about ~:>omP of tt>< JlH>-f artiv1tir", the CIAJ2s
(
an agency thought by every Pre:;idE'nt since Fra.nklm D . Roosrvelt to oe
t'SSentml to. the sert~rity or tlw United Sta!es and-m a ":~se-the. ~ree
world. It Ji:! Impos::nblr for a government wisely to make cntJcal deciSions
about foreign polic) and na'tiona1 defent~e without the benefit of dependable
forr1gn intelligence. Sec generally T . Power::;, The Man Who Kept the
\ ~ (1979)
fO/ '.Judge Hoffman'H dissent suggests that even this remedy may be un/ available If the Government must bring suit in a State that allows pumtive
damages only upon proof of eompPn:::atory damage:::. 595 F . 2d., at 940.
The Court of Apprals majority, however, hrld HS a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trwst agree-

c~ ;~
~ c. ..s#"'t)

+~ t>SS)

NO. 78-1871: SNEPP V. U.S.

INSERT C
\){

Although both the District Court and the Court of

Appeals expressly found otherwise, MR. JUSTICE STEVENS says that
"the interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract was
designed to protect has not been compromised."

Post, at 1-2.

Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at odds with the record,
the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and treats its
interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated
obligations:

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS then analogizes Snepp's

prepublication review agreement with the Government to a private
employee's covenant not to compete with his employer.

A body of

private law intended to preserve competition, however, simply has
no bearing on a contract made by the Director of the CIA in
conformity with his statutory obligation to "protec[t]
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."
50

u.s.c.

.

~.

-~

§

403(d)(3) •
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the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduc~
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences tha .
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant ~o elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust~ It deals fairly with both parties by con- \!Y
forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refusecvl. to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we reinstate the full judgment of the District Court.

•

ment will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937~938.
,-M! See id., at 039 (I-Ioffwan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part ,
"/
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS conceeds that, even in the absence

of a written contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to
protect confidential information obtained during the course of his
employment.

Post, at 3.

He also conceeds that all personal

profits gained from the exploitation of such information are
impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the employer.
Post, at 5.

In this case, he seems to think that the common law

would not treat information as "confidential" unless it were
"classified."

See, e.g., post, at 3.

We have thought that the

common law obligation was considerably more expansive.
Restatement (Second) of

Agency§~

See, e.g.,

396(c), 400 and Comment c, 404

and Comments b, d (1958); V Scott on Trusts§ 505 (1967).

But

since this case involves a written contract specifically designed
to prevent the disclosure of confidential information, we have no
occasion to linger over that question.

There is no need to invoke

L

;

common- law principles in order to impose a constructive trust on
Snepp's profits.
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Mr. Justice
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
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Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided January -, 1980

MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency
any information he intended to publish about it for prepublication review. 1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classified, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926,
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972) , cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063.
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for
prepublication review. However, the Government has conceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic materiaP Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality
1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made
t he same commitment.
2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that
" ... Decent Intel'val contains classified information or any information
concPrning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA,"
the Government stuted that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintiff does
not so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession,
the district judge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts
to determine whether Decent Intel'val in fact contains information that
Lhe Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral
Stun!lfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu,
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153.
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that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been
compromised. Nevertheless. the Court today grants the Govermnent unprecedented a11d drastic relief in the form of a
eonstructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the
sale of the book. Because that remedy is not authorized by
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for
the Court to dispose of this novel issue summarily on the
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I respectfully dissent.

1
The rule of law the Court. announces today is not supported
by statute, by the coutract, or by the common law. Although
Cougress has enacted a number of criminal statutes punishing
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified
inforn1ation, 3 it has not see11 fit to authorize the constructive
trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor does either of the
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such
remedy in the event of a breach.4 The Court's per curiam
opiuion suggests that its result is supported by a common-law
blend of the law of trusts and the law of contracts. But lleither
of these branches of the common law supports the imposition
of a constructive trust under the circumstances of this case.
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a settlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for
8 See, e. (!., 18 U. S. C. § 798, whieh imposes a prison term of 10 years
and a $10,000 fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certain types of
cla&;ified information; 18 U. S. C. § 794, which makes it a criminal offense
punishable b~· life in prison to communicate national defense information
to a foreign government; and 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdmws the
right to govemment retirement be11efits from a pcrl:ion eonvicted of violating these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401,
which provide:; aclministrativ£' ::<unctions, including discharge, against employees who publish clal:!Sfied information.
4 In both his original employment agreement and the termination agreement Snepp acknowledged the criminal penalties that might attach to any
publication of clas::;ified information. In his employment agreement healso agreed that <L breach of the agreement would be cau~:~e for termination of his employment. No other remedie:; were mentioned in either
agreemeut.
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the use alHl benefit of designated be11eficiaries. Rather, iL is
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the
common law even in the absence of a writteu employmeut
agreement, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified"
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the common law would support the implicatiou of a constructive trust
upon the beuefits derived from his misuse of confidential
information. 5
But Snepp did not bre~:~:ch his duty to protect confidential
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, imposed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the imposition of a constructive trust. the majority attempts to
equate this coutractual duty with Snepp's duty not to disdose, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in
the common law to support such an approach.
Employment agreements often contain covenants designed
to ensure in various ways that au employee fully complies
with his duty 11ot to disclose or misuse confidential information. One of the most common is a covenant not to compete. Contrary to the majority's approach in this case. the
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary,
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an individual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable ouly if they
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." That rule,
5 See, e. g., Sperry Rand Corp. 1'. A- 1'-0, Inc., 447 F. 2d 1387, 1392
(CA4 1971), cert.. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia la.w) ; 1'lapek v.
r'hfvron Oil r'o .. 407 F . 2d 1129 (CA~ 1969) (ArktUl;;a:; law) ; Strurturul
DJI'namil's R fsearch Corp. v. Engiueel'ing Merhanics Research Corp., 401

F. Supp. 110'2, ll:lO (ED Mich. 1975) (),Iichignn law); Restntemeut
(Sf>rOHd) of Agency§ ;{96 (e) (1951-1) ("lJnle~;; otherwise agreed, aft<'r the
termination of the agency the agPnt: ... (e) ha;; n duty tQ account. for
proti.t s madCI by the ~ale or U>'( \ of trade 1<Pcret~< and otht>r ronfidt>ntial
information, whether or 110t iu c·om}wtition with the principal. • , ."),

4

SNEPP v. UNITED STAT'Jl'..S

originally laid do\\11 in the seminal case of M·itchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), requires that
the covcnaut Le reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate
interest of the employer (such as an interest iu confidentiality), that the em player's interest not be outweighed by the
public interest, 6 and that the covenant not be of any longer
rluration or wider georaphical scope than necessary to protect
the employer's interest. 7
The enforceability of Rnepp's contractual agreement to submit to prepublication review is doubtful when the rule of
reason is applied to it. The interest that the agreement
was desiglled to protect-the confidentiality of classified information- has not been offended by what Rnepp did; the
agreement is contrary to the public interest in the unrestricted
dissen1ination of unclassified information; and the commitment was of indefiuitf' duration and scope--a factor that
would make most similar covenants unenforceable. 8 This
0 A,; thr rourt hrld in Herbert Morns, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. Cas./
rJ916) fi8b, 704, thr employrr':-; inti'J'P:;t in protecting tmdr ~!'('l'Ct~ does
11o!, out wei!,(h the public in!NP~t in kreping thP em11loyee in t h<' workforce:

Pmplo~·<·r l'anj"notl llfl'Vl'llt. his t>mployPf' from using the
u,nd knowledgr in hiR tradr or proff'~sion which hr has Je,~rnt
in tlw l"our::;r of hi1-1 rmplo~·mrnt by 1U<'all>' of dirrdion~ or in~tructions
from the employl'l'. That information and that. additional ~kill he is
eutitlrd to nse for thr benefit. of himself ami the benefit of the public
who gain the advautn!!,'e of his having bt~d :;ueh admirable im;truction.
The case in which the Court. interft>res fur the purpo~<' of prutrction is
whrre use i~< made, uot of the ~<kill which the man ma? have acquired,
but of the st>cret::; of the t mdP or profes:;ion which he had no right to
n•vcal to an~· onr else . . . . "
7 See, e. g .. Bl'iggs v. R. R. Do11nelley & Sons Co., 589 F. 2d 39, 41 (CAl
1H78) (Illinois law); American lfot Rod A8sn .. Inc . '· Carrie1·, 500 F. 2d
12fi9, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina hLw) ; Alstoll Studios. Inc. v.
Lloyd V. Gil:'ss t~ Associates. ~92 F . 2d :279. 2S:2 (CA4 197-!) (Virginia
hw) ; !llixing Equip111ent C'o . ,.. Philadelphia Gear. l11c .. -!:36 F. 2d 1308,
1312 (CA:3 1971) (New York law): Watel' Servir·es. Inc. v. 'l'esco Chemitals, I nr•., 410 F . 2d 163, 1G7 (CA5 HHi9) (Georgia law); T{p,;latc•mcnL
(Sec·ond) of Ccmtml'ts § 330 (Teut.. DrafL No . 12, }.Jarch 1977) .
8 See, e. y., AMon Studios, Inc. \'. Lloyd V. Giess & A8sociates, 492'
F. 2d 279, 2KB (('A4 1974) (holding void IUHlcr \'irginia law lL covenant

" . . . IA]u
~>kill
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com.bination of factors might well persuade a common law
court to hold tho covenant unenforceable in equity.
But even if the Court were correct as a matter of common
law that Snepp's duty to seek prepublication review was a
fiduciary duty, the constructive trust remedy imposed here
would not be appropriate. When an employee uses his employer's confidential information for his own personal profit,
a constructive trust over those profits is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are the direct result of
the breach. But Rnepp admittedly did not use confidential
information in his hook; nor were the profits from his book
in any sense a product of his failure to submit the book for
prepublication review. For even if Suepp had submitted
the book to the agency for prepublication review, the Government's censorship authority would surely have been limited
to the excision of classified material. In this case, then, it
would have been obliged to clear the book for publication in
precisely the same form as it now stands. 0 Thus, Sllepp has
not gained any profits as a result of his breach; the Goverument, rather than Snepp, will be unjustly enriched if he is
required to disgorge profits attributable entirely to his own
legitimate activity.10
with no gt.'Ogr~q>hieal limit:tlion): Amel"ican llot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Ca1··
1·ier, 500 F . 2d 12o9, 1279 (('A~ 1\JH) (holding void uncln North Carolina htw a covenant with no dura.tioual or g<>ographieal limit <ttion); E. L.
Conwell & Co. v. Gutbel'let. 42H F . 2d 527, 52R (CA4 1970) (holding void
under Maryland law u. covenm1L with no dmatiomd or geographical
limitation) .
9 lf he had submitted the book to the a~enc·y and tlw agency had re~
fused to eou,;Pnt to the pni.Jliention of PPrtaiu material in it, Snepp could
have obtained jndieial rrviPW to d<'t<'rmin<> whethrr the agency was correct in l'Ol1>'Jdering lh<' material elaR:;ifi<>d . See United States\. Marchetti,
466 F. 2d 1309, 1;317 (CA4 1972), r<'r1. d<'uied, 409 U. S. 10G3.
10
As the Court of Ap[wal~ held, to the extent that the (iovernm<>nt seek~:~
to ptmi~h Snrpp for ])J'(•aehing hi,.; obligntion to ~ ubmit th<> manu~cript
for pn·pub!Jration n·vil'w or to ddPr oth<>rl:l from engaging iu ::;imilar
brearhe,.;, punitivo dttllHII):<'-' :tr<> rl<·arl~· a more appropriate remedy than a
con:;trurt ivo tru:;t., 1' • • • ~i n cr n t·o nst nwtiv<> tru:;t depend~ on the concept of 11njn:;t <'Jil'i<·htnPnt rather than deterrence and puni:;hnwnt. See
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Although recognizing that Suepp did not divulge any con~
fidential information in his book, the Court nevertheless states
that the Govermuent has been harmed by its publication. It
makes this factual determination on the basis of testimony
by the Director of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turucr, stat·
ing that Snepp's book and others like it have jeopardized the
CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence services by mak·
ing them unsure of the agency's ability to maintain confidentiality. Admiral Tumer's truncated testimony does not
explain whether these unidentified "other" books actually
contained classified informatiou (unlike Snepp's) or whether
foreign agencies fear the publication of unclassified information which Snepp and other CIA employees have a
First Amendment right to dissemiuate. 11 If the former is
true, I fail to see how Snepp's book, which does not reveal
confidences, has exacerbated the problem. And if the latter
is true, then the reluctance of foreign governments to work
with our government must be accepted as au inevitable byD. Dobb:;:, Law of Rcmcdie~ § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246 (1973)." 595
F. 2d, at 937.
11 The Di8trid .Tndge su~tained the Government's objeciions to questions con<'<>rning the identitr of other agents who had published the unauthorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 130. However,
Admiral Turner did trstify that the h:mnful ma,lerial::; involved "[p]rimarily the appearnncr in the United States media of identification of
r:;onrces and method::; of collPcting intelligence . . . . " Tr. 14a . This type
of information i~ certmnly <'onfidrutial and is specifically the type of information that Snf'pp has maintained he did not revral in Decent Interval.
See, e. g., Snepp's Decrmber 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show,
in which he l:itated: " . . . I have made a very determined effort not to
ex)losc i:iOurces or mcthorli:i . . . ." Government's Requei:its for Admissions,
Record Item 19.
Snepp's attorneys wPre alHo foreclosed from a~king Admiral Turner
whethrr particular forrign ~ource,.; had stopped cooperating with United
States' authoritif's as a direct rP:::ult of the publication of Decl!llt lntet·val.
Tr. 138. Thus, it i,; unclear wlwther or why foreign ~ources ma.v have
r<>actrd uufavorably to its publication. Howcvrr, William E. Colby, the
CIA's former DirPctor, did indicate in hi:; te::;timony that foreign nations
generall ' have ·~ stri<'ter secrecy code than docs the United States. :Tr,
175...:176.

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

7

product of the exercise of First A1nendwcnt rights by gov·
ernmeut employees.

II
The Court's decisiou to dispose of this case summarily on
the Govermneut's couditioual cross-petition for certiorari is
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits.
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth
Circuit's decisiou insofar as it affirmed the entry of au injunction requiriug him to submit all future mauuscripts for prepublication review and remanded for a determination of
whether punitiw damages~ appropriate for his failure to
submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication.
The Government filed a brief iu opposition as well as a ·crosspetition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated,
however, that it was cross-petitio11ing ouly to bring the eutire
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide
to grant Snepp's petition. The Government explained that
11
[b] ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of appeals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's
interest, the governmeu t has not independently sought review in
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government
stated that 11 [i]f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petitiou for a
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871. it should also grant this crosspetition. If the petition iu No. 78-1871 is denied, this petition should also be denied." Petition, at 5.
Given the Govermneut's position, it would be highly inappropriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction,
to grant the Governmeut's petition while deuying Snepp's.
Yet tha.t is in essence what has been done. 12 The majority
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as
manifestly "without merit." Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that
12 I have been unable to di::;covcr any previou::; ca~e in which the Court
has acted m; it does today, reaehing the merits of a conditional ero~s
pei.ition dc::;pii.e itl:i belief that the petition dO('S not merit granting:
C(lrtiorad,

~

t0
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Snepp's petition would not have been granted on its own
merits.
The Court's opinioll is a good demonstration of why this
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the
Court forges ahead aud summarily rejects that remedy on the
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against
similar breaches of security," ante, at 6, and (b) that it might
require the Government to reveal confidential information
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might
thus be left with "uo remedy at all," ante, at 7. It seems
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either
ground by the Government's acquiescence in the punitive
damages remedy. Moreover, the second rationale 13 is eutirely /
speculative and, iu this case at least, almost certainly wrong.
The Court states that:
"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an
award of punitive damages might force the Government
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised
to protect."
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government
would Le entitled to punitive damages simply by proving
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for pre[mblication review and that the Government relied on these misrepreselltatious to its detriment. ] fail to see how such a
showing would require the Government to reveal any confidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 7.
18 Which, iL ;;lwuld be uotrd, due:; uol <Lllpl·ar anywhere in the
jnpnt's 5 page croHs-p!'tition,

Govern~
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III
'l'he uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmakiug
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this
case.
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that
his remedy at law was iuadequate. Wit}'wut waiting for all
opportunity to appraise the adequacy of the punitive damages
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion
that equitable relief is necessary.
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to
criticize his govern men t. 1 '1 lnhereu t in this prior restraint is
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority
to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the demands of secrecy. 'l'he character of the covenaut as a prior
restraint 011 free speech surely imposes an especially heavy
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me
that that burden has been met.
I respectfully dissent.

14 The mere fact that the aget1cy hws thr authority to rrview the text
or a eritical book in search of classifi£•d information before it, is publi~hcd
i:> bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover,
the right t.o delay publication until the revirw is completed i~ it~elf a form
of prior restraint that would not. hr t olemted in other contrxts. See,
e. g.. New York T·imP8 Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska
Press Association v. St·uart, 427 U.S. 539. In view of the }"ational inten•;;t
in maintaining an effective intelligence servire, I am not prepared to ~a~·
that the r<>::;traint is nrrr~;;arily intolerablr in thi~ context. I am preparrd
to :;ay, however, that crrt iorari hnving bPen gmntrd, the issue :surely ~hould
not he re~olved in the absence of full brirfiug and argumPnt.

I
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As Snepp would have access to highly sensitive
information, the Agency required as a precondition
to his employment in 1968 that he execute an
agreement "not to disclose any classified
information relating to the Agency without proper

a,_~~#-(
authorization."

Pet. 58a.

-Ul. the
1\

same agreement

Snepp promised not to publish "any information or
material relating to the Agency its activities or
intelligence activities generally, either during or
after the term of [his] employment
)

~ithout

specific prior approval of the Agency."
59a.

Id., at

lfp/ss

1/7/80

Both the District Court and Court of
Appeals found that publication by a former
intelligence agent of unreviewed material relatinq
to intelligence activities can be detrimental to
vital national interests even if the information is
unclassified.

If a former agent may rely on his

own judgment as to what information may be
detrimental, classified information could be
revealed by him without the opportunity of the CIA
with its broader understanding of what may in
fact expose secrets or sources - to prevent
publication.

Sources relied upon include the

foreign intelligence services of friendly nations
as well as secret agents, often operatinq in
foreign countries.

The continuing availability of

these sources would be jeopardized if the CIA could
not, by the preclearance process prevent
compromising them and even endangering the safety
of agents.
Admiral Turner, director of the CIA
testified without contradiction • • •

lfp/ss

Greg:

l/7/80

Add a footnote alonq the following lines:

~:/

In belittling Admiral Turner's

testimony, the dissent by Mr. Justice Stevens
states that if our country loses the cooperation of
foreign intelligence services this "must be
accepted as an inevitable byproduct of the exercise
of First Amendment rights by qovernment employees".
~'

6, 7.

We would not have thought that a CIA

agent with access to sensitive intelligence
information can be viewed as iust another
"government employee".

Indeed, it is more than a

little surprising that one would sugqest seriously
that the government of the United States is
helpless, by virtue of the First Amendment,

to

prevent the disclosure of information vital to the
security of our country and hence, perhaps, to the
preservation of all freedoms.
Nothing in the decisions of this Court,
zealous as we have been to protect First Amendment
rights, justifies the dissent's position.
3, sopra, and cases cited therein.

u.s.

(l9. . )•
-----

See n.

See also, Mears
In any event

2.

the dissent's argument is irrelevant in this case.
Here we have an express undertaking by Snepp,
voluntarily assumed as a precondition to beinq
employed by the CIA, pursuant to which he aqreed to
the preclearance procedure.

lfp/ss

l/7/80

Despite express findings to the contrary
by the courts below, Mr. Justice Stevens - at the
outset of his dissent - states that "the interest
and confidentiality that Snepp's contract was
designed to protect have not been compromised".
~ost,

l.

Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at

odds with the record in this case, the dissent
bifurcates the secrecy agreement of September 16,
1968, and treats the two interdependent provisions
thereof as if they were separate and unrelated
obligations.

Mr. Justice Stevens suggests that

the preclearance agreement is unenforceable

under

common law principles, and analogizes Snepp's
undertaking to a "covenant not to compete". He then
argues that it would not survive under the "rule of
reason".

One hardly would have thought that an

analogy drawn from the private world of business
has the slighest relationship to an express
agreement entered into pursuant to the National
Security Act by the Director of the CIA for the
purpose of "protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure".

§403(d) (3).

50 U.S.C.
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Nos. 78-1871 and 79- 265. Decided October -, 1979

PEu C u RIAM.

In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Centl·al intelligence Agency
CIA ) . Hek ontends that imnitive damages are an inappro~
priate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In
No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the j udgment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book about certaih CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
publish ed the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1~68 , however, Snepp had
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ...
publish ... any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [hisl employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the _Agency without proper authorization." Id., at 58a.1 /
l: Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also /

also

..
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book \vithout submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would perlllit the book for prepublication clearauce. Finally,
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss."
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8 ~
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp'if
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable'
as a prior restrnint on protected speech.
Whcu Suepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed
the agrecnwnt that expres::;ly obligated him to ;;ubmit any proposed publil'<l'tion for vrior review. He doe~ not claim that he executed tbis agre/
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936. 4 In other words,
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material.
~
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the~
mrnt under durrss. Inderd, he voltmtaril~· reaffirmrd his obligation when
he left the Ageney. We agree with tlw Court of Appeals that Snepp's
agrrrment is an "entirely nppropriatr" exrrci:;r of the CIA Director's
statutorr mandate to "protec[t] intelligrncr source:; and methods from
mwuthorizrd disclosure," 50 U. S. C. § .t03 (d) (3) . 595 F. 2d , nt 932.

{ /itih eme, thie Couet'e "'""' moke dm thet ~~~;;!!;~ ev~>e
absence of an express agreement~ould have~reaonable restrictions on ~ employe~etse-of their irat · mendment righ~
I' to pro~ ubstantial government-inter~ Civil Service Comm'n
v. etter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973) ; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id., at 844848 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972).

Thr Government has a compelling intrrest in protrcting both the :;ecrecy
of information important to our nn.tional security and the appearance of
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intel_iigcnce service. See p. 5, infra. The agrrement that Snepp signed is a
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest .
4 The Government's concession distinguished this case from United StateB
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate hi ~ agreement not. to publbh an~· f"lassified information. 466 F. 2d,
at l:H3 . Marchetti therefore did not con:;idcr the appropriate remedy for
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over~
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue

in Marchetti.
~
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possibility of puuitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial- could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote . "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d.,
at 938. Prepublicatiou clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were bdh a speculative
ancl inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. "we agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust.
II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he slgned, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance.
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obligation- he had been "assigned to various positions of trust"
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified
information, including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178. 6 Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this back-/
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read : " I, Frank W. Snepp,
III, unders1and that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
Oo,nernment . . . ." Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of
Snepp's dUtl<'::l and his conceded access to confidential sources and matr riab could rstablish a truot relationship. See 595 F. 2d , at 939 (Hoffman, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) . Few types of
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that.
reposed in a C!A employee with Snepp's duties.

....
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend- at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he ma.y reveal
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources- could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelli11;ence from domestically based or controlled
sources. the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the~
7 Every major nation in t he world has an intelligence servire.
Whatrv r r fairly may be ~a id about ~orne of it ~ past nctivitie;:, the CIA (or it s
pr e d ecr~so r the OSS) is an agc,ncy thought by every Pre::;ident since
Frnnklin D . Hoosevelt to be c::;sential to the ~;e rurity of t he United States
and- in a l:lense-the free world . It il:l impossible for a government wi::;ely
to make crit ical deci::;ions about fo reign policy and national defen::;e without. tlH' benefit of dependablr fore ip:n intelligence . See generally T . Powers,

The M.o Who Kept the Sm et' (1979).

/
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security of information that might compromise them and
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Uudisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because peo- ,
ple were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis~
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material~
8 In *ttf~~ Admirnl Turner's testimony, MR. Jus·riCE S•rEVENs'
di:;sPnting opmion declares that damage to our Nation's ability to cooperate
with foreign intelligence services " mnilt bP accepted as an inevitable
byvrodnct of the exercise of Fir~t Amrndment rights by government
employer~." Post, at 6-7. This notion tll;tt the Government is hrlpless
to protrct sources of intelligence which m9.y be vital to the preservation
of national Recurity and the co11duct of foreign affair~ finds no support
·
· · ~ in thr deci~ions of this Court. We have held con·
·
sistently tha!,> he Government can m .'ltict its employees
J;~iPo;l Anwnament r.jghtf!' in orde to proteet . ubatantial-g
menrtntp~ Ree ca~e:; cited, at n. 3, supm. One Jhould have thought that tlfo:;e
j}?ii'rPdent;; applied with sprcial force to a"'tiA agent who had acces.~ to
sen:;itiw intellig<>nce. In any eve11t, the dissent's statement is scarcely
relevant in light of th<:' exprC'Htl ohlig:t t ion th:t t. Snepp voluntarily undertook
ns .tt cbndi1 io.n of his employmrnt with the CIA.

.
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classified or not--for prepublication clearance has irreparably
harmed the United States Govemment. 595 F. 2d, at 935;
456 F. Supp., at 180. 0

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might fore~
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that/
0 Although both the District Court and the Court of AppPals expressly
found otherwi;;e, ~JR . Jus'l'ICE STE\'ENS say~ that ''thr intere~:;t in ronfidentiality that Snepp's contract waH designed to protect ha::; not bePn
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the ba;;i:,; of a premi;;e wholly at
odds with the record, th<> dissent bifmcates Snepp's 1968 agre<>m<>nt and
treat~ its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unr<>lated obligations. MR. JusTICE S·rEVENS then analogize~; Snepp's prepublication review
agreemt"nt with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to
comppte with his employPr.L A body of private law intended to pre:::erve
rompPtition, however, simp!; ha::; no bearing on a contract made by tlu~
Dirertor of tlw CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to
"proterl II intelligence sourres and methods fwm unauthorized di~:;clos me."
50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3).
J(t JudgP Hoffman';; di;;sent
suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
damages on!~· upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n . 10, 937938.
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. ·Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable riskf'l, it has no remedy at aU.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trustX!I It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
coutribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a constructive trust on Suepp's profits, and we
~the full judgment of the District Court.
11 See id .. at 939 (Hoffmau, .T., concurring in part and dissenting in part) .
1\TH . .lu::~TJCE , '!'EVENt\ eonePdf'~ thai, rvrn in tlJP ab::;encr of a written
ront met, an employre has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3.
HP abo conerdrs that all prrsonal profitR gainrd from the rxploitation of
:;urh informatio n are imprrssed with a con!;tructive trust in favor of the
crnployet. Post, at 5, In thil:' <'Hse, he sePms to think that the common
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lHw would not treat infornwtion as "ronfidPntial" unlP::;s it were "clas::;ified."
SPr, e. fJ., post. at 3. Wr havr though! that the rommon-hnr obligafion
was con~idPrably more expansive. Rrr, e. g .. RPstatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and CommPnt c, 404 and Commt>nts b, d (1958);
V Scott on Trusts § 505 (1967). But since this case involvP::; a written
eontrart :>pPcifirally designPd to prevent tht> disclosure of confidrntial
information, we have no occasion to linger over that QUP:>tion. There i:>
no need to invoke common-law principle!:> in order to impose a con ·tructive
trust on Rnepp'i:l profits.
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Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October-, 1979
PER CURIAM.

In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a.
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inap·
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to sub1nit all
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In
No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judg-j
ment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA a.gent, Snepp published
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
·executed an agreement promising that he would "not ...
publish . . . any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The \
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." ld., at 58a.1

I

1

Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally,
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss."
I d. , at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract.'
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA . .. without the express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative.)> Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 18~181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceableas a prior restraint on protected speech.
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed
thr ngreement that cxpre;;:,;ly obligated him to submit auy proposed publi·catiou for prior review . He dOt'~ not claim that he exec·uted this agree-·
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to sub- /
mit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the in.i unction agaiust future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested ou the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935--936. 4 ln other words,
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material.
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the
ment under durcs:;;. Inclf'f'd, hf' voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when
he left the Agency. We agrcr with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's
agreement il4 an "f'ntirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's
statutory manda tc to "protec [ tl intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosurf'," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932.
Moreover, this Court 'i1 rai1<'R make clf'ar that~even in the ab~enc!' of an
I
exprf's.~ agre!'mrnt~the CIA b,rtt'd to prot crt. ~ubstantial governmmt in- C.,t>O
tercst,; by imposing rraHonablr restrictions on employer activities that in
otll{'r <'Ontexts might b<> protrrtf'd by thr Fir~t Amf'ndmf'nt. Civil Ser-vice
Comrn'n v. Letter Carriers. 413 U. S. 54-R, 565 (1973); ::;er Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976);
id., at 844-84, (PowEu,, J., concmring); Cole v. Z:li('hrmlson, 405 U.S. 676
(1972). Tho Govrrmnrnt has a compelling intere:;t in protecting both the )
serrrcy of information imvortant to our national security and the appearnnce of ronfidrnt iality so p~srntinJ to the !'ffect.ive operation of our foreign
intrlligf'nce srrvice. Srr p. 5, infm. The agreement that Snrpp signed is a
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest.
• The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his ag;reement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d,
at 1313. Marchetti thrrefore did not ron;.:id!:'r thr appropriate remedy forthe breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue-

in Marchetti.

J

~

4!
"I)

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the I
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." !d.,
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con..
structive trust.
II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed. Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship.G The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance.
Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positions of trust"
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified
information, including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178. 6 Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously )
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp,
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I am undertaking a position of tntst in that Agency of the
GoV'Crnment ... ." Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of'
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . Few types of
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend- at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA- with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the
7 E very major nation in the world has an intelligence servire. Whatever fairly may be said about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President ;;ince
Franklin D . Roosevelt to be essential to the security of the United States
and-in a sense-the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defPnse without the ben efit of dependable foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers,
The Man Who Kept t he Sec rets (1979).
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security of information that might compromise them a.nd
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Uudisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his materials Jn questioning the force IAdmirnl Turner's testimony, MR. JusncE
Sn;vENS' di,senting opinion ~clares that damage to our Nation's ability
to cooperat<' with for<'ign intelligence services "must be accepted as an
inevitnble byproduct of the exerci;;<' of First Amendment rights by government employees." Post, at 6-7. This notion that the Government is
helpi<'I>S to protect sources of intelligence which may be vital to the preservat.ion of nat ional s<'curity and the conduct of foreign affairs finds no
sup1)0rt in the d<'cisions of this Court. We have held consistently that,
in order to protect, substant ial governml'nt int<'rests, tlw Government can
restrict its employe&; in activities that in other contexts might be protected
by the First Amcndmrnt. See cases cited, at n. 3, supra. One would
have thought. that those prrc<'d<'nts applied with sp<'cial force to a CIA
agent who had acrrss to sen;;itive intelligence. In any event, the dissent's
statrment. i:s scarce!~· relevant in light of the express obligation tha.t Snepp
voluntarily undertook as a cond ition of his employment with the CIA_
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c1assified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935;
456 F. Supp., at 180.u
/

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of Avpeals expressly
found otherwise, MR. JusTICE STEVENS says that "the interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at
odds with the record, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and
treats its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated obligations. MR. Jus'ricE 8'l'EVENS then analogizes Snepp's prepublication review
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to
compete with his employer. Post. at 3. A body of private law intended
to preserve competition, however, ::;imply has no bearing on a contract
made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to " protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure." 50 U.S . C. §403 (d)(3).
10
Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-

'938.

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

8

Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 11 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
See id ., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
u, written
contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3.
He also concedes tl1at all personal profits gained from the exploitation of
such information are impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common
law would not treat information as "confidential" unless it were "classified."
See, e. g., post, at 3. We have thought that the common-law obliga.tion
was considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958);
V Scott on Trusts § 505 (1967) . But since this case involves a written
contract specifically de;,;igned to prevent the disclosure of confidential
information, we have no occasion to linger over that question. There is
no need to invoke common-law principles in order to impose a constructive
tru t on Snepp's profits.
11

MR. JusTICE STEVENS conct>des that, even in the absence of
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breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full
judgment of the District Court.
So ordered.
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In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a.
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inap·
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In
No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally cross~petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgment from which both parties seek relief.
1

l

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
·executed an agreement promising that he would "not ...
publish ... any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking 11 not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization;'' /d., at 58a.1
1

Upon the eve of his departure from' the Agency in 1976, .Snepp also

i
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
-clearance. The Government brought this suit. to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.•
The District Court found that Snepp had 11 willfully, delib. erately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally,
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book
had 11 caused the United States irreparable harm and loss."
!d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
· The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
'Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid oontract.•
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been m'ade public
by CIA •.• without the express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a..
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
a The Court of Appea1s and the District Court rejected each of Sneppta
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 18(}-181. In his petition for certiorari,
·snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceablel
· as a prior restraint on protected speech.
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluptarily signed
the ngreement that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publi'Ca.tion for prior rt:."view. He docs not claim that 'he executed this agree-
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublica.tion review had inflicted
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intelligence. Id., at 93&-936.' In other words,
the court thought that Snepp;s fiduciary obligation extended
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material.
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the
ment under duress. Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed ·his obligation when
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that· Snepp's
agreement is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's
statutory mandate to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from
unautl10rized disclosure," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932.
Moreover, this Court's cases mal<e clt•a.r thnt.-even in the nbsence of an
express ngret>mt>nh-the CIA/ncted to protect. substantinl government intcrests by imposing rt>asonatJe rt>strictions on employee activities that in
other contexis might bt> protected by the First Amendment. Civil Service
Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Buckley v.
Valeo , 424 U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976);
id ., a.t 844-848 (PowELL, J ., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676
(1972). The Government has a compelling intere:;t in protecting both the
secrecy of information imporhmt to our nntionnl security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the efft>ctive operation of our foreign
intclligt>nre service. See p. 5, infra. The ngreement that Snepp signed is a
reasonable means for protecting this vital intt>rest.
• The Government's concession distinguished this case from United Statu
v. Marchetta', 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d,
at 1313. Marchetti t-herefore did not considrr the approprinte remedy for
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation a.t issue-
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the \
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreeme~t, he
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." /d.,
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con...
structive trust.

-u

Snepp's employment with the CIA. involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognizea that be was
entering a ~rust relationship. 5 "The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the ·Agency without submitting it for clearance.
Snepp stipulated at tria1 that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been tcassigned to various positions of trust"
and that he had · been granted 1Cfrequent access to classified
information, including information regarding intelligence
sources arid methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.6 Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp,
III, understand that upon ent ering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
Government ... ." Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types or
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that.
reposed in a. CIA employee with Snepp's duties.

!-
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp . should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information . and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence service.
Whatever fairly may be said about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since
Franklin D. Roost>velt to be essential to the security of the United States
and-in a sense-the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit. of dr pendable fore;11:n intelligNlCe. See gPnerally T . Powers~
The M11n Who K<>pt t.he Secrets (1979).
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security of information that might compromise them and
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison a.rrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material8 In
uestioning the forceL_Admiral Turner's testjmony, MR. JusTICE
STEVENS' 's.spnting opinion d!:'Clares that. damage to our Nation's ~
t<> cooperat with foreign intelligence semces "must. be accepted as an
inevitable byp uct of the exercise of First Amendment. rigbteby government employees. Pwt, at. 6-7. 'l11is notion that jhe' Government is
helpless to protect s 1rces of intelligence which m~t)C vital to the preservation of national 8(> rify and the conduct of forPign affairs finds no
support in the decisions f this Courj,.---We have hrld ronf::istently that,
in order to protect substan 'al go :efilment. intrrE>:Sts, thr Government can
restrict its ernployePS in activ · that in other contrxts might be protected
by the First Amcndme . See asPS cited, at. n. 3, supra. One would
have thought that osP prrcedrn applied with sp<•rial force to a CIA
agent. who ha
cces:> to sen!:'itive int igence. In nny rvent, the dissent's
statemrn 's scarcdy relPvant in light o 1e express obligation that Snepp
volu rily undertook as n cm1dition of 1 · employmrnt with the CIAr
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c1assified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935;
456 F. Supp., at 180.9

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes · that the a.Ctual damages attributable to a publication such a.s Snepp's generally
.are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative a.nd unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of
_the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly
found otherwise, MR. JusTICE STEVENS says that "the interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at
odds with the record, tl1e dis...<:ent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and
treats its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated obligations. MR. JusTICE STEVENS then analogizes Snepp's prepublication review
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to
compete with his employer. Po.st, at. 3. A body of private law intended
to preserve competition, however, simply has no bearing on a contract
made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to "protec[t] intelligence source~ and methods from unauthorized
disclosure." 50 U.S. C. § 403 (d) (3).
10
Jud~e Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable ' if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
dama~es only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appe~ majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937'938.
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant RO elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Govemment run this risk.
In 8 letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Govemment cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of 8
breach of trust. 11 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
11

See id .. at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) .

MR. JusTICE STEVENS conCE'des tl1at, even in the absence of a written
contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3.
He also c.oncedes that all personal profits gained from the exploitation of
such information are impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common
law would not treat information as "confidential" unless it were "classified."
See, e. g., post, at 3. We havr thought that the common-law obligation
was considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Re&t,atement. (Second) of
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958);
V
n Trusts § 505 (1967) . But since this case involves a written
contract specifically 6c~igncd to l'revent tlle disciGs~o~~d8lltial
inf.oR~n,.we-htwe-n<HW~~·u;ion to lingei-Ove!'-t-hat-question:--!fhere-is
~-t~~mmon-ln·w;~rHl~ples...in..order-4G-imJ'IOI:le-a-constntcti~

tnn;t en Sm pt*-vrofitft;-
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oreacn, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of thi~ equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full
judgment of the District Court.
So ordered.
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In questioning the force of Admiral Turner's testimony,
Mr. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion would attribute the
concern of foreign intelligence services not to the hazards of
allowing an agent like Snepp to publish whatever he pleases, but
to the CIA's failure to classify what "should have been classified
or of the foreign government's disagreement with our government's
classification policy".

Post, at 6-7.

Mr. Justice Stevens' views

in this respect not only find no support in the record, but they
also reflect a misappreciation
Turner's testimony.

~

of~concern

reflected by Admiral

If in fact information is unclassified or in

the public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be
concerned.

The problem is to ensure in advance, and by proper

procedures, that information detrimental to national interests is
not published.

Without a dependable prepublication review

procedure, no intelligence agency or responsible government
official could be assured that an employee privy to sensitive
information might not conclude on his own - innocently or
otherwise - that it should be disclosed to the world.
The dissent finds an "implication in the Court's
opinion" that the CIA should have "carte blanche to censor"
employees' publications.

Snepp's contract, however, requires no

more than a clearance procedure subject to judicial review.

If

Snepp had submitted his material for review and the Agency had
found it to contain sensitive material, it would have been left to
the Agency to seek an injunction against publication.

See Alfred
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~.S.

992

(1975)~

United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (CA4),
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MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency
any information he intended to publish ab'out it for prepubli..:
cation review. 1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classified, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926,
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063.
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for
prepublication review. However, the Government has conceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic materiaP Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality

.'

1

Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made
the same commitment.
2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that
" . . . Decent Interval contains classified information or any information
concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA,"
the Government staled that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintiff does
not so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession,
the district judge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts
to determine whether Decent Interval in fact. contains information that
the Government considers clas.~ified . See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu,
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153.
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that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been
compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Government unprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a
constructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the
sale of the book. Because that rrmcdy is not authorized by
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for
the Court to dispose of this novel issue summarily on the
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I respectfully dissent.
I
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although
Congress has enacted a number of criminal statutes punishing
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified
information, 3 it has not seen fit to authorize the constructive
trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor does either of the
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such
remedy in the event of a breach.4 The Court's per curiam
,..-n-n""""-.J\---:-tQ;--T..----~o~p~m~l-:=:'OI~ii'Jsuggestrthat its result is supported by a~nnwn lav;
_,..,_.,_.,' ·~
blend of the law of trusts and the law of contracts:"UBut neither
of these branches of the common law supports the imposition
of a constructive trust under the circumstances of this case.
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a settlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for

(

See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 798, which imposes a prison term of 10 years
"and a $10,000 fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certain types of
·classified information; 18 U. S. C. § 794, wbich makes it a criminal offense
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defense information
to a foreign government; and "5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdraws the
right to government retirement benefits from a person convicted of violat"ing these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401,
which provides 11dministrative sanctions, including discharge, against employees wbo publish classfied information.
4
In both bis original employment agreement and the termination agreement Snepp acknowledged the criminal penalties that might attach to any
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cause for termination of his employment. No other remedies were mentioned in either
agreement .
8
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the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the
common Jaw even in the absence of a wTitten employment
agreement, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified"
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the common law would support the implication of a constructive trust
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential
infonna tion.~
But Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, im:
posed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to
obtain prepublication clearance. In order td justify the imposition of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to disclose, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in
the common law to support such an approach.
Employment agreements often contain covenants designed
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies
with his duty not to disclose or misuse confidential information. One of the most common is a covenant not to compete. Contrary to the majority's appr.oach in this case, the
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary,
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an individual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable only if they
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." That rule,
w.i.Ze, e. g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-0, Inc., 447 F. 2d 1387, 1392
(CA4 1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginja law); Tla:pek v.
Chevron Oil Co., 407 F. 2d 1129 (CAS 1969) (Arkansas Jaw); Structural
Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mich. 1975) (Michigan Jaw); Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 396 (c) (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, after the
termination of the agency the agent: ... (c) has a duty to aecount for
profits made by the sale or use of trade secrets and other confidential
information, whether or not in competition with t.he principal.•••").

t.. "'
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~s the court held in Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. Cas.
[1916] 688, 704, the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does
not outweigh the public interest in keeping the employee in the workforce:
..u ••• [A]n employer can[not] prevent his employee from using the
skill and · knowledge in · his trade or profession which ·he has learnt
in the course of his employment by means of directions or instructions
from the employer. That information and that additional skill he is
entitled to · use for the benefit of himself and the benefit of the public
:who gain ·the advantage of his haYing· had such admirable instruction.
'The case in which the Court interferes for the purpose of protection is
where use is made, not of the skill which the man may have acquired,
but of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to
rC;:fjl to any one else... ·."
...li€ee, e. g., Briggs v. R. ·R. Donnelley & Sons Co .. 589 F. 2d 39, 41 (CAl
1978) (Illinois law); American Hot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Carrier, 500 F. ·2d
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina law); Alston Studios, Inc. v.
:Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2d 279, 282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia
law); Mixing Equipment Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc ., 436 F. 2d 1308,
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law); Water Services, Inc . v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F. 2d 163, 167 (CA5 1969) (Georgia law); Restatement
(S nd) of Contracts § 330 (Tent. Draft No. 12, March 1977).
ee, e. g., Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492
--~. 2d 279, 283 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Virginia law a covenant

.•
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ght well pers
common
nant unenfor able in equity.
as a matter o

w

lo er's confidential information for his own personal profit,
a constructive trust over those profits is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are the direct result of
the breach. But Snepp admittedly did not use confidential
information in his book; nor were the profits from his book
in any sense a product of his failure to submit the book for
prepublication review. For even if Snepp had submitted
the book to the agency for prepublication review, the Government's censorship authority would surely have been limited
to the excision of classified material. In this case, then, it
would have been obliged to clear the b?o~r publication in
precisely the same form as it now stands. Thus, Snepp has
not gained any profits as a result of his breach; the Govern•
inent, rather than Snepp, will be unjustly enriched if he is
required to disgor~rofits attributable entirely to his own
legitimate activity.
with no geographical l]mitiltion); American Hot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Carrier, 500 F. 2d 1269, 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Nort.h Carolina Jaw a covenant with no durational or geographical limitation); E. L.
Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F. 2d 527, 528 (CA4 1970) (holding void
under Maryland Jaw a covenant with no durational or geographical
ii~j~tion).
_ffllf he had submitted the book to the agency and the agency had refused to consent to the publication of certain mat€rial in it, Snepp could
have obtained judicial review to de1ermine whether the agency was correct in considering the material classified. See United States v. Marchetti,
466. f. 2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063.
_.U../As the Court of Appeals held, to the extent that the Government seeks
to punish Snepp for breaching his obligation to submit the manuscript
for prepublication review or to deter others from engaging in similar
breaches, punitive damages are clearly a more appropriate remedy than a
constructive trust, " ... since a constructive trust depends on ' the concept of unjust enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment. See

'.•
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D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246 {1973)." 595
F .•~d, at 937.
J3'the District Judge sustained the Government's objections to questions concerning the identity of other agents who had published the unauthorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 136. However,
Admiral Turner did testify that the harmful materials involved "[p]rimarily the appearance in the United States media of identification of
sources and metl1ods of collecting intelligence . . . . " Tr. 143. This type
of information is certainly confidential and is specifically the type of information that Snepp has maintained he did not reveal in Decent Interval.
See, e. g., Snepp's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show,
in which he stated: " ... I have made a very determined effort not to
ell:pose sources or methods . . . ." Government's Requests for Admissions,
'Record Item 19.
Snepp's attorneys were also foreclosed from asking Admiral Turner
whether particular foreign sources had stopped cooperating with United
States' authorities as a direct result of the publication of Decent Interval.
·Tr. 138. Thus, it is unclear whether or why foreign sources may have
reacted unfavorably to its publication. However, William E. Colby, the
CIA's former Director, did indicate in his testimony that foreign nations
generally have a stricter secrecy code than does the United States. Tr.
175-176.
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..p.reEltie~~:lret'e~merni~.rumt=right~by-g~:v~
~mnen~pffiyeesy""'"

II
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari is
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits.
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunction requiring him to submit all future manuscripts for prepublication review and remanded for a determination of
whether punitive damages would be appropriate for his failure
to submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication.
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a crosspetition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated,
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide
to grant Snepp's petition. The Government explained that
"[b]ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of appeals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's
interest, the government has not independently sought review in
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government
stated that "[i] f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petition for a
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871, it should aJso grant this crosspetition. If the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this petition should also be denied." Petition, at 5.
Given the Government's position, it would be highly inappropriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction,
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's.
Yet that is in essence what has been doneSJ The majority
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as
manifestly "without merit." Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that

jjJ

have been unable to discover any previous case in which the Court
has acted as it does today, reaching the merits of a conditional crosspetition despite its belief . that the petition does not merit granting
certiorari.

f'! •.
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Snepp's petition . would not have been granted on its own
merits.
The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against
similar breaches of security," ante, at 6, and (b) that it might
require the Government to reveal confidential information
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might
thus be left with t(no remedy at all," ante, at 7. It seems
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either
ground by the Government's acquiescence in tqj~JPUnitive
damages remedy. Moreover, the second rationale.!:»is entirely
speculative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong.
The Court states that:
"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an
award of punitive damages might force the Government
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised
to protect."
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government
-would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to
-·comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepublication review and that the Government relied on these misrepresentations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a
showing would require the Government to reveal any confidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 7.
Aich, it should be noted, does not appear anywhere in the Government's 5-page cross-petition.
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III
The uninhibited character of toda.y's exercise in lawmaking
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this
case.
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an
opportunity to appraise the adequacy of the punitive damages
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion
that equitable relief is necessary.
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware
of the fact tha.t its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to
criticize his governmenJ$/ Inherent in this prior restraint is
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority
to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the demands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me
that that burden has been met.
·
I respectfully dissent.

~ere fact that the agency has the authority to review the text

oPa' ~~~ic~' book in search of classified information before it is published

is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover,
the right to delay publication until the review is completed is itself a form
of prior restraint that would not be tolerated in other contexts. See,
e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539. In view of the national interest
in maintaining an effective intelligence service, I am not prepar~ed:;:_:,t~o...:;s;:;:.a'.:;.'---;;..-------,
that the restraint is necessarily intolerable in this context. I amfi:irepa.red
(
t\l)~e rJL
to say ..]o.s e: E'l. that, certiorari having been granted, the issue surely should
)
.
J
not be resolve<rin the absence of full briefing and argument.

78-1871 and 79-265
-
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Insert A

5/

In light of its heavy reliance in the text on
of fiduciary duty and contract law and its
failure to identify any other source for the result it
announces today, I find the Court's statement in a footnote
that there "is no need to invoke common law principles in
order to impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits,"
ante, at 8 n. 11, surprising, to say the least.
~rinciples

/

78-1871 and 79-265
-
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Insert B

The Court has not persuaded me that a rule of reason
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenant to submit to
prepublication review.

Like an ordinary employer, the CIA has

a vital interest in protecting certain types of information; at
the same time, the CIA employee has a countervailing interest
in preserving a wide range of work opportunities (including
work as an author) and in protecting his First Amendment
rights. The public interest lies in a proper accomodation that
will preserve the intelligence m5ssion of the agency while not
abridging the free flow of unclassified information.

When the

government seeks to enforce a harsh restriction on the
employee's freedom~/ despite its admission that the interest
the agreement was designed to protect--the confinentiality of
classified information--has not been compromised, an equity
court might well be persuaded that the case is not one in which
the covenant should be enforced.
But even assuming that Snepp's covenant to submit to
prepublication review should be enforced, the constructive
trust imposed by the Court is not an appropriate remedy.

If an

employee has used his employer's rreturn to text page 5.1
9/ The covenant imposes a serious prior restraint on Snepp's
ability to speak freely, see infra n. 15, and is of indefinite
duration and scope--factors that-would make most similar
covenants unenforceable.
fBack to cites in printed footnote q
(previously note 8) .]

-. · 78-1871 and 79-265

- 4 -

Insert C

Despite the fact that Snepp has not caused the government
the type of harm that would ordinarily be remedie0 by the
imposition of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the
government has suffered some harm.

But, in light of. the

sketchy trial record in this case, even that factual
determination is difficult to support.

The Court bases its

finding of harm on testimony freturn to text, p. 6]

Insert D (p. 6)
And if the Jatter is true, then the reluctance of foreign

I share the Court's appraisal of the importance of an
effective intelligence service and I agree with it that the riA
has broad power to protect its vital sources bv classifying
information whose disclosure may compromise its mission.

T

cannot agree with the implication in the Court's opinion,
however, that the agency has carte blanche to censor its
employees' pubJication of even unclassified information or
information that is already in the public domain on the basis

78-1871 and 79-265
- 5 -

of its opinion that publication may be "detrimental to vital
national interests."

Ante at 5.

The CIA never attempted to

assert such power over Snepp in either of the contracts he
signed~

rather, the agency itself limited its censorship power

to preventing the disclosure of "classified" information.
Moreover, even assuming that a11owing the CIA the power to
impose such a wide-ranging prior restraint would be

goo~

national security policy, I would have difficulty reconci1ing
such a policy with the demands of the First Amendment.

·'
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
ON PETITIONS POR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 78- 1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979
PER C URIAM.

In No. 78- 1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) . He also contends that punitive damages are an inappropriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In
No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed an agreement promising that he would "not . . .
publish ... any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment .. . without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." ld., at 58a.1
1

.

'

Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also

.
,.
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally,
the comt determined as a fact that publication of the book
had "caused the United States irreparalJlc harm and loss.''
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoinerl future
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a coostructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 3
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed'
his obligabon "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA . , . without the exptess written consent of the Duector of Central
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 6la.
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad•
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In bis petition for certiorari,
Snepp relies primanly on tl1e claim that his agreement is unenforceable'
as a prior restraint on protected speech.
When Snepp accepted employment w1th the CIA, he voluntarily signed
·the agrf'f'lllPnl thnt cxpre::;t;ly obligated him to submit any proposed publitatiou fo1· prior review. He· d·~s not claim that he executed thb agree-
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intellige11Ce. ld., at 935-936. 4 ln other words,
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material.
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the
mrnt unch•r durr~"· Ind(•ed, lw voluntarily rraffirmed his obligation when
he lrft tlH' Agrn<:y . We ugreP with the Court of Appeal~ that Snepp's
agreemPnt i~ :m ''pntJrp)~· appropriatt>" exrreise of thC' CIA Director's
statutm~· mandntP to "protec lt] intelligence :sources and methods from
unauthorized dit-~clo~urc," 50 U. S. C. § 408 (d) (8). 595 F. 2d, at 932.
Morcm·rr, this Court'~ C'a;;cl': make· elt>:ll' that~cvC'n in the ab~ence of an
exprr~s agr<·Pnwnt-t hC' CIA ronld havP nd<·d to protrt'f ><ub;;tantial govrrnmC'nt. intrrr~t,.. b~· impo"ing rPm;onabiP rr><trietion,.. on rmplo~·pp activitir:-: ilwt in ot brr· eon tPXIH mighi bP protect('([ by thr .Fir::;t Amendmrnt.
Civil 8er1'1ce Comm'n v. Ldter Carriers. 413 1J . R. 5-lB, 5fi5 (Hl/3); oC'C
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 11. R. 1, 25-2R (lfli'fl): Greer \'. 8pock, 424 LT. S.
828 (1970): id .. at l'.f4-S4S (PowELL . •T., C'onru ning) : C'ule \'. Richardson ,
405 LT. S. 6/fi (1!172).. Thr C:ovrmmrnt ha,; n. romp<·lling intere:;t in protcrting hoth tbr ...;rri'<'C' ~' of information important to 0\11' national i->'<'C urity
and tho nppea r:llH'<' of C'onfidPntiality ~o rRsPntial to the f'ffPctiv<' O])('ration
of om t'orc·ig;n intPIIigPJlf'C' ,.;rrvieP. &or p. 5, infm. Thr agre<'nwni that
SnPpp "ignPd i>< a rrn"'onahlr mran" for protPcting thiH vital intrn';;t.
• The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
viola.te hifl agrerment not to publit-h any c/w;sified informatiOn. 466 F . 2d,
at 1313. Marchetti thcrf'forP did not con.-idf'r tht> appropriate remedy for
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue

in Marchetti.
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote. "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested ill Snepp the trust of the CIA." !d.,
at 938. Prepublica.tion clearance was part of SHepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued. were both a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust.
II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship.G The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance.
Shepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positions of trust"
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified
information, including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178. 6 Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublicaG The first sentence of the 1968 agreement rrad: "I, Frank W. Snepp,
III, undrrstand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agrncy, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
Government . .. ." Pet. 58a.
6 Qu1te apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of
Snepp's dutie~ and ' his conceded. access to confidential sources and materials could establish a tru~t relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, .T., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types oi
governmental employment' involve a higher degree of trust than that
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities cau be detrimental
to vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies ou his own judgment about what i11formation is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiviug intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the
7 Every maJor nation in the world has an intelli~enre servire.
Whatever fa.irly may be said about. som!:' of its past. activities, the CIA (or its
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President ~ince
Franklin D. Roosevelt to b!:' essential to the Hecurity of the United States
and-in a spnse--the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national d!'fense without the benefit of dPpcnduble forrign intelligrncc. See generally T. Powers.
The Man Who Kept the Scrrets (1979).
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security of information that might compromise them and
even eudanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Undisputed evidt~nce in this case shows that a. CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Tumer. Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into husiness with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record. both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his materialsIn qll(·~tioniug tlw forcr of Admiral Tumpr'~ rr~timon~·, :"\fn . .TL'H'l'Icg
S·I'EmKR' di~~<'nting opinion would :t tf ributc• tlH• conc·Prn of fon•ign inte11igt'I1C't' ~c·rncP~ not fo the hazard~ of :11lowing au agc·ut likt• Srwpp to
puhli~h whafewr lw plea ..;<'~. but, to flu• CIA':-; failure• to (']a~:-;if\ what
"~>hould hn vc· !wen l'la:-;~iti<'d or ~ t lH' forc·igu gov('f'rlllwnf'~ di"ag;rf't•nwut
with Oil!' go\'c•nmwnf '~ ela~"ifiratiou polie~· ." Post, at fi-7. :\I H .• J L'H'l'!CE
STJ·;n;N:;' vil'w,.: rn thi~ l't'"P<'C't. not onl~· find no ~uppurf in tlw l'l'C'OI'cl,
but. Ow~ · al~o l'<'fl<'rt a rni~apprPlwn»ion of the c·orH·f'rll rf'flc·!'tc-d h~· Admiral Tunwr\ f<•><f imon~ · . If in fad. in format iun i~ tllll'la""ifiPd or in
thr public· domain , IIPitlH·r fhr CIA nor· t'orrign ag;t'lll'it·" would be· c·oncernrd. The problc·tn i.• fo t·ll~lll'<' in ruloance, and b~· proppr pmc·pdurrs,
that. inform:dron dt·trimc•nf:d to natior~:~l int<'r<'~t~ i,; not pnhli"IH•d . Without a depc·ndablP prc·puhli<"afion r!'virw pro<'Pdt!l't', no illlt•llig<'rH't' ag;PIH'Y
or re~pon~ihlc go\'t'rllllll'llt oflieial could he a~~ured that. an cmployel'

:\
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!ClassifiPrl or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
'harmed the lTnited States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935·;
456 ~.,. Supp., at 180.0

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that
privy 1o st·n~itive iuformation might not C'Oneludt> on hi" ow11-innoeently
or ot .hcrwi~<<~tha1 it. ~<houlcl l><• di;;C'Io~Pd to the world.
The di~;::<·nt finds an ''impli<'alion in th<' Court'~ opinion" that thr CIA
should hnv<' "cw·te blanche 1o r<•n;::or" rrnplo~·<'<'~' puhli<'at ioll>'. SnPpp'~
contrac·t, lww!'\'!'1', n•qu1rc>,.; 110 mon• than a elearanrt• proerdurp ,;uhjt•ct
to judic·ial l'!'viPw . lf Snc·pp hnd submittPd hi;; lliHtt>rial for reviPw aud
t.he Ag<'1le~ · had found it to c·m1tain ,.;c•n,-i1ivr matt•rial. it would havp been
left to tlw Agl•nry to sepk an injunction Hgainst puhlic·ation. Sre Alfrt>d
A. Knupj , Inc. v. Colby. 509 F. ~d 1aG2 (C'A4) . ei•rt. d('ll1<'<L 4~1 U. S.
992 ( Hl75) ; Uuit t>d ;:)tati'S \ . Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA-t), (·crt.
denied, 409 P . S. 106:3 (1972) .
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of AppealR expressly
found otherwise, M~t. JusncE STEVEN:5 says that "thP interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protPrt has not been
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basi:-; of a premisr wholly at
odds with the rrcorcl, the dissent bifmcate::; Suepp's 1968 agreement and
treats its interdrpendent provi~ions a::> if tht'Y imposed unr('lated obligations . MR . .JusTICE 8'1'EVBNS then analogize" Snepp's prepublication revirw
agreement with the Government to a private cmploype's cov('nant not to
compew wtth hi;, employrr. Post, at. 3. A body of privatp law intended
to presprve f'Olll]JPtition , however, l'impl~ · ha::; no bra ring 011 a cont raet
made by tlw Dirrctor of t.be CIA in conformity with hi,- ~f<ttutory obligation to ''pro1C'eLtJ intelli~~:enc•t> ~>ource;; m1d mPthod:; from l!Uauthorized
disclo urc." 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3) .
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the Court of Appeals left it ' 0 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant RO elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in cri111inal cases. Existing law, he stated, 11requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust.11 It deals fairly with both parties by conJudgr Hoffman '~ dis~ent :,;uggest"' that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F . 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937038.
11 See id., at 939 (Hoffman, .T., eoncurring m part and dissenting in part).
MR. JusTinJ S'I'~~\'BNS coneedl't; that., rwn in the abownce of a written
contraet, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during the cour:;e of his employment. Post , at 3.
lie also COncedes t.hat alJ per~ona) profit ~; gaiuPd from thE' exploitation of'
such information arr impressed with a constructive trm;t in favor of the
employer. Post, at 5. In thi~; ca;;e, he :seems to think that the common
law would not tn•at information as "confidE-ntial" unle:ss it were "classified ."
Sec, e. g., post, at 3. We have thought tllllt the common-law obligation
waH considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comment::; b, d (1958);
V Scott on Trusts § 505 (1967). But ~ince thi:; ca::;e involves a written \
eontract. sp<>eifi<·all.\· mtpo~ing a. !ru"t, wr ll<'l'd pot look to thP common
law to d<'tcnuinc 1:-\m•pp '~ fidm:iary relati onship.
10
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forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only fund.s attributable to the
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damag~s out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full
judgment of the District Court.
So ordered.

( -(!-'{;C~

~DRAFT
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
COURT OF APPEALS FOR T:a:E FOURTH CIRCUIT

STATE~

Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October-, 1979
PER CURIAM.

In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a.
judgment enforcing an a.greement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) . He also contends that punitive damages are an inap·
propriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In
No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross~petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgM ,.
ment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the a.ccount without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
·executed an agreement promising that he would "not ...
publish . . . any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." /d., at 58a.1
1

.

'

Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also

'

.
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had 11willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally,
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book
had 11 caused the United States irreparable harm and loss."
I d. , at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA . .. without the express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative.u Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F . Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Court of Appeals a.nd the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F . 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 181}-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable'
as a prior restraint on protected speech.
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed
thr ngrerment that expre:osly obligated him to submit any proposed publi·t ation for prior review. He doe~ not cfuim that he executed t his agree-·
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936. 4 In other words,
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material.
It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the
ment under duresR. Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's
agreement is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's
statutory mandate to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure," 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932 .
..MQ.reover, this Court'R cases make rlen.r thnt~even in the ab::;ence of an
express ngreemPnt,-the CIA/artrd to protect substantial govermnent intcrcst,; by imposing rensonnt!P restrictions on employee activities that in
other contexts might br protrcted by the Fir:;t Amendment. Civil Service
Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); liN' Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828 (1976);
id., at 844-848 (PowELL, J., c•oncurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676
(1972). Tho Govrrmnent hn~ n compelling interest in protecting both the
secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearnnce of confidentiality ~o essentinl to the effect-ive operation of our foreign
intclligencP service. Sec p. 5, in/l·a. The agreement that Snrpp signed is a
reasonable means for protecting this vital interest.
• The Government's conc•ion distinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CAli), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government clajmed that a former CIA employee intended to
viohLto hm agreement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d,
at 1313. Marchetti tluorefor<' did not consider the a11propriatc remedy forthe breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue-

ln M arcl!etti.

c.c~.A./.52 L.....:a.tJe_,
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." !d.,
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hofl"man argued, were both a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con..
structive trust.
II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed. Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship. 0 The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting it for clearance.
Snepp stipulated at trifil that-after undertaking this obligation- he had been "assigned to various positions of trust"
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified
information, including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178. 6 Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublica5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp,
UI, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
Government .. .." Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of'
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and rna~
terials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoff~
man, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types or
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.

I
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principle-Snepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
informa.tion that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire.
Whatever fairly may be said about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its \
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be essential to the security of the United State~
and-in a sense-the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable fore;~~:n intelligence. See generally T. Powers,
The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1979).
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security of infonnatiou that might compromise them and
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material8 In
uestioning the forceL,Admiral Turner's testimony, Ma. JusTICE
STEVENS' ·sseuting opinion declares that damage to our Nation's ability
to cooperat with foreign intelligence services "must. be accepted as an
inevitable byp uct of the exercise of First Amendment rights by government employees. Post, at. 6-7. This notion that_) h Government is
helple:>S to protects 1rces of intelligence which m11-y!Se vital to the preservation of national S<' rit~· and the conduct of foreign affairs finds no
support, in the decisions I' this Court. We have held consistently that,
in order to protect. substan 'al gg_yernment intere;;ts, the Government can
restrict, its employees in activ '6 that in other contexts might be protected
by the First Amcndme . See ases cited, at n. 3, supra. One would
have thought that. hose prrceden applied with spPcial force to a CIA
agent who ha , cce::;:s to se n ~:<itive int igence. In any event, the dissent's
statenwn · · scarcrly relevant in light o
e expre;;s obligntion tha.t SuepJl
:rily undertook "" a condition of 1 • employment with the CIA.

.7
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1-17-80
No. 78-1871, Snepp v. U.S.
new footnote 8, page 6
In questioning the force of Admiral Turner's testimony,
Mr. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion would attribute the
concern of foreign intelligence services not to the hazards of
allowing an agent like Snepp to publish whatever he pleases, but
to the CIA's failure to classify what "should have been classified
or of the foreign government's disagreement with our government's
classification policy".

Post, at 6-7.

Mr. Justice Stevens' views

in this respect not only find no support in the record, but they
also reflect a misapprehension of the concern reflected by Admiral
Turner's testimony.

If in fact information is unclassified or in

the public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be
concerned.

The problem is to ensure in advance, and by proper

procedures, that information detrimental to national interests is
not published.

Without a dependable prepublication review

procedure, no intelligence agency or responsible government
official could be assured that an employee privy to sensitive
information might not conclude on his own - innocently or
otherwise - that it should be disclosed to the world.
The dissent finds an "implication in the Court's
opinion" that the CIA should have "carte blanche to censor"
employees' publications.

Snepp's contract, however, requires no

more than a clearance procedure subject to judicial review.

If

Snepp had submitted his material for review and the Agency had
found it to contain sensitive material, it would have been left to
the Agency to seek an injunction against publication.

See Alfred

A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (CA4), cert. denied, 421

u.s.

992 (1975): United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (CA4),

cert. denied, 409

u.s.

1063 (1972).
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
harmed the United States Government. 595 F . 2d, at 935;
456 F. Supp., at 180.9

III

\

The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government could not pursue the only remedy that___
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that
Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly
found otherwise, MR. JusTICE STEVENS says that "the interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at
odds with the record, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and
treats its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated obligations. MR. Jus'l'ICE S'I'EVENS then analogizes Snepp's prepublication review
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to
compete with his employer. Post, at 3. A body of private law intended
to preserve competition, however, simply has no bearing on a contract
made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to "prot.ec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure." 50 U.S. C. §403 (d)(3).
10 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 9379

'938.
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Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 11 It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
11

See id., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) .

MR. JusTICE STEVENS concedes that, rven in the absence of a written
contract, an rmployee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3.
He also concedes t}utt all personal profits gained from the exploitation of
such information are impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common
law would not treat information as " confidential" unless it were "classified."
See, e. g., post, at 3. We ha.ve thought that the common-law obligation
was considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958);
V
tt n Trusts § 505 ( 1967). But since this ca.;,;e involves a written
contract specifically tiel!igned to,>~osur
confidential
iufomw:io we- ha
no-occ:urion to linger over that question . There is
..1~ to-iiTvulre eommon-la principle.s.i1Lord6r to impot>e-tt constructi¥&

trQilt.
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breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full
judgment of the District Court.
So ordered.
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
ON

PETITION F10R WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OP' A:fl'EALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 78--1871 and 79-265. Decided January-, 1980

MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom · MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed.an employment agreement
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency
any information he intended to publish about it for prepubli~
cation review.1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the. power to censor
its employees' critical speech, but rather ·to ensure that classi~
· fied, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926,
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F .
2d 1309, 1317 (CA~. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063.
In this caSe Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for
prepublication review. However, the Go~emment has con~
ceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic m~
terial.2 Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality
1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in ' 1976 in which he made
the same commitment.
• In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that
". ,'. Decent IntervoJ contains classified infol'IJlation or any information
concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA,"
the Government stated that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintitf'does
npt so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession,
the district judge sustained the Government's objections to qefense efforts
to detennine whether Decent Interval in fact contains information that
the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu.
the CIA'e Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153.
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that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not 'been
compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Gov'ernment unprecedented and drastic . relief in the form of a
eonstructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from thesale of the book. Because that · remedy is not authorized by
. any applicable law and because tt ·is most inappropriate for
'the Court to dispose of this novel i~sQe s\.unmarily on the
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, · I respectfully dissent.

I
\.

The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although
, Congress has enacted a nu:,nber of criminal statutes punishing
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified
information,~ it has not seen fit to authorize the constructive
'· trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor does either of the
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such
remedy in the event of a breach! The Court's per curiam
opinion seems to suggest that its result is supported by a
blend of the law of trusts and the law of contracts.>ll But
8 See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 798, which impolo'es a prison term of 10 years
and a $10,000 fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certain types of
classified information ; 18 U. S. C.§ 794, which makes it a criminal offense
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defense information
to a foreign government; and 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdraws the
right to government retirement benefits from a person convicted of violating these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401,
which provides administrative sanctions, including discharge, against employees who publish classfied information.
~ In both his original employment agreement and the termination agreement Snepp acknowled~ed the criminal penalties that might attach to any
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cause for ternlination of his employment. No other remedies were mentioned in either
· agreement.
:; In light of its heavy reliance in the text on principles of fiduciary
·· duty and contract law und its failure to identify any other source for the
:result it. announc~ today, I find t.he Court's statement in a footnote that
there "is no need to invoke common law principles in order to impose a

'

'
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neither of the&- branches of the common law supports the
impositiOn of a constructive trust under the circumstances of
this case.
Plainly this iH not a typical trust situation in which a settlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for
the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the
common law even in the absence of a written employment
agreement, i.s the duty to protect confidential or "classified"
information, If Snepp had breached that obligation, the common law would support the implication of a constructive trust
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential
information ,6
But Snepp did l10t breach his duty to protect confidential
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, irnu
posed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the imposition of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to disclose, labeling them both as "fidueiary." I find nothing in
the common law to support such an approach.
Employment agreements often contain covenants designed
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies
with his duty not to disclose or misuse confidential information. One of the most common is a covenant not to cornu
constructiv:fl 'Lru,;t. on Snepp'.-. profits," ante, at 8, n . 11, surprising, to (
e,a.y t.he )ea.-st.
6 See, e. g., Spm·y Rand Co1'p. v. A-T-0, Inc. , 447 F . 2d 1387, 1392
(CA4 1971), cen demed, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia law) ; Tltrpek v.
Chev1'on Oil Co., 407 .F. 2d 1121:1 (CA8 1969) (Arkansas law) ; Stl"uctuml
Dynamics Research Cm-p. v. Engineering Mechanics R esearch Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mich. 1975) (Michigan law) ; Re~;tatement
(Second) of Agency §a96 (c) (1958) (" Unless otherwise agreed, after the
termination of the agm1ey the agent. : . . . (c) hal:! a duty to account for
profits made by the' ;;ale or use of trade secret8 and ot.ht>r confidential
lnfo.rm>~.tion, whPLhP-r or not, in eompetitiou with t.he priiwipal . •••") .
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pete. Contru.ty to the majority's approach in this case, the
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply
because they suvport a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary,
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an in·
_dividual's fr~~dom of t~ade, they are enforceable only if they
can survive scrutiny under the "nile of reason." 'That rule,
originally laid down in the seminal case of Mitchel v. Rey·
nolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (17ll), requires that
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a 'legitimate
. interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidentiality), that the employer's interest not "be outweighed by the
public interest,'1 and that the covenant not be of any longer
duration or wider georaphicaJ scope than necessary to protect
the employer's iuterest. 8
'The Court has not persuaded nie that a rule of reason}
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenant to submit
to prepublicatiou review. Like an ordinary employer, the
CIA has a vital wterest in protecting certain types of infqr. 7 As the court held in Herbert Mor1·is. Ltd. v. Sa:xelby, 1 App. Ca .
'[1916] 688, 704, the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does
not out,weigh the public interest in 'keeping the employee in the workforce:
~a ••• [A]n employer can[not] prevent his employee from using the
skill and knowledge in his trade or profession which he has learnt
in the courl:le of his employment by means of directions or instructionl:j
from the employer. Th~~ot information and that additional skill he is
entitled to use for the benefit of hin1self and the benefit, of the public
who gain the advantage of his having had such admirable instruction.
The case in which the Court interferes for the purpose of protection is
where use is made, not of the skill wl1ich the man may ha.ve acquired,
but of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to
reveal to an)' one el:>e. . . / '
8 8«_., e y., !Jriggs v. R. R . Donn£lley & Smt8 Co., 589 F . 2d 39, 41 (CAl
1978) (Illinois law) ; Arne1ican Hot Rod Ass-n., Inc. v. Can'ier, 500 F . 2d
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina law); Alston Studios, 1rw. v •
.Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F . 2d '279, '282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia
la.w) ; Mixing ]i}quiprnent Co. v. Philadelphia ·oear, "Trw., 436 Jl,. 2d 1308,
13~2 (CA3 1971) (New York law) ; Water Services, 'Inc. v. Tesco Chemi•
r:als, lnc., 410 },. 2d 163, 167 (CA5 1969) (Georgia law) ; Restatement.
(Second.) of Contractt! § 330 (Tent. Draft No. 12, MaJ'ch 1971).
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mation ; at the same time, the CIA employee has a counter~
vailing interest iu preserving a wide range of work oppor~
tunities (including work as an author) and in protecting his
First Amendment rights. The public interest lies in a proper
accommodation that will preserve the intelligence mission of
the agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified
information . When the Government seeks to enforce ·a harsh
restriction on the employee's freedom 9 despite its admission
that the interest the agreement was designed to protect-the
confidentiality of classified information-has not been compromised, an equity court might well be persuaded that the
case is not one in which the covenant should be enforced.
But even assuming that 8nepp's covenant to submit to pre~
publication review should be enforced, the constructive trust
im~sed by the eourt ls net an appropriate remedy. If an
employee has used his employer's confldential information for
his own personal profit, a constructive trust over those profits
is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are
the direct result of the breach. But Snepp admittedly did
not use couflden tial information in his book; nor were the
profits from his book in any sense a product of his failure to
submit the hook for prepublication review.
even if
Snepp had submitted the book to the agency for prepublic~
tion review, the Government's censorship authority woul<t
surely have been limited to the excision of classified material.
In this case, then, it would have been obliged to clear the
book for publication in precisely the same form as it now
o Tlw covena.ut impOI:les a serlou~ prior restraint on Snepp's ability to
speak freely, Si~ infra n. 15, and is of indefinite duration and scope-.
f1wl.ors that would llll\ke mo.st. similar covenants unenforceable: See, e. g.,
Alsto·n Studio~>. lnc. v. Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2d 279,
283 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Virgin~t law :t covenant with no
geographiCal hmitat.i on); American Hot Rod Assn., lru:. v. Carrier, 500
F.
1~6\J, 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under North Carolina
law a cov£-JlHnt wlth no durational or geographical limitation) ; E. L.
Conwea & Co . v. Gutberiet, 429 F . 2d 527, 528 (CA4 1970) (holding voicf'
under Maryland hl.W a envemmt with no durational or geogr-aphical
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'rhus, Snepp has not gained any profits as a result
of his breach; the Government, rather than Snepp, will be
unjustly enriched if he is required to disgorge profits attributable entirely to his own legitimate activity.11
Despite the fact that Snepp has. not caused the Government the type of harm that wo~ld ordinarily be remedied by
the imposition of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the
Government has suffered BQme harm. But, in light of the
sketchy trial record in this. case, even that factual determination is difficult to support_ The Court bases its finding ·of
hann on teatimony by the Director of the CIA,· Admiral
Stansfield Turner. stating that Snepp's bOolc and others like
it have jeopardized the CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence services by . making them unsure of the agency's
ability to maintain confidentiality.. · Admiral Turner's trunCfl-ted testimony does not ·explain whether these unidentified
"other'' books actually contained clas8ified information (unlike Snepp's) or whether foreign ·agencies fear the publication
of unclaBSified information which Snepp and other CIA employees 'have a First Amendment right to disseminate. 12 · If
10 If he had · ~ubmitted the book to the agency and the agency had refused to consent to the· publication of certain material in it, .Snepp could
have obtained · judicial review to determine whether the agency was correct in con.sidering the material clasSified. See United States v. Marchetti,
466 F . 2d 1309,· 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063.
11 As the Court of Appeals held, to the extent that the Government seeks
to punish Snepp for· breaching · his obligation tQ -submit the manuscript
for prepublication review or to deter others from engaging in similar
breaches, punitive damages are clearly a ·more appropriate remedy than a
constructive tmat; · ". . . since .a constructive · trust· depends on· the concept of unjust enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment. See
D . Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246 (1973)." ·595
F. 2d, at 937.
12 The District Judge sustained the Government's objections to questions concerning the ·identity of other agents who had published the unau. thorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 136. However,
Admiral Turner did 'testify that the harmful lDaterials involved "[p)ri.: marily -the appeamnee in the United States tnedia of identification ~9!'
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the former is true, I fail to see how Snepp's book, which does
not reveal confidences, has exacerbated the problem. And if
tpe latter is true, then the reluctance of foreign governments
to work with our Government is a consequence either of the
failure of the agency to classify information that should have
b~ classified or of the foreign government's disagreement
with our Government's classification policy.
I share the Court's appraisal of the importance of an ef.fective intelligence service and I agree with it that the CIA
has broad power to protect its vital sources by classifying
information whose disclosure may compromise its mission.
I cannot ·agree with the implication in the Court's opinion,
however, that the agency has carte blanche to censor its em..12.------p~lo-:YEl;-.. ' publication of even unclassified information or information that is already in the public domain on the basis of
its opinion that publication may be "detrimental to vital
national iuterest." Ante, at 5. The CIA never attempted to
assert such power over Snepp in either of the contracts he
signed ; rather, the agency itself limited its censorship power
to preventing the disclosure of "classified" information.
Moreover, even assuming that allowing the CIA the power to
impose such a wide-ranging prior restraint would be good
national security policy, I would have difficulty reconciling·
such a policy with the demands of the First Amendment.

j+L/

sources and method::~ of eollecting intelligence . .. ." Tr. 143. This type
of information is certainly confidential and is specifically the type of information that Snepp has maintained he did not reveal in Decent Interval.
See, e. g., Snepp's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show,
in which he stated : " ... I have made a very determined effort not to
expose sources or methods .•••" Government's Requests for AdmiSBions,
Record Item 19.
Spepp's attorneys were also foreclosed from asking Admiral Turner
whether particular foreign sources had stopped cooperating with United
States' authorities as a. direct result of the publication of Decent Interval.
Tr. 138. Thus, it is unclear whether or why foreign sources may havereacted unfavorably to its publication. ~owever, William E. Colby, the'
CIA's former Director, did indic11te in his testimony that foreign nation~r
genjlrally have a stricter secrecy code than does the Unite~ States. Trr.
17.5-l'Z6..
.
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II
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari- is
just as unprecedented ~s its disposition of the merits.
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunction requiring him to s'ubmit all f\J:ture manuscripts for prepublication review and remanded for a determination ·of
whether punit!ve damages would be appropriate for his failure
to submit Decent Irderval to the _agency prior to its publication.
The Government filed· a brief in opposition as well as a crosspetition for certiorari ) tQe Government specifically stated,
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire
case before the Court in the..event that the Court should decide
to grant Snepp's ,petition. , The G<:}vernment explained that
" [b] ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of appeals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's
interest, the government has not independently sought review in
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government
stated that "[i]f this Court grants .[Snepp's} .. . petition for a
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871, it should also grant this crosspetition. lf the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this petition should also be denied." Petition, at 5.
Given the Government's position, ·it would be ·highly inappropriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction,
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's.
Yet that is in essence what bas been done.u ·The majority
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as
manifestly "without merit~" Ante, at 2, n. 3. It·is clear that
Snepp's petition would not have been granted on its own.
merits.
I have been UMble to discover any previous case· in which the Court
· has acted as it doe!:! today, reaching the merits of a. conditional cross-·
petition detipite it8 belief that the petition does not merit gr~tnting:
.
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The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against
similar breaches of security," ante, at 6, and (b) that it might
require the Government to reveal confidential information
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might
thus be left with "no remedy at all," ante, at 7. It seems
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either
ground by the Government's acquiescence in . the punitive
damages remedy. Moreover, the second rationale His entirely
speculative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong.
The Court states that :
"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an
award of punitive damages might force the Government
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised
to protect."
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to
comply with his duty to subll).it the manuscript for prepublication review and that the Government relied on these misrepresentations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a
showing would require the Government to reveal any confidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante,' at 7.

III
The uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmaking
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable:14 Which , it should be noted, does not appear anywhere in the Government's 5-page cross-petition.
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principles that favor a more conservative approach to this
case.
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an
opportunity to appraise the adequacy of the punitive damages
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion
that equitable relief is necessary.
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to
criticize his government. 15 Inherent in this prior restraint is
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority
to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the demands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me
that that burden has been met.
I respectfully dissent.

15 The mere fact that the agency has the authority to reView the text
of a critical book in search of cl~ssified information before it is published
is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover,
the right to delay publication until the review is completed is itself a form
of prior restraint that would not be tolerated in other contexts. See,
·e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. ·,713; Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539. In view of the national interest
in maintaining an effective intelligence service, I am not prepared to say
that the restraint is necessarily intolerable in this context. I am, 'however,
prepared to say that, certiorari having been grant~d, the issue surely
should not oo resolved in the absence of full briefing and argument.

;
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
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MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency
any information he intended to publish about it for prepublication review.1 'The purpose of such an agreement, as the
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classified, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926,
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063.
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for
prepublication review. However, the Government has conceded that the 'book contains no c1assified, nonpublic rna.
teriaJ.2 Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality
1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made
the same commitment.
2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that
" • .. Decent Interval contains classified information or any information
concerning intelligence or CIA lhat has not been made public by CIA,"
the Government stated that "[fjor the purpose of this action, plaintiff does
not so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession,
the district JUdge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts
to determine whether Decent Interval in fact contains information that
the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu~
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153,
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that nep p\, ctw lt-a,ct, was designed to protect has not been
compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Gov"
ernment Ullprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a
constructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the
sale of the book. Because that r€'medy is not authorized by
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for
the Cour·t to dispose of this novel issue ·summarily on the
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I respectfully dissent.

'I
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although
Congress has enacted a nuniber of criminal statutes punishing
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified
information, 3 it has not seell fit to authorize the constructive
trust remedy the Court ·creates today. Nor does either of the
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such
remedy in the event of a· breach.1 The Court's per curiam
opinion seems to suggest that its result is supported by a
blend of the law of trusts and the law of contracts." But
8 See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 798, whieh imposes a prison term of 10 years
and a $10,000 fine for knowingly ~tnd willfully publishing cerULin types of
classified information ; 18 U.S. C.§ 794. which makes it a criminal offense
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defense information
to a foreign government; and 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdmws the
right to government retiremenL benefits from a person convicted of violating these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401,
which provides administrative sancti011~, including discharge, against employees who publish clas::;ified information. Thus, even in the ab::;rnce of]
:1 ronstruct1vr trust remedy, Hll agrnt like Snepp would hardly be f.ree, as
the majorit~· ,;uggest;:;, "to publish whatevrr he pleases." Ante, at o, n. 8.
4 In hoth his origmal employment agreement and the Lerminatiori agreement Snepp u.cknowledged the criminal penalties that might atta.ch to any
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cau<>e for tenni..t1a,.
tion of hi~:~ employment;. No other remedie~:~ were mentioned in either
agreement.
6 ln a foot note, &l'P ante, at 8, n . 11, the Court ~ugge::;t:;; thai it need not
look to tlw r·ommon law to ~uppor1 it~ holdmg beeau<>e the ca~c involve1:1 a
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neither of these branches of the common law supports the
imposition of a constructive trust under the circumstances of
this case.
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a settlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for
the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the
common law even in the absence of a written employment
agreement, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified"
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the common law would support the implication of a constructive trust
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential
information. 6
But Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, imposed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the imposition of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to disdose, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in
the common law to support such an approach.
Employmellt agreements ofte11 'Contain covellants designed
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies
with his duty not to clisclose or misuse confidential informawritten contrnrt Bnt, inn~murh as tlw eontract itself does not state what]
remedy is to be applied in the PVE'nt of a breach, the eommon law iH the
only Rouree of Jaw to whieh we can look to determine what cou~titul<'S
an appropriate rPnwdy.
(l See, 1'. g., Sper1·y
Rand Corp. v. A-T-0, Inc., 447 F. 2d 1387, 1392
(CA4 1971), cert,. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia law) ; Tla:pek v.
Chevron Oil Co., 407 .F. 2d 1129 (UAH H)(i9) (Arkan~as law) ; Structural
Dynamics Nesearch Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Re8earch Corp., 401
F. Snpp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mirh. 1975) (Michigan law) ; R{'statement
(Serond) of Ageney § 39o (r) (1958) ("Unle~s otherwi::;c agreed, <lfter the
Lermination of the agency the agent: . . . (c) ha~:> a duty to account for
profits madtl by the ::;alP or u,.;c of trade ,;erret" and other eonfidential

infornmtion, whether or uot. in eornpl't.ition wit.h the principal.•• ,'').
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tion. One of the most common is a covenant not to compete. Contrary to the majority's approach in this case, the
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary,
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an individual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable only if they
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." ·That rule,
originally .laid down in the seminal case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, ·24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), requires that
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate
interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidentiality), that the employer's interest not be outweighed by the
public interest. 7 and that the ·covenant not be of any longer·
duration or wider georaphical scope than necessary to protect
the employer's interest. 8
The Court has not persuaded me that a rule of reason
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenaut to submit
to prepublication review. Like an ordinary employer, the
7 As t!JP court lwld in Herbert Mol'1·is. Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. Cas.
P916] 688, 704, 't he employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does
not outweigh the public interest in keeping the ·employee in the workforce :
" • . . [A]n employer can[not] prevent his employee from using the
skill and · knowledge in his · trade Dr profession which he has learnt
in the course of hio; employment by means of directions or ino;tructions
from the employer. That information and that additional ~kill he is
entitled to use for the benefit of him::;elf and the benefit of the public
who gain the advantage of his having lH\d such admirable instruction.
The case in which .the Court · interferes for · the purpose of protection is
where use is ma.de, not of · the ·skill which the man may have acquired,
hut of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to
reveal to any one ebe. . . ."
8 See, e. g., B1iggs v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 589 F . 2d 39,41 (CAl
1978) (Illinois law) ; American Hot Rod Assn., Inc. v. CmTier, 500 F. 2d
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina. la.w); Alston St·udios, Inc . v.
Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F . 2d 279 , 282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia
law) ; Mixing Equipment Co . v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F. 2d 1308,
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law) ; Water Services. Inc . v. 'l'esco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F . 2d 163, lfi7 (CA5 1969) (Georgia. law) ; Re:>tatement
(Second) 0f Contracts § ~30 (Tent. Dra.ft No. 12, March HJ77).
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CIA has a vita] interest in protecting certain types of information; at the same time, the CIA employee has a countervailing interest in preserving a wide range of work opportunities (including work as an author) and in protecting his
First Amendment rights. The public interest lies in a proper
accommodation that will preserve the intelligence mission of
the agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified
information. When the Government seeks to enforce a harsh
restriction on the employee's freedom, 9 despite its admission
that the interest the agreement was designed to protect-the
·confidentiality of classified information-has not been compromised, an equity court might well be persuaded that the
case is not one in which the covenant should be enforced. 10
But even assuming that Snepp's covenant to submit to prepublication review should be enforced, the constructive trust
imposed by the Court is not an appropriate remedy. If an
employe<' has used his employer's confidential information for
his own personal profit. a constructive trust over those profits
is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are
the direct result of the breach. But Snepp admittedly did
not use confidential information in his book; nor were the
The rownan! impose::; a , erious prior restraint on Snrpp '~ ability to
frr<·l y, ~rr mfra n. 15, nnd i~:> of iudefiuite duration and :>ropc"faclon; that. would makr moRt ~imilar rovenantH unenforc~·abl<' . See, e. y .,
Alston Studws , Inc. v. Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F . 2d 27!),
2R3 (CA4 197+) (holding void under Virgiua law a covenant. with no
geographi cal lit111tation) ; American llot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Carrier. 500
F . 2d 126!), 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under North Carolina.
bw a cov<>nant w1th no dumtional or geographical limitation) ; E. L.
Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F . 2d 527, 5:28 (CA4 1970) (holding void
under Maryland law a covenant with no dumtimml or geographical
limitation) .
10 Th!' Coul"l rorr('ctly point:; out thaL the Government may regulate
certain aPtivitie~ of 1t;; employer>< that would be protected by thr First
Amendmrut 111 otlwr rontext:<. Aute, a! :3, 11 . 3. But none of tlw ca;;es it
C'itr~< illvolvrd a requirem<>ut that an employee ;;ubmit a propo::;rd public
statrml'nt for pr<'rPIPa~r cen:;orKhip or approval. The Court ha,; not previou;o;l~ ron:;Hinrd the rnforrrabilit~· of thi::; kmd of prior rt'litramt or tlw
remedy lhal :;hould he impo~ed in tiH' event of a breach,
:J

~>peak

SNEPP v. UNITED S'l'ATES

profits from his book in any sense a product of his failure to
submit the book for prepublication review. For, even if
Snepp had submitted the book to the agency for prepublication review, the Government's censorship authority would
surely have been limited to the excision of classified material.
In this case, then, it would have been obliged to clear the
book for publication in precisely the same fonn as it now
stands.n Thus, Snepp has not gained any profits as a result
of his breach; the Government. rather than Snepp, will be
unjustly enriched if he is required to disgorge profits attributable entirely to his own legitimate activity.
Despite the fact that Snepp has not caused the Government the type of harm that would ordinarily be remedied by
the imposition of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the
Govemment has suffered some harm. The Court states that
publication of "unreviewed material'' by a former CIA agent
"can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the published information is unclassified. " Ante, at 5. It then seems
to suggest that the injury in such cases stems from the
agency's inability to catch "harmful" but unclassified information before it is published. I do not believe, however, that
the agency has any authority to censor its employees' publication of unclassified informatiou on the basis of its opinion that
publication may be "detrimental to vital national interests"
11 If he had ~ubnntted tlw book to the rtgeucy and the agent')' had rcfm;ed to consent to the publication of certain material in it, Snepp could
have obtained jndJCial review to determine whether the agency was correct in considering the material classified. See United States v. Marchetti,
46ti F . 2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972) , cert. denied, 409 U. S. 106:3. It is
uotPworthy that thP Court dot·~ uot di~agree with the Fourth Circuit's
view in Marr·hetti, reiterated in Snepp, that a CIA employe!:' ha,; a Fir~t
AuwndmPnt nght to p11bli~h uncla~~ified information . Thu~, despitP its
referpnce in footnote ;~ of itH opmion to the Government';; so-called com[WIIing intere:st in protecting " thP appearance of confidentiality ," ante, at
3, n. 3, and de~pite :-;orne ambiguity in the Court's rcfrreiH'C to "detriuwutnl' and "harmful" HI' oppo~rd to ~classifird" information, ante, at
5, l do not undN;,iaud the Court to imply that the Governnwnt could
ohtain <Ill inJllll<:t wu again~l t ht' publication of unclas~ified mformation ..
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or otherwise "identified as harmful." Ibid. The CIA never
attempted to assert such power over Snepp in either of the
coutracts he signed; rather, the agency itself limited its censorship power to preventing the disclosl,.lre of "classified"
information. Moreover, even if such a wide-rauging prior
restraint would be good 11ational security policy, I would have
great difficulty reconciling it with the demands of the First
Amenumeut.
The Court also relies to some extent on the Government's
theory at trial that Snepp caused it harm by flouting his prepublication review obligation and thus making it appear that
the CIA was powerless to prevent its agents from publishing
any information they chose to publish, whether classified or
not. The Goverument theorized that this appearance of
weakness would discourage foreign governments from cooperating with the CIA because of a fear that their secrets might
also be compromised. In support of its position that Snepp's
book had in fact had such an impact, the Government introduced testimony by the Director of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turner, stating that Snepp's book and others like it had
jeopardized the CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence
services by making them unsure of the agency's ability to
maintain confidentiality. Admiral Turner's truncated testimony does not explain, however, whether these unidentified
"other" books actually contained classified information. 12 If
so, it is difficult to believe that the publication of a book like
12

The Dist ri<"1 .TudgP su::;tained the Government's objeclioni> to questions concerning the identity of other agents who had published the unauthorized works to which Admiral '1\uner referred. Tr. 136. However,
Admiral TurnPr did testify that the harmful materials involved "[p]rimarily the appearance in the United States media of identification of
sources and method::; of collecting intelligence . . . ." Tr. 143. ThiR type
of information is certainly confidential and is specifically the type of information th,tt Snepp has maintained he did not reveal in Decent Interval.
See, e. g., Snepp 's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomonow show,
in which he l:itated : " . . . I have made a very determined effort not to
expose ::;ourrr:; or methods, . •. " Government's Requests for Admissions,
Rerord Tteru 19.

s
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Sitepp's, which does not reveal classified information, has

significantly weakened the agency's position. Nor does it
explain whether the unidentified foreign agencies who have
stopped cooperating with the CIA have done so because of
a legitimate fear that secrets will be revealed or because they
merely disagree with our Government's classification policies. 13
In any event, to the extent that the Government seeks to
punish Snepp for the geuera.lized harm he has caused by
failing to submit to prepublication review and to deter others
from following in his footsteps, punitive damages is. as the
Court of Appeals held, clearly the preferable remedy" . . .
since a constructive trust depends on the concept of unjust
enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment. See
D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246
(1973) ." 595 F. 2d, at 937. 11
II
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari is
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits.
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunction requiring him to submit all future manuscripts for prepublication review and remanded for a determination of
whether punitive damages would be appropriate for his failure
to submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication.
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a cross-

J

1 ~ Snep]l's attorneys were forr<"losrd from asking Admiral Turnrr whethrr
particular forrign source:; had stopped eooperating with United Stat<>s'
authontiC's as a dm'ct result of tlw puhlictttion of Decent Interval . Tr.
138. 'flnt::l, it. is nne1flltr whether or· why foreign sources may hav<> reacted
unfavorably to it:; publication. However, William E. Colby, the CIA's
former Dirretor, drd indicate in hi~ te~timony that for~1 nation~ generally
have a Htrretrr ,;ecrecy code than does the United Statel:i. Tr. 175-176.
14 One of the Court's justifications for rb; constructiw trust n•medy is
that ''rt cannot :saddle the former agent wrth exemplary damagel:i out of all
proportron to his gam.'' Ante. at 9. This solicitude for Snepp'::; welfare
is ra fher iron1e m view of tbe dmconian nature of the remedy imposed by
lhe Court todny .
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petition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated,
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide
to grant Snepp's petition. The Government explained that
"[b] ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of appeals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's
interest, the government has not independently sought review in
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government
stated that "[i] f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petition for a
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871, it should also grant this crosspetition. If the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this petition should also be denied." Petition, at 5.
Given the Government's position, it would be highly inappropriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction,
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's.
Yet that is in essence what has been done. 15 The majority
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as
manifestly "without merit." Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that
Snepp's petition would not have been granted on its own
merits.
The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against
similar breaches of security,'' ante, at 7, and (b) that it might
require the Government to reveal confidential information
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might
1 5 I hav<· heen unable lo di~cover any pn'vious ca:;e in which the Court
bas acted as it does today, reaching the merits of a conditional crosspetition desp1te its belief that the petition does not merit granting
certiorari.
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thus be left with "no remedy at all," ante, at 8. It seems
to me that the Qourt is foreclosed from relying upon either
ground by the Government's acquiescence in the punitive
damage remedy. Moreover, the second rationale ' 6 is entirely
specqlati ve and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong.
The Court states that:
"Proof of the tortiou~ conduct necessary to sustain an
award of punitive damages might force the Government
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised
to protect."
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepublication review and that the Government relied on these misrepresentations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a
showing would require the Government to reveal any confidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery
.into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 8.

III
The uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmaking
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this
case.
Ji'irst, for ceuturies the English-speaking judiciary refused
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an
opportunity to appraise the adequacy of the punitive damage
remedy in this case, the Court has jurnped to the conclusion
that equitable relief is necessary.
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to,
Whi ch, it should be noted, do{•s uof
ment's 5-page cross-p~ttition..
10

appet~r

anywhere in the Govern- ··
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criticize his government.' 7 Iuherent in this prior restraint is
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority
to delay the p4blication of a critical work or to persua-de an
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the demands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me
that that burden hlts been met.
I respectfully dissent.

The mere fact that the agency has the authority to review the text
of a critical book in search of classified information before it is published
is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover,
the right to delay publication until the review is completed is itself a form
of prior restraint that would not be tolerated in other contexts. See,
e. g., Netv York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539. In view of the national interest
in maintaining an effective intelligence ~ervice, I am not prepared to say
that the r~traint is necessarily intolerable in this context. I am, however,
prepared to say that, certiorari having been granted, the issue surely
should not be resolved m t.he ab ·en<'e of full briefing and argument.
17
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MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency
any information he intended to publish about it for prepublication review.1 'The purpose of such an agreement, as the
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classified, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2d 926,
932 (CA4 1979) ; see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063.
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for
prepublication review. However, the Government has conceded that the book contains no c1assified, nonpublic material.2 Thus, by definition, the interest in confidentiality
Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made
the same commitment.
2 In response to an intetTogatory asking whether it contended that
" • .. Decent Interval contains classified information or any information
concerning mtelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA,"
the Government stated that "[f]or the purpose of this action, plaintiff does
not so contend." Record Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession,
the district JUdge sustained the Government's objections to defense efforts
to determine whether Decent Interval in fact contains information that
the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135 ; and of Herbert Hetu)
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153,
1
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that uep p'b coli tmct was designed to protect has not been
compromised. Nevertheless, the Comt today grants the Government unprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a
<lOnstructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the
sale of the book. Because , that remedy is not authorized by
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for
the Court to dispose of this novel issue ·summarily on the
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I respectfully dissent.

'I
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although
Congress has enacted a nuniber of criminal statutes punishing
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified
information,8 it has not seeu fit to authorize the constructive
trust remedy the Court creates today. Nor does either of the
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such
remedy in the event of a· breach.4 The Court's per curiam
opinion seems to suggest that its result is supported by a
blend of tbe law of trusts and the law of contracts." But
See, e. g., 18 U . S. C. § 798, whirh impo:ses a pri::;on term of 10 years
and a $10,000 fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certa.in types of
classified infonnation ; 18 U . S. C. § 794. which makes it a criminal offense
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defen~e information
to a foreign government ; atld 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdraws the
right to government retirement benefits from a per::;on convicted of violating these statutes. See al:o Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U . S. C. § 401,
which provides administrative sanction~, including discharge, again~:>L employees who publish classified information. Tim:; , even in the absence of]
a ron:structivl' trul:lt remed~· , an ageut like Snepp would hardly be free, as
the majority ~ ugge::;t::;, "to publish whatever l1e pleases." Ante, at 6, n. 8.
4 In both his original employment agreement and the tenninatiori agreement Snepp a.cknowledged the criminal penalties that might attach to any
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cau~:>e for termination of his employment. No other remedies were mentioned in either
agreement.
fi In a foot11ote , bPf' unte, fit 8, n . 11, the Court suggests that it neC'd not
look to tlw f'ommon Jaw to ~upport it~ holding becaul:le th<' ca;:;e iuvolve;; a
8
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neither of these branches of the common ]aw supports the
imposition of a constructive trust under the circumstances of
this case.
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a settlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for
the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the
common law even in the absence of a written employment
agreemeut, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified"
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the common law would support the implication of a constructive trust
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential
information.6
But Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, imposed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the imposition of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to disclose, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in
the common law to support such an approach.
Employment agreements often •contain covenants designed
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies
with his duty not to disclose or misuse confidential informa-

do<·~

writtc·n conirari But, inasmuch as the <"ontract itl:lrlf
not Riate what·]
remedy is to br applied in thr Pvent of a brcarh, the common law i:; the
only ROlli'<'<' of law to which we can look to determine what conHtitutPs
an approJwiate rem<·dy.
~

Sel•, e. g., Sperry Rand Cm·p . v. A-T-0, Inc ., 447 F . 2d 1387, 1392

(CA4 1971), cert.. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia law) ; Tlapek v.
Chevron Oil Co. , 407 F . 2cl 11:.>-n (CA8 H)("i9) (Arkan:;as la.w) ; Structural
Dynamics Nesearch Corp . v. Engineeri?!{J 111echauics Re8mrch Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102, 1120 (ED l\Jirh. 1975) (Michigan law) ; H~statement
(Se<·ond) or Agency§ 396 (e) (1958) ("Unle~R otherwise agreed, after the
termination of !he agency the agent: . . . (c) hn::; a dut.~· w account. for
profits m:tdl~ by the ::;ale or n::;c of t radr o>c·crel::; and other eonfidrntia1
inforrrmLwn, whether or not in competitiOn wit.h Lhe prineipal. •• .'') .
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tion. One of the most common is a covenant not to compete. Contrary to the majority's approach in this case, the
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary,
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an individual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable only if they
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." ·That rule,
originally laid down in the seminal case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, ·24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), requires that
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate
interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidentiality), that the employer's interest not be outweighed by the
public interest. 7 and that the covenant not be of any longer
duration or wider georaphical scope than necessary to protect
the employer's interest. 8
The Court has not persuaded me that a rule of reason
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenant to submit
Lo prepublication review. Like an ordinary employer, the
As !he court held in Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. CaR.
P916] 688, 704, the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does
not outweigh the p'ublic interest in keeping the employee in the workforce:
· " ... [A]n employer can[not] prevent his employee from using the
kill and · knowledge in his · trade or profession which he has learnt
in the course of hit:~ rmployment by means of directions or in~tructions
from the employer. That information at'ld that additional ~kill he is
entitled to use for the benefit of him~elf and the benefit of the public
who gain the ~tdvantage of his having had such admirable instruction.
The case in which the Court interferes for 'the purpose of protection is
where use is made, not of ·the skill which the man may have acquired,
hut of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to
reveal to any one elt:~e ... ."
8 See, e. g. , B1iggs v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 589 F. 2d 39, 41 (CAl
1978) (Illinois law); American Hot Rod Assn., Inc . v. Carrier, 500 .F. 2d
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina law); Alston Studios, Inc . v.
Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2rl 279, 282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia
law) ; Mixing Equipment Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F . 2d 1308,
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law) ; Water Se1·vices. Inc . v. 'l'esco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F. 2d 163, 157 (CA5 1969) (Georgia law) ; Re;;!atement
(Second ) nf Contrac t~:> § R30 (Tent. Draft No. J2, March 1977).
7

(

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

5

CIA has a vital interest in protecting certain types of information; at the same time, the CIA employee has a countervailing interest in preserving a wide range of work opportunities (including work as an author) and in protecting his
First Amendment rights. The public interest lies in a proper
accommodation that will preserve the intelligence mission of
the agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified
informatio11. Wheu the Government seeks to enforce a harsh
restriction on the employee's freedorn, 11 despite its admission
that the interest the agreement was designed to protect-the
confide11tiality of classified information-has not been compromised, an equity court might well be persuaded that the
case is not one in which the covenant should be enforced. 10
But evt>n assuming that Snepp's covenant to submit to prepublication review should be enforced, the constructive trust
imposed by the Court is not an appropriate remedy. If an
employee has used his employer's confideHtial information for
his own persm1al profit, a constructive trust over those profits
is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are
the direct result of the breach. But Snepp admittedly did
not use confidential information in his book; nor were the
eon'nan{ imposP~ a srrious prior restraint on SnPpp't'l ability to
fredy, sre mfra n. 15, and is of indPfinite duratiou and scope-'-faclor::; that. would make mo,;t ~milar eovenant~ ltnenforcf'~thlP. See, e. g.,
Alston Studius. lru·. v. Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 493 F. 2d 279,
2R3 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Virgma la.w a covenant, with no
gPogmphieal limitation) ; American 1-Iot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Canier. 500
F. 2d 1269, 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under North Carolina.
bw a rovcnant w1th no dura.tional or gPographical limit at ion) ; E. L.
Conwell & Co. v. Gutbe1·let, 429 F. 2d 527, 528 (CA4 1970) (holding void
under Maryland law a covenant with no dumtional or geographical
limitation) .
10 The Court rorreetly point~ onl that the Government may regulate
ccrt a in activit iPs of 1l~ employe<'~' tlw.t would be protect Pel by the First
Amendnwut 111 othrr eontPxt:::. Ante, at :3, 11 . :3. Hut none of the CllHCS i~
c·ites mvolved a rcquiremeut that au employee submit a propo~ed public
&tatrnwnt for prPrel<'a~c een,or::~hip or approval. The Court has not previou~ly <'OllHtdered t lw rnforerabilit~· of thi~ kind of prior rc'Htraml or lho
remedy that ;;hould br impo:sC'cl 111 thf' event of it breach,
D Tho
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profits from hi:s book in any sense a product of his failure to
submit the book for prepublication review. For, even if
Snepp had submitted the book to the agency for prepublication review, the Government's censorship authority would
surely have been limited to the excision of classified material.
In this case, theu, it would have been obliged to clear the
book for publication in precisely the same form as it now
stands. 11 Thus, Snepp has not gained any profits as a result
of his breach; the Government, rather thau Suepp, will be
unjustly enriched if he is required to disgorge profits attributable entirely to his own legitimate activity.
Despite the fact that Snepp has not caused the Govemment the type of harm that would ordinarily be remedied by
the imposition of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the
Government has suffered some harm. The Court states that
publication of "unreviewed material" by a former CIA agent
"can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the published information is unclassified." Ante, a.t 5. It then seems
to suggest that the injury in such cases stems from the
agency's illability to catch "harmful" but unclassified information before it is published. I do not believe, however, that
the agency has any authority to censor its employees' publication of unclassified information on the basis of its opinion that
publication may be "detrimental to vital national interests"
11
H he hat! ~uhmittC'd th<' book to thC' rtgency and the agency hat! rC'fu:;cd to consent to the publication of certain material in it, Snepp could
have obtained judicial review to determine whether the agency was correct in considering the material classified. See United States v. M a1'chetti,
46() F . 2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. clt>uied, 409 U. 8. lOUa. It i~
uotPworthy that the Court clop;; not di~agree with the Fourth Circuit':;
vi<·w in Marchetti, reJterated i11 Snepp, thai n CIA emplo:vP<' ha,; a Fir~t
Amendnwnt n~llt to publi:::h nnclas:-;ified information. Thu,.;, de,.;pitc its
refrrPn(·f' in footnote :3 of it~ opmion to the Government's so-called compt>lling llltPI'PHt in protecting '' tlw appearame of confidentialit~·," ante, at
3, n. 0, and de;;pitC' Home ambi~uity in the Court'~ rcfC'rPn<'e to "d<'t rilllPJJtal '' and '' lmrmful '' a~ opposPd to «rla~~ifil'd" information, ante, at
5, l do not lllld<>r:;tand tlw Court to imply that the GovemmC'nt could
obtain au lll,1\lllt'twn agaJI!H( t h<· publication of unclassified mformat ion ..
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or otherwise "identified as harmful." Ibid. The CIA never
attempted to assert such power over Snepp in either of the
co11tracts he signed; rather, the agency itself limited its censorship power to preventing the disclosure of "classified"
information. Moreover, even if such a wide-ranging prior
restraint would be good natioual security policy, I would have
great difficulty reconciling it with the demands of the First
Amemlmen t.
The Court also relies to some extent on the Government's
theory at trial that Snepp caused it harm by flouting his prepublication review obligation and thus making it appear that
the CIA was powerless to prevent its agents from publishing
any infonnation they chose to publish, whether classified or
not. rrhe Govemment theorized that this appearance of
weakness would discourage foreign governments from cooperating with the CIA because of a fear that their secrets might
also be compromised. In support of its position that Snepp's
book had in fact had such an impact, the Government illtroduced testimony by the Director of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turner, stating that Snepp's book and others like it had
jeopardized the CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence
services by making them unsure of the agency's ability to
maintain confidentiality. Admiral Turner's truncated testimony does not explain, however, whether these unidentified
"other" books actually contained classified information. 12 If
so, it is difficult to believe that the publication of a book like
12 Thfl District. Judge susta.h1ed the Government's objections lo questions concerning the identity of other agents who had published the unauthorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 136. However,
Admiral Turner did testify that the harmful materials involved "[p]rimarily the appearance in the United States media of identification of
sources and method::; of collectiug intelligf'nce . ..." Tr. 143. This type
of information is certainly confidential and is specifically the type of information that Snepp has maintainf'd he did not reveal in Decent Interval.
See, e. g., Snepp's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show,
in which he sta.ted : " ... I have made a very determined effort not to
expose sourees or methods, . • ." Government's Requests for Admissions,
Reeord Item 19.

s
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Suepp's. which uoes not reveal classified iuformation, has
significantly weakened the agency's position. Nor does it
explain whether the unidentified foreign agencies who have
stopped cooperating with the CIA have done so because of
a legitimate fear that secrets will be revealed or because they
merely uisagree with our Go~crnment's classification policies. 13
In any event, to the extellt that the Government seeks to
punish S11epp for the geuera.lized harm he has caused by
failing to submit to prepublication review and to deter others
from following in his footsteps, puuitive damages is. as the
Court of Appeals held, clearly the preferable remedy" . . .
since a constructive trust depends on the concept of unjust
enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment. See
D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 and § 4.3 at 246
(1973 )." 595 F . 2d, at 937.11
II
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari is
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits.
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunction requiring him to submit all future manuscripts for prepublication review and remanded for a determination of
whether punitive damages would be appropriate for his failure
to submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication.
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a cross1 ~ Snepp's a Horney:; were foreclos<•d from asking Admiral TurnPr wheth<•r
particular forrign sources had :;topped cooperating with Unit ed Statt>:s'
authoritlC's a;; a din•ct. result of tlw publication of Decent luterval. Tr.
138. Till!:,;, it. is ·uncll'I<Lr ~'hethPr or why foreign sources may hnvr react ed
uufnvorably to it:; publiration. HowPwr, William E. Colby , the CIA ':;
formrr Director, did indicatt> in hi~ testimony that for~1 nation:; geuerally
have a ~t nct e r ::;pcrecy code than does the UnitPd State,;. Tr. 175- 176.
14 On e of t he Court 's justification,; for tb constructive trust remedy is
that "it ('a nuot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all
proportion to hi ~ ga m.'' Ante, al 9. This solicitude for Snepp '~ welfare
i:s ratlwr irolli(' in View of the dra('onian naLure of the remedy imposed hy
the Court loday.
·
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petition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated,
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide
to grE~.nt Snepp's petition. The Government explained that
"[b] ecause the contract remedy provided by the court of appeals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency's
interet!!t, the government has not independently sought review in
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government
stated that "[i]f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petition for a
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871 , it should also grant this crosspetition. If the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this petition should also be denied." Petition, at 5.
Given the Government's position, it would be highly inappropriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction,
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's.
Yet that is in essence what has been done.1 5 The majority
obviously does not believe that Snepp's claims merit this
Court's consideration, for they are dismissed in a footnote as
manifestly "without merit." Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that
Snepp's petition would not have been granted on its own
merits.
The Court's opinion is a good demonstration of why this
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against
similar breaches of security," ante, at 7, and (b) that it might
require the Government to reveal confidential information
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might
lfi r ha V! ' heen unable t.o dio;cover any previoul:l cm;e in whirh the Court
has acted as it docs today, reaching the merits of a conditional crosspetition despite its brlief t hat the petition does not merit granting
certiorari.
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thus be left with "no remedy at all," ante, at 8. It seems
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either
ground by the Government's acquiescence in the punitive
dam~:~-ge remedy. Moreover, the second rationale ' 6 is entirely
spem-1lative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong.
The Court states that:
"Proof of the tortiou~ conduct necessary to sustain an
award of punitive damages might force the Government
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised
to protect."
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepublication review aud that the Government relied on these misrepreseutations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a
showing would require the Government to reveal any con. fidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery
into the Age11cy's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 8.

III
The uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmaking
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this
case.
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an
opportunity to appr'aise the adequacy of the punitive damage
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion
that equitable relief is necessary.
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to'
Whieh, it 8hould be noted, does not appcm anywhere in the Govern- ·
ment's 5-page cross-petitii:m ..
10
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criticize his government.17 Inherent in this prior restraint is
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority
to delay the pqblication of a critical work or to persuade an
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the demands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me
that that burden has been met.
I respectfully dissent.

17 The mere fact that the agency has the authority to review the text
of a critical book in search of clal:lSified information before it is published
is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover,
the right to delay publication until the review il:l completed is itself a form
of prior restraint that would not be tolemted in other contexts. See,
e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539. In view of the national intere~:>t
in maintaining an etfecti'"e intelligence service, I am not prepared to say
that. 1he restraint. il:l nece~:>sarily intolerable in this context. I am, however,
prepared to say tha.t, certiorari lmving been granted, the is:sue :surely
,hould not be resolved m the ahoence of full briefing and argument,.
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In No. 78- 1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) . He also contends that punitive damages are an inappropriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In
No. 79-265 , the United States conditionally cross-petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ...
publish . . . any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.t /
1

Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also

'·

~
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willful1y, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally,
the court determined as a fact thai publication of the book
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss."
I d., at 180. The District Court therefore eujoi rwrl future
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 3 ~
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed'
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the exptess written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative. 17 Pet. 6Ia.
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in ad•
vance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 4"56 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. "595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp relies primanly on t11e claim that his agreement is unenforceable'
as a prior restraint on protected speech.
When Snepp accepted employment wtth t he CIA, he voluntarily signed
the agn'<'llH'nt tlmt CXJH'c:s:;ly obligated him to :submit any proposed publication fol prior revi!:lW. lie' <!i~, not, claim that, he executed thi:; a g r /'
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
11
irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Suepp's book divulged
no classified ihtelligence. ld., at 935-936. 4 In other w o r d s , /
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material.
It therefore liinited recovery to nominal damages and to the

;.$..r ,_,..,... ~ .

~,- .
t.A..~S.-

{tct~o) j

mrnt undPr durr~,:;. Indeed, hr voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's
agreement is nn "entirely appropriate" exerci~e of the CIA Director's
statuto!':'' mandatP to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from
tmauthorized disclosure, " 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2cl, at 932.
Moreover, this Court's eas<"' 1mi'k<- clrar that~ev!:'n in the absence of an
exprpss ngr<•cment-thP CIA could have nC't<'d to prot(·et ~ub:stantial govemmrnt, intrrc::;t:.; h~ · imposing rr;t:souablc l'f'~t .rict ions ou Pmployrr activitirl'l thnt in o!hrr routrxt~ might br protec·ted by tlw Fir::;t Amt•ndmen!.
Civil SPJ'm'cp r'omm'n v. Lettet Canif'l's. 413 U. S. 548, 5f\5 (1973); :;f'{'
uckley v. Vall'o, 42-t U. B. 1, 25-2R (1976); Greer " : Spuck, 424 U. S.
828 (Hl7o): id .. ai R4.t-R+R (PowELL. J., ronrurring) ; Cole v. Richardson,
405 U . S. ()7fi ( l!l72). Thr Gowrnmrnt. hn~ n rom]wlling in!rrest in protecting both fhr ~crrPry of informn!ion important to our national ;;ecurity
and ibn llpJWnrnner of r<mficlC'Ilfiality so rssential to thP effectivE~ operation
of om for<•ign intt'lligruc<• ~rrviee. Sr(• p. 5, infra. The agreement that
Snf'pp f'ignrd if' n rpasonablP rl'ICHJJI' for protrciing t.hiR vital intrrest.
he Government'~ concession distinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
viola.te hiH agreement. not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d,
at 1313. Marchetti thcrf'forf' did not con:>ider t.he appropriate remedy for
the bteach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review. By .relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals o v / e r looked the diffe.rence between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue

in Marchetti.

·.
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possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d.,
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages. Judge Hoffman argued. were both a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust.
II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship." The trust agreement specifically itnposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting · for clearance. 7-"-.. ; ~~-.;z...f.,-~
Shepp stipulated at trial that-after underta ing this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positions of trust"
and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified
information, including information regardi11g intelligence
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178.n Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this b a c v k
ground and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously
violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublic 5 The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "1, Frank W. Snepp,
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
GoV~ernment . ..." Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of
Snepp's duties and his conceded· access to confidential sources and materials could establish a truHt relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, .J., concurring in part and · di:;senting in part). Few types of
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that.
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties
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tion review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disc~osure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to ' publish unclassified information:. Nor does
it contend-at 'this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
tha~in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agree- .....(\
ment that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
)
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital m:ltioual interests even if the pub~i~hed information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrin:1ental, he may revea:l
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the~
1 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire.
Whatever fairly ma.y be ::;aid about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its
predeces::;or the OSS) is an agency thought by every President ~ince
Franklin D . Hoosevelt to be essential to the security of the United States
and-in a st>use-the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable foreign intelligencr. See generally T . Powers.
The Man Who Kept the Secret« (1979) ,
/
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security of lnfonuation that might compromise them and
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a. CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the pffecti veness of
American i ntelligcncc operatious. "Over the last six to nine
months," he sa.id,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had ·more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
canuot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the Dis~
trict Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material-/ ' "
sIn

qu<•>'tionin~

thr forrr of Admir,d Tur·rwr'"

t<'>' fimon~ ·,

:\Tn. ,fl',.,-rrcg

~~;Ns' di~"Pnting opinimr ~·mlo at~rilmt<• th<>~ of fHrt"i~n in.t.elligetwe ,·'JTice.;; not fo th~azard~ of allowing Hn .rg('nt- likt• Snepp lo

publish whaf<'vrJ' lw plea~r~ . but. toJ!ltP CI,\'n fuilut'P te e br.•.~if:l-~
<·ltl .....ifi~l o.r (f tlw fot·Ei ~ u gtn·t t'tllll(o'ut'• di ....tgre<·meu
with onr iowt·rmwnf',-1 {'IH~~iftcation pol~ 1 81, at
:\JR . .Tu,.;TJCE:
·n:n;N;;' virw~ in tlu~ I'<'SJlf'l't not on!~· nd no ~upporl in thr n•pord ,
but. t hry abo rpfft•r t n mi~a pprrhm~ion of t hP r·otwerJl n·flc•eted h~· Admiral Tlll'lll'r',- f<'~l unony. If in fnc·t. in forma fion i~ llll<"la:<;-;ifiPd or in
the J>llblir domain, uP it h<·r t h<' CIA 11or forrign :t!(<'JH'i<·" would h<· C"oncernrd. Tlw probl!'lll i~ lo rn~urP in advanc<', ;md h~· prop<•r Jli'O<'<'Ulll'l'O',
iJ..lat. inforuwtron drtrimc•nfal to wrtional intrt'<'~ts i~ not publi"hr·d . Without n. dPJH'ndal.JI<- JH'< 'JHthli<"ation 1'!'\'iPw prorP<hm·, no intPIIig;Pn<'e ag<'JH'Y
or re:;pon~ible goverumenl oflh·inl could be a:-~ured that. au employee
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suggests that the concern of foreign intelligence
services may not be occasioned by the hazards of
allowing an agent like Snepp to publish whatever he

pleases, but

ra~ ~the

release of classified

~

information or the disagreement of foreign agencies
. h ou)\
~
w1t

"
classification policy.

Post,

at 7-8.
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rcilassified ot· not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
'harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935;
'456 F . Supp., at 180.9

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Governent's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
The Government could not pursue the only reme
privy to S('n~itive information might. not eonf'lndr on hi,.. ow -innoecntly
or othcrwi,p--t hat 11. ><hould lw di~elo:sPd to thP world.
q;'he dissm~t limls- 'Ill "ia~~hrttre ~"'01 · ·.
" >4~•· &~~· ·~~' E'!H:playl'('•·' 1
Sucpjl"
coutr~~Rt, l1owe\·cr, l'f4llJr<• · no morp tlum a deuranetc> )JroePdtltP sol~~(,
to_judicial 1'('\'i<•w. lf SnP)lp had snbmittC>d his
·. for n•view und
tlw Agener had fmUld it to <·ontain RPn~itivl:\ lURtPrial, •• W<8ttld luwt'" ~~
I hf' Agt•tw~· ~ an injnnetion ttg11in:st pnblieati~ Sre Alfred
A. nopf, /II(:. " · Coib!l , .509 F. ~d 1302 (CA4). c!·rL df~niPd, -l:.!l 1J. S.
W2 (Hl75) ; United ~lutes \ . llfan·heltl, -166 F . 2d 1309 (('A-!), <'<'ft.
~d. 409 r. s. 10oa (1972) .
9 Although both the District Court and the Comt of Appeals exprc~sly
found otherwise, MR. Jus'l'ICE S'l'EVI!:NS savs that "tlw int<'rest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract Wll.'l designed to protect has not been
compromi::1ed." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the bat~i;; of a premi:sP wholly at
odds with the rrcorcl, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agrerment and
treats its intPrclrpcndent provisions a:; if they imposPd unrelutecl obligations. MR. JusTICE STEVENS then :walogizes Snepp's prPpublication review
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to
compel{• w1th hi" employPr. Po.~t, at. 3/ A body of private law intended
to pres<•rve rotnpPtition , howevt>r, simPly ha:; no bParing on a eontract
made by tlw Direetor of t.he CIA in conformity with hi.- ~tatutory obligation to ''proterJ t] int<'lli~rnef' :-;ource" n.ud nwthod:; from unauthorized
dl"'"'"'"·" 50 u s C'. § 40.> (d)(3) .
/
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forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full
judgment of the District Court.
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UNITED STATES v. FRANK W. SNEPP, III
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COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 78-1871 and 79-265. Decided October -, 1979
PER CURIAM.

In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inappropriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit an
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. InI
No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ...
publish ... any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." Id., at 58a.1
1

Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also

2
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge cla13sifted information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. . It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would pennit the book for prepublication clea.rance. Finally,
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book '
had "caused the United States · irreparable harm and loss."
Id., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future
· breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that ·snepp had breached a valid contract. 8
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never" to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the •express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative." Pet. 61a.
2 At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about .$60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his ·publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F . Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp•s
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable
as a prior restraint on protecfed speech.
When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed
the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publication for prior review. He does not claim that he executed this agree-
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
11
irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intelligence. I d., at 935-936. 4 In other words,
the court thought that Snepp's fiduciary obligation extended
only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material.
ment under duress . Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when
he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's
agreement is an "entirely appropriate" exercise of the CIA Director's
statutory mandate to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure," 50 U . S. C. § 403 (d) (3). 595 F. 2d, at 932.
Moreover, this Court's cases make clear thair-even in the absence of an
express agreement-the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restriction s on employee activities that in other contextA might be protected by the First Amendment.
Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see
Brown v. Glines, U. S. (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1,
25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spack, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id., at. 844-848
(PowELL, J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U. S. 676 (1972) . The
Government haA a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of
information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence
service. See p. 5, infra. The agreement that Snepp signed is a reasonable
means for protecting this vital interest.
"The Government's concession distinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Governil'l.ent claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d,
at 1313. Marchetti therefore did not consider the appropriate remedy for
the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue

in Marchetti.
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It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the
possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d.,
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust.
11

Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that ·he was·
entering a trust relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting the information for
clearance. Snepp stipulatea at trial that-after undertaking
this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positions of
trust" and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified information, including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178. 6 'Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously
G The first sentence of the '1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp,
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
Gov•ernment . . . ." Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types of
·· governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that, in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the
Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servil'e. Whatever fairly may be sajd about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be essential to the security of the United States
and-in a sense--the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defrnse without the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers,
The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1979).
7
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security of information that might compromise them and
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
"we have had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material8 In questioning the force of Admiral Turner's testimony, MR. JusTICE
STEVENS' dissenting opinion suggPsts that the concern of foreign intelligence
services may not be occaf>ioned by the hazards of allowing an agent like
Snepp to publish whatever he pleases, but by the relrase of classified
information or simply the disagreemrnt of foreign agencies with our Government's classification policy. Post, at 7-8. MR. JusTICE STEVENs'
views in this respect not only find no support in the record, but they
also reflect a misapprehension of the concern reflected by Admiral
Turner's testimony. If in fact information is uncla:::sified or in the
public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be concerned.
The problem is to ensure in advance, and by proper procedures, that
information detrimental to national interest is not published. Without a dependable prepublication review procedure, no intelligence agency
or responsible government official could be assured that an employee
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dassified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935;
456 F. Supp., at 180.0
III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
privy to sensitive information might not conclude on his own-innocently
or otherwise-that it should be disclosed to the world.
Tho dissent argues that the Court is allowing the CIA to "censor" its
employees' publications. !d., at 6-7. Sncpp's contract, however, requires
no more than a clearance procedure ~ubject to judicial review. If Snepp,
in compliance with his cont.ract, had submitted his manuscript for review
and the Agency had found it to contain sensitive material, presumablyif one accepts Snepp's pre~ent assertion of good intentions-an effort
would have been made to eliminate harmful disclosures. Absent agreement in this respect, the Agency would have borne the burden of seeking
an injunction against publication. See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby,
509 F. 2d 1362 (CA4), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly
found otherwise, MR. JusTICE STEVENS says that "the interest in confidentiality that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been
compromised." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at
odds with the record, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and
treats its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated obligations. MR. JusncE STEVENS then analogizes Snepp's prepublication review
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to
compete with his employer. Post, at 3-5. A body of private law intended
to preserve competition, however, simply has no bearing on a contract
made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to "protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure." 50 U. S. C. § 403 (d)(3).
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The Government could not pursue the only remedy that
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
-This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 11 It deals fairly with both parties by con1 0 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggest s that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
·damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F . 2d., at 940.
·· The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a m atter of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937. 938.
11 See id., at 939 (Hoffman, J ., concurring in part and dissent ing in part) .
MR. Jusn cE STEVENS concedes that , even in the absence of a writ ten
contract, an employee has a fidu ciary obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during t he course of his employment. Post, at 3.
·H e also concedes t hat all personal profits gained from the exploitation of
·such information are impressed wit h a construct ive t rust in favor of the
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common
law would not t reat information as "confident ial" unless it were "classified."
See, e. g., post, at 3. We have t hought that the common-law obligation
was considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 396 (c) , 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958);
V Scott on Trusts § 505 ( 1967). But since t his case involves the breach
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forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full
judgment· of the District Court.
So ordere-d.

of a t rust agreement that specifically required t he prepublication review
of all information about the employer, we need not look t.o the common
law to determine t he scope of Snepp's fiduciary obligation.

1.
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INSERT B
In deprecating Admiral Turner's testimony, the dissent
declares that damage to our Nation's ability to cooperate with
foreign intelligence services "must be accepted as an inevitable
byproduct of the exercise of First Amendment riqhts by government
employees."

Post, at 6-7.
_...._

This statement totally iqnores the

cases in which we have held that the Government can restrict its
employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights in order to
protect substantial qovernment interests.

See note 3, sopra.

One

should have thouqht that those precedents applied with special
force to a CIA aqent who had access to sensitive intelliqence.
any event, the dissent's statement is scarcely relevant in light
of the express obligation that Snepp voluntarily undertook as a
condition of his employment with the CIA.
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Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at odds with the record,
the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and treats its
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PER CURIAM.

In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inappropriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In
No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ...
publish ... any information or material relating to the
Agency, its .activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." !d., at 58a.r
1

Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also.
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge cl<usified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
Snepp's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency.2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978) . The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally,
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss."
f d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 3
I

executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "never,' to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the express written consent of the Dmctor of Central
Intelligence or his representative.,, Pet. 61a.
2 At the time oi suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties ·
and other pote11tial profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978) .
3 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari,
• nepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable··
a a prior restraint on protected speech.
When ~nepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed
t he agreement that expre;;::;ly obligated him to submit any proposed publi~
catio n fm ])l'ior .review. He· doos not claim. that he cxeeuted this agree--·
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It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
"irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
11ational security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
t,he court upheld the injunction against future violations of
, '11epp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a con·tructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that SHepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Government's concessionfor the purposes of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intelligeuce. I d., at 935-936. 4 In other words,
the court thought that Suepp's fiduciary obligation extended
only to preRerving the confidentiality of classified material.
nwnt under dnrE'S>'. liH.lN•d, he ,·oluntanly reaffirmed hi~ obligation when
he left 1lw Ag!'tlcy. WE' agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp's
n~n·enwn1 iH an ''mtirely np]Jropriatr" exerci~e of the CIA Director's
sfatH!ot-:; manda tc· to " prot <'C[ t] intelligence sources and methods from
HnauthorizPd di~closlll'P," 50 U. S. C. § 40:3 (d) (3) . 595 F. 2d, at 932.
1\ltH'<•owr, thi" Co11r!'::< ea:;es make clear that~rwn in thE' ab~t·nce of an
oxprP.RS agr('enu·nt-tlw CIA eoulcl havr acted to protPc1 ~ubHtantml govt•nlm<•nt infpn·~t,; hy impo,;ing rE'fuionabll• rp::;triction~ on employee artivifiP.~ that in otlwr context<' might 'bl• protPcted by thr .Fir::;t Amrnclmrnt.
('i1 •il ::lel·uice ( 'omm'n v. Letter Carl'iens, 41:3 LT. S. 54~, 565 (HJ7a); sre
HnJ!I'n 1. Uliw's. F . S. (HJHO); Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U. S. 1, \
2,)-~S (10/(i) : Oret'l' , .. Spock , 4:24 U . 8. 82S (1!:17()) ; id., at. 844--848
( l'owELL • •1., concurring): C'ole v. Rir·hardso11, 405 U. S. 676 (1972 ). The
Gon•r·nmPnf ha M a ('Ompelling in!Prc•;;(. in protecting both tlw ~Pcn~cy of
information important. to our national ,.;pcurit.y and t.he appearanec of conf.illl·ntiality ~o P~Pntial to tlw rffretin· operation of our forE>ign intelhgence
~en·i<·<· . ~<'<' p . 5, i11jra. Thr agn•(•mpnt tha.t. Snepp :;igned i:s n rea:sonuble
Jllf•:HJ,; for proft>('ting !.hi,; \'ita! intcre:;t..
4 The GovernmE'nt's concession distinguished this case from United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4) , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) .
There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d,
at 1313. Marchetti therefore did not consider the appropriate remedy for
the brcRch of an agreement to submit all material for prepublication
review . By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals over~
looked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issue

in Marchetti.
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It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the
possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
r0fusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote. "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." I d.,
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a con' tructive trust.
II
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
en tcring a trust relationship. 5 The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting the information for \
clearance. Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking
this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positions of
trust" and that he had been granted "frequent access to classifi'eu information , including information regarding intelligence
ources and methods." 456 F. Supp., at 178. 6 Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously
:; The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp,
liT, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence
;\grncy, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
Government . .. ." Pet. 58a.
·
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of
nepp's dtHies and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hofflllan , J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . Few types of
governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that.
repo ed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principlenepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that, in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Keither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital natioJtal interests even if the published inform'ation is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what Inay expose classified information and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
t·eceiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the
7 Every major nation in the world has an intelligence servire.
Whatever fairly rna) Le ~aid about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its
prPdeces;;or the OSS) is an agency thought by every Pre:;Jdcnt since
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be e;;;;ential to the security of the United States
aml-in a ;;em;e--the frer world. It i:; impossible for a government wisely
lo make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See g~nerall:y T . Powers•.
'1~he Man Who Kepi the Secrets (197.9}.
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security of information that might compromise them and
evell endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Uudisputcd evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CJ A, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
"we h$Ve had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8

T11 view of this and other evidence in the record, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his materialsIn questioning the force of Admiral

Turner'::~

testimony,

MR ..JusTICE

i'l'l't~v~;m,;' dis:;enting opinion suggests that the concern of for<,ign intelligence

I

lit'rvi1·es may not. be oceasiOJwd by the hazard:; of allowing UJ1 agent like
Rw·pp to publish whatever he please:;, but br the relt•a:se of cla:ssified
information or :simply the disagreement of foreig11 agencirs with our Gov('rlllllPJJt',: <'la:<:oinration policy. Post, at. 7-8. MR. .JusTICE STEVENs'
\'ii'Wf' in thi::; re:spect not only find no support in the record, but they
:d~o n•Hect. a misaP})rehen~;ion of the concern reflected by Admiral
TtH'IH'r':s te~timon)·. lf in faet information is unelasoified or in the
public· dom«in, nc>itlH'r tho CJA nor foreign agenci<'t~ would 'be concerned.
Tho prol>lc'lll i;; to ensll!'(' in advance, and by proper proc('dure:s, tha.t
iuformation dc>t rimental to national interest is not publiHh<'d. Without. :o d<'pendahle prPpublication review procedure, no intelligl'Hce agency
or n·HpousJhle government oflicial could be a:;:mred that m1 employee'
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935;
456 F. Supp., at 180.9

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Tndeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquanti:fiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
privy to sen:>itivt• informution might not conclude on hil- owu-innocently
or ot.herwi::;<~that it. should lw disclo;;ed to the world .
The di&;ent. argues thal the Court. is allowing the CIA to "cen,;or" its
c•mployre:;' publication:,. ld., nt 6-7. Sn<:>pp';; eontract, however, requires
110 more than a cl<•aratH'P procrclur<:> ~ubject to judicial revirw. If Snrpp,
in eomplian<·<• with hi;; cont rue(, had ,;ubmittcd hi,.; mami:>cript. for review
and the Agency had found it, to contain sensitive mat<:>rial, pr<•sumablyif one acc•l'pt,.; Hnepp's pre><Pnt a:-:sertion of good intention;;-an effort
would htLv<:> be<·n madr to eliminate harmful disclo:>ure,;. AbsPut agreenH·nt in thi~ rP:<pl'et, the Agrncy would have bonw the burdrn of ~Peking
an iujmwtiOII again~t publication. Sec• Alfred A. Knopf, Inc . v. Colby,
509 F. 2d 1:m2 (C'A4), <·<>rt. deniPd, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); Umted States
v. Marchetti , .!(\() F. 2d 1:309 (CA4), cert.. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
9 Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly
fuund otherwisP, Mn. Ju::;ucE STEVEN::; says that " the interest in confidentiali1y that Snrpp'::; contract wa::: designed 1o protect has not been
compromi~ed." Post, at 1-2. Thus, on the ba~i::; of a premi~c wholly at
odds with the recorcl, the di15sent bifurcates Snepp':,; 1968 agreement and
treats it~:~ in1erdependent provision,; as if they irnpo:::ed unrelated obligations. Ma. JusTICE S'l'JWENS then mmlogizes Snepp's prepublication review
agreement with the Government to a private employee's covenant not to
l'umpete with hi::; employer. Post, at 3-5. A body of private law intended
Lo prellerw competition, however, :::imply ha::; no bearing on a contract
tnade by thu Dirertor of thu CIA in conformity with hi" st<ttntory obligat iou to "1 1rotee Lt j intelligrnce :>omces <Uld methods from 1111au thonzcd'
di:Sclo::>ure"" 50 U. S. C. § 40:! (ct:) ';$).
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The Government could not pursue the only remedy that
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant ~o elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency's highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust.ll It deals fairly with both parties by con10 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940.
The Court ot Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law
thnL the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will sUpport an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 93793 .
n Sec id., at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
MH. JusncE S'l'EVEN"s concedes that, evel'l in the absence of a written
coll1'ract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3.
fie also concedes that aii personal profits gained from the exploitation of
l: lllrh information are ib:l.pressed with a con~tructive trust in favor of the
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common
Ia w would not treat information as "confidential" unless it were "classified."
Sec, e. g.. post, at 3. We have thought that the common-law obligation
was Ponsiderably more expansive. See, e. g ., Restatement (Second) of
Agcney §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958);
V S<·ntt on Trn:;ts § 505 (1967.) . But siuee this case involve;; the breach•.
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forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to dctrr those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
b1·each, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
coutribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a coustructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full
judgment of the District Court.

o ordered.

of a tru:4 u~rt>Pment that specifically required the pr<·publication review
of all information about the employer, w<• need not look to the common
law to determine the scope of Snepp':; fiduciary obligution.
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PER CuRIAM.

In No. 78-1871, Frank W. Snepp, III, seeks review of a
judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he
accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA ). He also contends that punitive damages are an inappropriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all
writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In
No. 79- 265, the United States conditionally cross-petitions
from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to
Snepp's breach are impressed with a constructive trust. We
grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgment from which both parties seek relief.

I
Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published
a book ~bqut certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp
published the account without submitting it to the Agency
for prepublication review. As an express condition of his
employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had
executed an agreement promising that he would "not ...
publish ... any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activites or intelligence activites generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval of the Agency." Pet. 59a. The
promise was an integral part of Snepp's concurrent undertaking "not to disclose any classified information relating
to the Agency without proper authorization." Id., at 58a. 1
1

Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also
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Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information
and not to publish any information without prepublication
clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce
SnepJ: 's agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had
breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order
imposing a constructive trust for the Government's benefit
on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book
in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. 2
The District Court found that Snepp had "willfully, deliberately and surreptitously breached his position of trust with
the CIA and the [19681 secrecy agreement" by publishing his
book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F.
Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The court also found that
Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he
would permit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally,
the court determined as a fact that publication of the book
had "caused the United States irreparable harm and loss."
!d., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future
breaches of Snepp's agreement and imposed a constructive
trust on Snepp's profits.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District
Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. 8
executed a "termination secrecy agreement." That document reaffirmed
his obligation "neYer" to reveal "any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public
by CIA ... without the express written consent of the Director of Central
Intelligence or his representative.>• l?et. 61a.
2 At the time ot suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties
and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 1'79 (ED Va. 1978).
8 The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp's
defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934
(CA4 1979) ; 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition ior certiorari,
Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable
as a prior restraint on protected speech.
When Snepp accepted employmrnt with the CIA, he voluntarily signed
the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publica'tion for prior 'review. He does not claim that ·he executed this agree-

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

3

It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp's failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted
11
irreparable harm" on intelligence activities vital to our
national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus,
the court upheld the injunction against future violations of
Snepp's prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court's perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish
unclassified information and the Governrr.ent's concessionfor the purposps of this litigation-that Snepp's book divulged
no classified intelligence. !d., at 935-936. 4 In otl>er words,
the court thought that Snepp 's fiduciary obligation extended
only to ureserving the collfidentiality of classified material.
ment nndrr durPH~. lTlch·rd, Jw ,·oluntaril.'· rraiiirmrd his obligation when
he lrft tlw .\f!:<'TH'~·. We> :tl!n'<' ll'ith tlw Court of AppPal~ that Snepp's
agrrrmc>nt i~ nn "Plltll'l·l~· :tp[n·opriatt>" <'xc>rri~r of the CIA Director's
statutory mandntc· to " protc•c·l t] intC'JligPncc· ~omcc>< and methods from
tmauthon zc·d di~<·lo~mc·," .10 r . fj_ C. § 40:~ (d) (:3). 595 F. 2d, at 932.
l\for!'on'r. till" Court·, <·:t~c·~ mnk<' l'l<'ar tlwt-<'YC'n in thC' ubsC'nce of an
exprr~~ :tgrP<'Illl'lll-1 h<· ( ' l.\ <"<ndd han' ac·t!'d to protret ~ub:-<tantial govrrmllC'nl. int<·rc·,-1~ h~ illlpo,-iu'" rP:L>'OII:thl<' rP~tril'tiou" on C'mployer activiti~ that in oiiH·r c·ouft·xJ, might ))(' JH'OtPI'tNl b~· thl' Fir~t Amrndment.
Ci1•il Sert•ir'<' ('r1111111'" ' T.('/t(l' ('urrier~<. -na F. S. 548, 5G5 (Hl73); see
B1'ou·n '. {;linr'H. r. ~- - (1980): Buckley " · Yoleo, 424 U. S. 1,
25-28 (l!liGl: Orr·1·1' Y. Spud. -1:2-t U. 8. S:2S (Hli6): id., at 844-848
(PowELL , J ., c·otH'Ilt'l'in).!:): ('ole \'. Rirhal'd.~o/1. 405 F. S. fi76 (1972). The
Gon•rnmrnt h<t" :1 t·onlpPIIin).!: intN!',:t in profcoding: hoth the :secrecy of
inform;dion importnnl to our n;tlional ''<'r\lrit~· aud the npprnrnnce of confidt·ntiali t~· "o C'~,.c·nlial to tlu· !'fT<•C'tin• oprr;ilion of onr forC'ign intelligence
~rn·i<'e. Rc•f' p. G, i11jro. ThP agrr<'TD<'Ill that Sncpp signed i:; a rea;:;onable
mr:m-; for prol<·<·ting t hi,: 1·il al int Pn•,:f".
4 The Governmrnt.'s concesswn di~tinguished this case from United States
v. Ma1'chetti, 466 F . 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
There, the Government rlaimcd that a former CIA employee intended to
violate his agrcrmrnt not to puhli:-<h an.v classified information. 466 F . 2d,
at 1313. M nrch,tti thrrpforc did not ronRidrr the appropriate remedy for
the breach of an agreemrnt to submit all material for prepublication
review. By relying on Marchetti in this case, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp's breach and the violation at issuein Marchetti.
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It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the
possibility of punitive damages if the Government-in a jury
trial-could prove tortious conduct.
Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the
refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he
wrote, "was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary
relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA." /d.,
at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp's undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative
and inappropriate remedy for Snepp's breach. We agree with
Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation
and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust.
II

Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was
entering a trust relationship. 6 The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information
relating to the Agency without submitting the information for
clearance. Snepp stipulated at trial that-after undertaking
this obligation-he had been "assigned to various positions of
trust" and that he had been granted "frequent access to classified information, including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods." . 456 F. Supp., at 178. 6 Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitously
G The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: "I, Frank W. Snepp,
III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the
Government ... ." Pet. 58a.
6 Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of
Snepp's duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types of
governmental employment inYolve a higher degree of trust than that
reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's duties.
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violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with
which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon
whether his book actually contained classified information.
The Government does not deny-as a general principleSnepp's right to publish unclassified information. Nor does
it contend-at this stage of the litigation-that Snepp's book
contains classified material. The Government simply claims
that, in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to
publish would compromise classified information or sources.
Neither of the Government's concessions undercuts its claim
that Snepp's failure to submit to prepublication review was a
breach of his trust.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found
that a former intelligence agent's publication of unreviewed
material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental
to vital national interests even if the published information is
unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal
information that the CIA-with its broader understanding of
what may expose classified information and confidential
sources-could have identified as harmful. In addition to
receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled
sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence
services of friendly nations 7 and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the
Every major nation in the world has an intelli~ence servil'e. Whatever fairly may be said about >'omc of its pasl activities, lhe CIA (or its
predecessor the OSS) is an agency thought by every President since
Franklin D. Roosevelt to be e~sent ial to the security of the United States
and-in a sense--the frPe world . It i,; impossible for a government wisely
to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers,
The Man Who Kept t11e Secrets (1979}.
7

SNEPP v. UNITED STATEa

security of information that might compromise them and
even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.
Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent's
violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency
for prepublication review impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp's book and
others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of
American intelligence operations. "Over the last six to nine
months," he said,
uwe h~ve had a number of sources discontinue work with
us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very
nervous about continuing work with us. We have had
very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligetlee services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I
cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or
liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us." 456
F. Supp., at 179-180.8
In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp's
breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material8 In questioning the force of Admiral Turner'~ testimony, MR. JusTICE
STEVENs' di,;:;(•nting opinion ~ngge:;t::; that the concern of foreign intelligence
services may not be ocrR:<ionPd by the hazard:; of allowing an agent. like
Snepp to publish whatever hr pleases. but by the relea<;e of cla&;ified
information or Himply the di:;agrrement of forrign Hgencie,; with our Government's cla.-;:,;ification policy. Post, at 7-8. MR. .JusncE STEVENS'
views in thi~ rrspcct not only find no support. in the record, but they
also reflf>ct a misapprrhrn><ion of tlJP concern reflectrd by Admiral
TurnPr's tc~timony. If in fact information is uncla~sified or in the
public domain, 1wither the CIA nor foreign agf>ncie.s would be concerned.
The problem i,; to rnHure iu advance. and by proper procedures, that
information detrimental to national intPrt.>st is not publi::;hed. Without a dt.>pendable prepublication review procedure, no intelligence agency
or resptmsihle govennnen t official could be as::mred that an employoo
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classified or not-for prepublication clearance has irreparably
harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935;
456 F . Supp., at 180.9

III
The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government
the most appropriate remedy for Snepp's acknowledged wrong.
Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the
Government with no reliable deterrent against similar
breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp's generally
are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if
recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government's irreparable loss or Snepp's unjust gain.
privy to ~Pn~itive information might not conclude on his own-innocently
or otherwise-! hat it. should be disrlo~rd to the world.
The cli,-sPnt argurs that the Court. is allowing the CIA to "censor" its
employee's' pul>lieaiion.". !d .. nt (i-7. Snepp'::; cont ra ct , however, requires
no more than a eiParam•c• prorrdure :'ubject to judicial rrview. If Snepp,
in compliame with his contract., had :,;ubmitt rd hi:; manu::;cript. for review
and the Agrncy had found it to conta in ::;en::;itive material, J1resumablyif one ac·c•ppts Snc'pp';: pre:'('llt a~;,.l:' r tion of good intrntion::;-an effort
would have bc•c•n madP to l'limina te harmful di:,;clo::;ure;;. Ab~ent agreement. in thi,; I'P:'prrt., the Ag<'m~· would have borne the bu rden of seeking
an inj unction against publieation . See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby,
509 F. 2d 13(i2 (CA-1), eert. tlrniPd, 421 U. S. 9H2 ( 1975) ; United States
v. Marchetti, 4()6 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), rPrt. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) .
9 Although both the Di::;trict Cou rt and the Court of Appeals expressly
found otherwise, l\JH. JUi:>TICE STgvENS says that "the interest in confidentiality that Snrpp's contract was designed to protect has not been
compromised." Post. at 1-2. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at
odd:; with the record, the dissent bifurcates Snepp's 1968 agreement and
treats its interdPpendent provi:;ions as if they impo:;ed unrelated obligations. MR. JusTICE STEVEN:; then analogize· Snepp's prepublication review
agreement with the Governmrnt to a private employee's covenant not to
compete with hi:; rmployer. Po8l, at 3-5. A body of private law intended
to preserve competition, however, f'imply has no bearing on a contract
made by the Director of the CIA in conformi ty with hi:; statutory obligation to "protec[t] intelligence .sources and method:; from unauthorized
disclosure." 50 U.S. C. §403 (d)(3).
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The Government could not pursue the only remedy that
the Court of Appeals left it 10 without losing the benefit of
the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proaf of the tortious conduct
necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force
the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that
Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a
jury if the defendant RO elects, would subject the CIA and its
officials to probing discovery into the Agency,s highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk.
In a letter introduced at Snepp's trial, former CIA Director
Colby noted the analogous problem in ctitnitutl cases. Existing law, he stated, "requires the revelation in open court of
confirming or additional information of such a nature that the
potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution." Pet. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its
remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at aii.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the
Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks.
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a
breach of trust. 11 it deais fairiy with both parties by con•
10 Judge Hoffman's dissent suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit ifi a State that allows punitive
damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F . 2d ., at 940.
The Court of Appeals ina]ority, howevei', held as a ffiattt\r of federal law
that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937938.
11 See id., at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS concedes that, even in the absence of a written
contract , an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential
information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 3.
He al~o concedes that ali j:wr~onal profits gained froln the exploitation of
such information are imprc~srd with a constructive trust in favor of the
employer. Post, at 5. In this case, he seems to think that the common
law would not treat information as "confidential;' unless it were "classified.''
See, e. g., post, at 3. We have thought that the common-law obligation
was considerably more expan::;ive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958);
V Scott on Tni::;t:S § 505 (1967). But ::;iuce thi~ case involve~ the breach
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forming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent
secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear
of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in
violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his
faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored
to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk.
And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the
breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the
Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may
contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it refused to
impose a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and we remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full
judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

of a trust agreement that specifically required the prepublication review
of all information about t he employer, we need not look to the common
law to determine the scope of Snepp 's fiduciary obligation.
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MR. JusTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In 1968 Frank W. Snepp signed an employment agreement
with the CIA in which he agreed to submit to the agency
any information he intended to publish about it for prepublication review. 1 The purpose of such an agreement, as the
Fourth Circuit held, is not to give the CIA the power to censor
its employees' critical speech, but rather to ensure that classified, nonpublic information is not disclosed without the
Agency's permission. United States v. Snepp, 595 F. 2'd 926,
932 (CA4 1979); see also United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.
2d 1309, 1317 (CA4 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063.
In this case Snepp admittedly breached his duty to submit
the manuscript of his book, Decent Interval, to the CIA for·
prepublication review. However, the Government has conceded that the book contains no classified, nonpublic materiaP Thus, by defi-nition, the interest in confidentiality1 Snepp also signed a termination agreement in 1976 in which he made
substantially the same commitment.
2 In response to an interrogatory asking whether it contended that
11
• • • Decent Interval contains classified information or any information
concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA,"
the Government stated that "rfJor the purpose of this action, plaintiff does
not so contend." Record ' Item No. 24, p. 14. Because of this concession,
the district judge sustained-the Government's objections to defense efforts
to determine whether D ecent Interval in fact contains information that·
the Government considers classified. See, e. g., the testimony of Admiral
Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, Tr. 135; and of Herbert Hetu;
the CIA's Director of Public Affairs, Tr. 153.
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that Snepp's contract was designed to protect has not been
compromised. Nevertheless, the Court today grants the Government unprecedented and drastic relief in the form of a
constructive trust over the profits derived by Snepp from the
sale of the book. Because that remedy is not authorized by
any applicable law and because it is most inappropriate for
the Court to dispose of this novel issue summarily on the
Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari, I respectfully dissent.
I
The rule of law the Court announces today is not supported
by statute, by the contract, or by the common law. Although
Congress has enacted a number of criminal statutes punishing
the unauthorized dissemination of certain types of classified
infonnation, 3 it has not seen fit to authorize the constructive
trust remedy the C'ourt creates today. Nor does either of the
contracts Snepp signed with the agency provide for any such
remedy in the event of a breach. 4 'The Court's per curiam
opinion seems to suggest that its result is supported by a
blend of the law of trusts a11d the law of contracts. 5 But
8 See, e. g.. lR U . S. C. § 798, which imposes a prison term of 10 years
and a SIO,OOO fine for knowingly and willfully publishing certain types of
clas::;ified infonna1ion ; 1R U. S. C. § 794. which makes it a criminal offense
punishable by life in prison to communicate national defense information
to a foreign government: and 5 U. S. C. § 8312, which withdraws the
righ t to govrrnment retiremrni benefitH from a per:son convicted of violating these statutes. See also Exec. Order No. 12065, 50 U. S. C. § 401,
which provides admiui;;trative ~anction s, including discharge, against emplo~·rrR who publi~h ela~:>ified informntion. Tim;;, pvcn in t·hp ab~cnce of
a cou::;tructivr tru~t rmwdy, nn agrnt likr Snepp would hardly be free, as
the majority ::;uggc>~t~, "to publish wl1nt(•vrr hr piPa~rs." Aute, at 6, n . 8.
4 In both his original employme11t agreement and the termination agreement Snepp acknowledgrd the criminal penaltie;:; that might attach to any
publication of classified information. In his employment agreement he
also agreed that a breach of the agreement would be cause for termina.tion of his employment. No other remedies were mentioned in either
agreement.
5 In a footnote, see aute, :t! f:-0. 11. 11, 1he Court ~uggr~t~ 1hat it need not
look to the common law to ~upport it,.; holding bccau>'e the <'ase involves a
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neither of these branches of the common law supports the
imposition of a constructive trust under the circumstances of
this case.
Plainly this is not a typical trust situation in which a settlor has conveyed legal title to certain assets to a trustee for
the use and benefit of designated beneficiaries. Rather, it is
an employment relationship in which the employee possesses
fiduciary obligations arising out of his duty of loyalty to his
employer. One of those obligations, long recognized by the
common law even in the absence of a written employment
agreement, is the duty to protect confidential or "classified"
information. If Snepp had breached that obligation, the common law would support the implication of a constructive trust
upon the benefits derived from his misuse of confidential
information. 6
But Snepp did not breach his duty to protect confidential
information. Rather, he breached a contractual duty, imposed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality, to
obtain prepublication clearance. In order to justify the imposition of a constructive trust, the majority attempts to
equate this contractual duty with Snepp's duty not to disclose, labeling them both as "fiduciary." I find nothing in
the common law to support such an approach.
Employment agreements often •contain covenants designed
to ensure in various ways that an employee fully complies
with his duty not to disclose or misuse confidential informawritten ro11tracl. Hut, li1u~mueh a ~ tlw contract it:;rlf cloPs not state what
remedy i;; to be applied in the pvmt of 11 breach, thP common law is the
only sourer of law to which we can look to determine what constitutes
an appro]Jrintr rPmcdy .
6
See, e. g., Sperry Rand Corp . v. A-T-0, Inc., 447 F . 2d 1387, 1392
(CA4 1971), eert. denied, 405 U. S. 1017 (Virginia law); Tlapek v.
Chevron Oil Co., 407 F. 2d 1129 (CAS 19o9) (Arkansas law); Structural
Dynamics Research Corp. ,.. Enginee1ing Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102, 1120 (ED Mich. 1975) (Michigan law); Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 396 (c) (195~) ("Unless otherwise agreed, a.fter the
termination of the agency the agrnt: ... (c) has a duty to account for
profits made by the sale or u:>e of trade secrets and other confidential
inforxnation, wheU1er or not in competition with the principal.•••").
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tion. One of the most common is a covenant not to com~
pete. Contrary to the majority's approach in this case, the
courts have not construed such covenants broadly simply
because they support a basic fiduciary duty; nor have they
granted sweeping remedies to enforce them. On the contrary,
because such covenants are agreements in restraint of an individual's freedom of trade, they are enforceable only if they
can survive scrutiny under the "rule of reason." That rule,
originally laid down in the seminal case of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711), requires that
the covenant be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate
interest of the employer (such as an interest in confidentiality), that the employer's interest not be outweighed by the
public interest, 7 and that the covenant not be of any longer
duration or wider geographical scope than necessary to protect
the employer's interest. 8
The Court has not persuaded me that a rule of reason
analysis should not be applied to Snepp's covenant to submit
to prepublication review. Like an ordinary employer, the
As the court held in Herbm·t Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, 1 App. Cas.
[1916] 688, 704, the employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does
not outweigh the public interest in keeping the employee in the workforce:
1
' • • • [A]n employer canrnot] prevent his employee from using the
skill and knowledge in hi~; trade or profession which he has learnt
in the course of hi:s employment by means of directions or instructions
from the employer. That information and that additional skill he is
entitled to use for the benefit of himself and the benefit of the public
who gain the advantftge of his having had such admirable instruction.
The case in which the Court. interferes for the purpose of protection is
where use is made, not of the skill which the man may have acquired,
but of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no right to
reveal to any one else .... "
8 See, e. g., B1iggs v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 589 F. 2d 39, 41 (CAl
1978) (Illinoi~; law); Ame1ican Hot Rod Assn., Inc. v. Cm·rier, 500 F. 2d
1269, 1277 (CA4 1974) (North Carolina la.w); Alston Studios, Inc. v.
Lloyd V. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2d 279, 282 (CA4 1974) (Virginia
law); Mixing Equipment Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc ., 436 F. 2d 1308,
1312 (CA3 1971) (New York law); Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F. 2d 163, 167 (CA5 1969) (Georgia law); Restatement,
(Second) of Contracts § 330 (Tent. Draft No. 12, March 1977).
7

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES

5

CIA has a vital interest in protecting certain types of information; at the same time, the CIA employee has a countervailing interest in preserving a wide range of work opportunities (including work as an author) and in protecting his
First Amendment rights. The public interest lies in a proper
accommodation that will preserve the intelligence mission of
the agency while not abridging the free flow of unclassified
information. When the Government seeks to enforce a harsh
restriction on the employee's freedom, 11 despite its admission
that the interest the agreement was designed to protect-the
confidentiality of classified information-has not been compromised, an equity court might well bE' persuaded that the
case is 110t one in which the covenant should be enforced.10
But ewn assuming that Snepp's covenant to submit to prepublication review should be enforced, the constructive trust
imposed by thC' Court is not an appropriate remedy. If an
employee has used his employer's co11fidential information for
his own personal profit. a constructive trust over those profits
is obviously an appropriate remedy because the profits are
the direct result of the breach. But Snepp admittedly did
not use confidential information in his book; nor were the
8 The covrnant impo~f'~ n s<'riou,; prior restraint on Snepp's ability to
spea.k fret•ly, set" iufra n. 15, and is of imiE>finite dnrntion Hnd scopefactor::; that. would makr most ,;imilar covenants mwnforecablt'. Src, e. g.,
Alston Studios. Inc. v. Lloyd l'. Giess & Associates, 492 F. 2d 279,
283 (CA4 1974) (holding void nnder Virgina b~w a. covenant with no
geogra.phieal limitation) ; American Hot Rod Assn., Inc. "· Carrier, 500
F. 2d 1269, 1279 (CA4 1974) (holding void under Notih Carolina
law a covenant with no dur<1tional or geographical limitation); E. L.
Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F. 2d 527, 528 (CA4 1970) (holding void
under Maryland law a covenant with no durational or geographical
limitation).
10 The Court rorrrctl:v point;, out that the Government. may regulate
certain activi!it's of it~ emplo)·re~ tha.t would be protected by the First
Amendmeut, in otll('r rontrx1,:. A11tc. at 3, n. 3. Bnt none of the ca.~es it
cite::; involvt:d a r('quirPmeu1 that an C'mployec submit all propo~ed public
statC'ment~ for prerrlra~e rPn~orship or approval. The Court has not previously COIL.~iderE'd thr enforceabilit)· of thi;; kind of prior re::;traint or the
remedy that showd. he impo,:ed in the event of 1~ breach.
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profits from his book in any sense a product of his failure to
submit the book for prepublication review. For, even if
Snepp had submitted the book to the agency for prepublication review, the Government's censorship authority would
surely have been limited to the excision of classified material.
In this case. then. it would have been obliged to clear the
book for publication in precisely the same form as it now
stands. 11 Thus, Snepp has not gained any profits as a result
of his breach; the Government. rather than Snepp, will be
unjustly enriched if he is required to disgorge profits attributable entirely to his own legitimate activity.
Despite the fact that Snepp has not caused the Government the type of harm that would ordinarily be remedied by
the impositioll of a constructive trust, the Court attempts to
justify a constructive trust remedy on the ground that the
Government has suffered some harm. The Court states that
publication of "unreviewrd material" by a former CIA agent
"can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the published information is unclassified." Ante, at 5. It then seems
to suggest that the injury in such cases stems from the
agency's inability to catch "harmful" but unclassified information before it is published. T do not believe, however, that
the agency has any authority to censor its employees' publication of unclassified information on the basis of its opinion that
publication may be "detrimental to vital national interests'~
11 If he had ~uLmii t('(l llw hook to the agency and the agency had refused to con:.:ent to the public·ation of certain material in it, Snepp could
have obtained judicial review to determine whether the agency was correct in considering the material elnssificd. See United States v. 'M ar·chetti,
466 F . 2d 18mJ, 1:317 (CM H.li:Z) , tPrt. dt·nied, 409 U. S. 1063. It is
noteworthy that the Colll't dot•,; not d.i:.:agrre with the Fourth Circuit'~
view in Jfarrhl!tti. reiterated in 8ue]Jp, that a CIA employee hn;; a First
AmendmC'Ilt right to publi ~ h uncla:.::.:ifird information. Thu~, de:spite its
refereuC'r in footnote 3 or it~ opiniou to the C:ovrrnment '~ :so-railed compelling int<•rf"'t in protediu11: "the• appeamnrc of ronfideutiality," ante, at
3, n. a, and dP:>pitc ~omP ambi~~;nit~· in the Court'~ rPfl'rPuce to "detrimental" and "ha rmful'' a~ oppo:.:C'd to " C'Ia~:;ified " information, ante. at
5, I do not under."taud thP Comt to illl]>ly that the Gowrnment could
ob,tain an injunction aga~n:;t the publication of unclu:;:sificd information,
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or otherwise "identified as harmful." Ibid. The CIA never
attempted to assert such power over Snepp in either of the
contracts he signed; rather, the agency itself limited its censorship power to preventing the disclosure of "classified"
information. Moreover, even if such a wide-ranging prior
restraint would be good national security policy, I would have
great difficulty reconciling it with the demands of the First
Amendment.
The Court also relies to some extent on the Government's
theory at trial that Snepp caused it harm by flouting his prepublication review obligation and thus making it appear that
the CIA was powerless to prevent its agents from publishing
any information they chose to publish, whether classified or
not. The Government theorized that this appearance of
weakness would discourage foreign governments from cooperating with the CIA because of a fear that their secrets might
also be compromised. In support of its position that Snepp's
book had in fact had such an impact, the Government introduced testimony by the Director of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turner. stating that Snepp's book and others like it had
jeopardized the CIA's relationship with foreign intelligence
services by making them unsure of the agency's ability to
maintain confidentiality. Admiral Turner's truncated testimony does not explain. however, whether these unidentified
"other'' books actually contained classified information. 12 If
so, it is difficult to believe that the publication of a book like
12 The District. Judge sustained the Governnwnt's objections to questions concerning the identity of other agents who had published the unauthorized works to which Admiral Turner referred. Tr. 136. However,
Admiral Turner did testify that the harmful materials involved "[p]rimarily the appearance in the United States media of identification of
sources and methods of collecting intelligence . . . . " Tr. 143. This type
of information is rPrtainly cla;;Hifird and i:; :spPcifically the typr of information that Snepp ha:s maintained he did not reveal in Decent Interval.
See, e. g., Snepp's December 7, 1977 interview on the Tomorrow show,
in which he stated: " ... I have made a very determined effort not to
expose sources or methods . . . . " GO\·ernment's Requests for Admissions,
Record Item 19.
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Snepp's, which does not reveal classified information, has
significantly weakened the agency's position. Nor does it
explain whether the unidentified foreign agencies who have
stopped cooperating with the CIA have done so because of
a legitimate fear that secrets will be revealed or because they
merely disagree with our Government's classification policies. 13
In any event. to the extent that the Government seeks to
punish Snepp for the generalized harm he has caused by
failing to submit to prepublication review and to deter others
from following in his footsteps, punitive damages is, as the
Court of Appeals held. clearly the preferable remedy " ... since
a constructive trust depends on the concept of unjust enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment. See D. Dobbs,
Law of Remedies § 3.9 at 205 aud § 4.3 at 246 (1973)." 595
F. 2d, at 937. 11
II
The Court's decision to dispose of this case summarily on
the Government's conditional cross-petition for certiorari is
just as unprecedented as its disposition of the merits.
Snepp filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Fourth
Circuit's decision insofar as it affirmed the entry of an injunction requiring him to submit all future manuscripts for prepublication review and remanded for a determination of
whether punitive damages would be appropriate for his failure
to submit Decent Interval to the agency prior to its publication.
The Government filed a brief in opposition as well as a cross18

Snepp'::; attonwy::; were foreclosrd from asking Admiral Turner whether
particular foreign ::;ource::: had stopped cooprrating with United States'
authorities as a. direct. re:sult of the publimtion of Decent Interval. Tr.
138. Thus, it. is uuclrar whether or why foreign ;.;ources may have rei~cted
unfavorably to it~ publication. However, William E. Colby, the CIA's
former Director, did indicate in his testimony that foreign nations generally
have a strietrr ~:;rerery code than doef: the United States. Tr. 175-176.
14 One of the Court'H ju;:tificationH for its constructive trust remedy is
that "it cannot :;addle the Jormrr agent with exrmplary damages out of all
proportion to his gain." Ante, at 9. This .-olieitude for Snepp's welfare
is rather ironic in view of the dmconian nature of the remedy imposed by
the Court today.
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petition for certiorari; the Government specifically stated 1
however, that it was cross-petitioning only to bring the entire
case before the Court in the event that the Court should decide
to grant Snepp's petition. The Government explained that
"[b] ecause the con tract remedy provided by the court of appeals appears to be sufficient in this case to protect the Agency;s
interest, the government has not independently sought review in
this Court." In its concluding paragraph the Government
stated that "[i]f this Court grants [Snepp's] ... petition for a
writ of certiorari in No. 78-1871, it should also grant this crosspetition. If the petition in No. 78-1871 is denied, this petition should also be denied." Petition, at 5.
Given the Government's position, it would be highly inappropriate, and perhaps even beyond this Court's jurisdiction,
to grant the Government's petition while denying Snepp's.
Yet that is in essence what has been done. 15 The majority
obviously does not believe that Snepp,s claims merit this
Court';, consideration, for they are summarily dismissed in a
footnote . Ante, at 2, n. 3. It is clear that Snepp's petition
would Hot have been granted on its own 'merits.
The Court's opiniM is a good demonstration of why this
Court should not reach out to decide a question not necessarily
presented to it, as it has done in this case. Despite the fact
that the Government has specifically stated that the punitive
damage remedy is "sufficient" to protect its interests, the
Court forges ahead and summarily rejects that remedy on the
grounds (a) that it is too speculative and thus would not
provide the Government with a "reliable deterrent against
similar breaches of security," ante, at 7, and (b) that it might
require the Government to reveal confidential information
in court, that the Government might forgo damages rather
than make such disclosures, and that the Government might
15 I have been unable to discover any previous case in which the Court
has acted as it does today, reaching the merits of a conditional crosspetition de~pite its belief that the petition d:oes not merit granting
certiorari.
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thus be left with "no remedy at all," ante, at 8. It seems
to me that the Court is foreclosed from relying upon either
ground by the Government's acquiescence in the punitive
damage remedy. Moreover, the second rationale 16 is entirely
speculative and, in this case at least, almost certainly wrong.
The Court states that:
"Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an
award of punitive damages might force the Government
to disclose some of the very confidences Snepp promised
to protect."
Yet under the Court of Appeals' opinion the Government
would be entitled to punitive damages simply by proving
that Snepp deceived it into believing that he was going to
comply with his duty to submit the manuscript for prepublication review and that the Government relied on these misrepresentations to its detriment. I fail to see how such a
showing would require the Government to reveal any confidential information or to expose itself to "probing discovery
into the Agency's highly confidential affairs." Ante, at 8.

. III
The uninhibited character of today's exercise in lawmaking
is highlighted by the Court's disregard of two venerable
principles that favor a more conservative approach to this
case.
First, for centuries the English-speaking judiciary refused
to grant equitable relief unless the plaintiff could show that
his remedy at law was inadequate. Without waiting for an
opportunity to appra.ise the adequacy of the punitive damage
remedy in this case, the Court has jumped to the conclusion
that equitable relief is necessary.
Second, and of greater importance, the Court seems unaware
of the fact that its drastic new remedy has been fashioned to
enforce a species of prior restraint on a citizen's right to
16

Which, it ;;houl<i br no1 ed, does not appenr anywhere in the Govern·

ment's 5-page cross-pHition.
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criticize his government. 17 Inherent in this prior restraint is
the risk that the reviewing agency will misuse its authority
to delay the publication of a critical work or to persuade an
author to modify the contents of his work beyond the demands of secrecy. The character of the covenant as a prior
restraint on free speech surely imposes an especially heavy
burden on the censor to justify the remedy it seeks. It
would take more than the Court has written to persuade me
that that burden has been met.
I respectfully dissent.

The mere fact that the agency has the authority to review the text
of a critical book in search of classified information before it is published
is bound to have an inhibiting effect on the author's writing. Moreover,
the right to delay publication until the review is completed is itself a form
of prior restraint that would not be tolerated in other contexts. See,
e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713; Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539. In view of the national interest
in maintaining an effective intelligence service, I am not prepared to say
that the restraint, is nece::;sarily intolerable in this context. I am, however,
prepared to say that, certiorari having been granted, the is::;ue surely
should not be resolved in the absence of fu:ll briefing and argument.
17

